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3Abstract
This thesis explores critically two central notions in the work of Ernesto Laclau: populism
and hegemony. From analytical and strategic points of view, some incongruities stand out.
For example, the conceptual proximity between the two often hinders their respective
explanatory and political purchase. Moreover, Laclau's arguments in support of left-wing
populism appear not to examine in sufficient depth some important issues, such as the
non-necessary but also potentially problematic relationship between populism and
democracy and the question of the leader. In this thesis I examine Laclau's work and
interpretations of his work before offering a fresh interpretation that will both retain and
enhance the distinctiveness and relevance of populism and hegemony for contemporary
debates in socialist thought, and emancipatory theory more generally.
My argument is grounded on both empirical and theoretical sources, relying on a
combination of concept- and case-based interpretive methods. The empirical aspect of the
thesis, which consists of an in-depth study of the trajectory of the Italian Communist Party
and the Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution, is used to problematise the conceptualisation of
populism and hegemony. From a theoretical point of view, I first conduct a geneaological
analysis of the emergence of the two notions in Laclau. I argue that this prompts a kind of
‘return to Antonio Gramsci’, involving the mobilisation of some insights that were
overlooked or progressively neglected in the reading that Laclau made of the Italian
thinker. The strategic upshot of this is that, while it is paramount to think in both populist
and hegemonic terms, the former does not necessarily imply or reduce to the latter, and
vice versa. Finally, I put forward the case for an agonistic, radical-democratic and ethical
left-wing populism, drawing from the contributions of Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Derrida,
William Connolly and Jacques Lacan.
4Introduction
The work of Ernesto Laclau enjoys a good health. It could not be otherwise in an époque in
which the category of populism is all the rage in both academic and non-academic debates,
thanks to the diffusion on a global scale of projects that make political polarisation their
hallmark. The fame of Laclau - especially that achieved in the last few years - is indeed
correlated to the rescuing of a term that is often railed against in political science and
employed as a sort of derogatory term in political practice, but today more than ever is
central in identifying the political watershed in which traditional actors are under the pressure
of a variety of subjects that are, at least at face value, adverse to the status quo. After all,
Laclau's contribution, no matter its increasingly abstract language, has always maintained a
foothold in concrete historical conditions and engaged, if only from the vantage point of
political theory, with real political scenarios.
It would be difficult to negate that we live in an age, especially in the Western world, that is
ripe for populism. The traumatic events that shatter previous certainties and overturn old
social regularities create the perfect conditions for the weakening of traditional political forces
and the emergence of outsiders that take issue with the current system and draw anew the
network of political allegiances. Several factors account for this populist moment. The global
financial crisis of 2007-2008 has ignited and accelerated many developments that have made
the lives of millions more insecure. Despite economic growth figures that have now by and
large returned to positive territory, the long wave of the crisis has left in disarray many
national economies that show signs of difficulty in recuperating the old standards. Heightened
international competition, commercial wars, debt-ridden national accounts and the rise of
new economic giants in the global scenario, rank high among the factors accounting for such
5troubles. However, the long-term rise of economic inequalities both in wealth and income - as
well demonstrated by the recent work of the economist Thomas Piketty - furnish a political
explanation for the crumbling of economic certainties among the great majority of the
population (Piketty, 2014). In Europe, the implementation of severe austerity cuts, the
liberalisation of capital movements with the ensuing processes of de-industrialisation and
financial speculation, the precarisation of the work-force and the rolling back of the welfare
state have, among other things, strongly impacted upon the productive activities and living
standards of much of the European peoples, especially in the south of the continent. In more
general terms, the ordoliberal model and debt culture propelled by Germany have clashed
with the need of many countries to revitalise their aggregate demands. The July 2015 Greek
government-debt crisis has dramatically shown the merciless approach of the economic and
political establishment against a moderately Keynesian course that simply conditioned debt
repayment to the reactivation of the economy.
However, it is not only the economy to be affecting the broad perception that something is no
longer working. The current social malaise is certainly connected but cannot be entirely
conflated with the economic question. The categories of post-politics and post-democracy
have thus made their appearance in order to make sense of the growing distance of the
political establishment from social demands and the lack of responsiveness of the institutions
both at national and supranational level (Crouch, 2004; Mouffe, 2005). It is impossible not to
note that the hiatus between governors and governed is widening rapidly and that meaningful
ideologies are progressively disappearing from the political arena. The economic and social
policies offered by different traditional political forces are now almost indistinguishable:
behind the old political labels we no longer find different weltanschauung, different societal
projects, but a brisk convergence towards the political centre. Moreover, democratic
6deliberation seems to be ever more manipulated by economic actors, with the progressive
replacement of the figure of the citizen - one endowed with rights and conceptualised as an
active participant of the political, social and economic life of a nation - with that of the
consumer - a mere passive recipient of market forces with little impact or interest in political
processes. At the same time, despite liberal-democratic institutions maintaining a facade of
regular functioning, the capacity of the elites to influence policy-making has considerably
increased. This is ever truer for the European institutions whose decisions are for the most
part beyond any type of popular accountability. It is not surprising then that as a result,
'citizens experience the governmental norms that rule contemporary society as externally
binding but not internally compelling' (Critchley, 2007: 7). Other types of dislocatory
experiences have also hit Western populations. Among these, it is worth mentioning the
Islamic terrorist attacks and the migrant crisis that have affected Europe over the last few
years. These phenomena have attracted much attention and sparked bitter polemics in the
old continent, fuelling feelings of insecurity and heightening social tensions.
The answer to all these social, political and economic transformations has been, as we have
seen, populism. However, a great deal of the populist expressions that have so far made their
emergence are oriented to the right. As well captured by Laclau, 'when people are confronted
with radical anomie, the need for some kind of order becomes more important than the actual
ontic order that brings it about' (OPR: 88). It is to be admitted that it has mostly been
reactionary forces that have furnished the horizon of a potential new order in replacement of
the old one, with the left lagging much behind. The election of Donald Trump in the United
States, the rise of Marine Le Pen's Front National in France and of Matteo Salvini's League in
Italy, the undisputed rule of Viktor Orban in Hungary along with the other right-populists of
the Visegrád group in Central Europe and the recent success of the Austrian People's Party,
7testify that much of the contemporary malcontent has taken the form of a reactionary and
often xenophobic contestation to the status quo. The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom could
also be read through a similar lens.
Yet, in the theory of Laclau, populism is not necessarily a right-wing phenomenon or a
'degraded form of democracy' (Müller, 2016: 6), as much of the conventional narrative has it.
More importantly, populism takes up a double status that it is vital to clarify from the very
outset: following the transformation that Antonio Gramsci operated with the notion of
hegemony, populism is at the same time an analytical instrument which puts at our disposal a
privileged interpretive prism to understand certain political phenomena, if not politics as such,
as well as a strategic proposal for the political part in which Laclau identified himself. In other
words, Laclau saw populism as a logic towards which the left had to tend to. However, if up to
recently left-wing populism had been a ‘natural’ occurrence which Laclau welcomed and
which his privileged theoretical framework was able to comprehend in a systematic manner,
things soon started to evolve. In the so called Latin American ‘pink tide’ of progressive
populist governments, where national-popular movements conquered power by putting
together unmet demands and adopting a polarising rhetoric, Laclau's theory played an
explicative and, to an extent, celebratory role. Elsewhere though, Laclau's books later turned
into some sort of strategic manuals. As one of Laclau's disciples aptly notes: 'in South America,
Laclau's theory was a tool to explain what was happening. In Europe too, although in a
different way: it seemed to contribute to the very constitution of the political movements that
can make it to the state' (Schuliaquer, 2016).
In this sense, the explicit reference of the Spanish political force Podemos to the work of the
Argentinian political theorist in the forging of its own political discourse (Iglesias, 2015;
8Errejón and Mouffe, 2016) is key to highlighting the strategic nature of Laclau's thought and
contributes to projecting his figure beyond the graduate classrooms to which it had hitherto
largely been confined. The upsurge of Podemos has also occurred in parallel with the
emergence of other relatively successful European left-wing experiences where Laclau's
footprint or interpretation seems to have some bearing: Alexis Tsipras' Syriza in Greece (at
least until the 'political normalisation' that took place following the already mentioned 2015
crisis) (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Howarth, 2015), Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France
Insoumise (Marlière, 2017; Besse Desmoulières, 2017) and even the Labour Party under
Jeremy Corbyn (Mouffe, 2018). The campaign launched by Bernie Sanders for the 2016
Democratic nomination in the United States can also be legitimately included in this group
(Fraser, 2017; Fraser 2017b).
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm for left-wing populism is not unanimous. Much of the left
remains sceptical towards the populist route. For some, the left should not 'take the masks of
others to try to break through with the oxymoron of a red populism' (Prospero, 2018);
according to others, populism is a form of 'passive revolution' as described by Gramsci, 'a
process controlled from above; a process where the modification of the domination system
does not translate into a change in the composition of the dominant block' (Modonesi, 2017:
135). The bulk of the left may well have surpassed some of the limits envisaged by Laclau and
Mouffe in the 1980s, such as the ontological privilege attributed to the traditional working
class and the fixation with the Revolution as the 'founding moment in the transition from one
type of society to another' (HSS: 2), but populism remains something perceived as too distant
from its own political culture; at most, as a recent article published by the Marxist editorial
revelation of the last few years, The Jacobin, reads, 'it might be possible to embrace some of
Mouffe and Laclau's philosophical insights — the conflictual nature of democracy, the role of
9hegemonic formations in politics — without embracing populism and all its oversights'
(Hamburger, 2018).
Yet, where the left has preferred to stay away from populism, it seems to be hopelessly
grappling with its own identity and remains far from showing any political efficacy. Prima
facie, what seems to be making a difference is the willingness of the left populist actors to
articulate demands, symbols and grievances of current purchase rather than asking for
adhesion to a defunct identity. In Italy, possibly the most paradigmatic example in this sense,
the foregrounding of the leftist pride and all its correlated liturgies at the expense of any
connection with the contemporary common sense has taken its toll. The recent collapse of
the traditional leftist forces at the 2018 general elections is only the final manifestation of the
idea that collective identities cannot be simply taken for granted but are constantly recreated
by reference to the contingent ‘material’ that society offers. Laclau had already understood
this and put it straightforwardly in a 1988 interview published in New Reflections on the
Revolution of Our Time (NR):
The left-right distinction […] was a clear political frontier in the first half of the nineteenth century and
was, in one way or another, reconstituted on new grounds throughout the whole of the following
century. But […] its political usefulness has done nothing but decline since the period of anti-fascist
struggle and Cold War. The reason for this decline is clear. The usefulness of political categories can only
be maintained if they manage to constitute polar political imaginaries, and that depends on whether
they are seen as the natural surface on which every new social and political demand can be inscribed.
Their erosion begins when this agglutinative capacity declines and when a range of inscription surfaces
emerge that contradict each other (NR: 227).
Less well-known among the public at large however are Laclau's take on hegemony and, more
generally, the overall theoretical edifice that he has given birth to. As a result, while populism
is surely the Laclauian term that exerts more attraction in contemporary debates and can be
said, in the latest version Laclau offers, to be the synthesis - and to some extent the
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formalisation - of his intellectual path, this emphasis may represent a limit insofar as it
represents a dangerous screen that obliterates the rest of the story. Before becoming 'the
theorist of left-wing populism' (Brading, 2014; Islam, 2015), Laclau has created a complex
theoretical system - known as the ‘Essex School of discourse theory’, through which he has
advanced a de-essentialisation of socialist thought and produced a theory of signification,
taking his cues, while concomitantly taking a distance, from the Gramscian intuitions on the
concept of hegemony. It is not by chance that others prefer to remember Laclau as the
'theorist of hegemony' (Errejón, 2014; Kioupkiolis, 2014: 254). It is precisely the radicalisation
of this category that permits him to overcome the Pillars of Hercules of Marxism or, in his own
words, to hold on to one of the best fragments amid its deflagration (NR: 201). Differently
from other authors who reject being straight-forwardly labelled then, Laclau proudly
proclaims himself as post-Marxist, and it is the novel and original re-elaboration of populism
and hegemony at the forefront of his political ontology - and, as we shall see, political strategy
- that is offered in the place of Marxist social ontology.
My first, if only transient contacts with Laclau's work happened as I was a BA student at SOAS
in London and then a MPhil candidate in Latin American Studies at the University of Oxford.
Little did I understand at first, through the complex jargon in which his concepts were
phrased. Yet the sensation was that in Laclau the two different ‘political worlds’ in which I had
been active merged in one. In my teenage years spent in Italy, I had been involved in politics
as a militant of one of the parties that emerged following the deflagration of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI). The late 1990s and early 2000s were a period in which the old
theoretical debates were still ongoing and talk of hegemony remained pervasive. It was in that
environment that I received my first political christening: the figure of Gramsci fared high in
the discussions and the memories of the PCI, as exerting a diffuse ‘cultural hegemony’ in the
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country, were still extremely vivid. Political struggle was first and foremost a pedagogical
struggle, a way to educate the citizenry, a battle for social justice that had to be fought at all
levels. However, by the time I was politically active what was missing was the stunning
electoral results of the past, the big and well-respected community that the party had
managed to construe, the well-attended summer parties that the PCI previously organised.
What I was witnessing was the fading of a tradition that had intersected so deeply with Italian
recent history and that had strongly impacted upon national politics; the tradition of the
biggest communist party of the West. Over the following years, my brief returns to Italy
confirmed that that world had no longer the strength to become once again what it used to
be. Melancholy of the past splendour had taken the place of politics proper.
If defeat became the word that characterised the Italian left in the years of my upbringing,
victory was the one that distinguished the other ‘political world’ that, thanks to the
vicissitudes of life, I encountered later: South America. In Ecuador, where I spent a number of
years and got involved with the government of the Citizens' Revolution led by Rafael Correa,
the picture I found myself immersed in was completely different. Along with Hugo Chávez'
Venezuela, Evo Morales' Bolivia, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner's Argentina, Ecuador was part of
a series of progressively-minded and national-popular governments that put an end to
neoliberal policies and gave life to a heterodox course. Instead of hegemony, it was populism
which here occupied the centrality of the discussions. More specifically, it was the puzzling
situation of a left that managed to win and arouse the passion of the masses as opposed to a
gloomy, unconvincing and ever more marginal left in Europe that induced me to go back to
Laclau and look for answers there. My formal entry to Laclau's theory has thus been primarily
political and dictated by the necessity to account for such differences and find ways to
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integrate the hegemony approach that I had, if only in its declining stage, learnt about in Italy,
with the populist one which I lived through in Ecuador.
As time went by, the Latin American populist governments experienced serious difficulties and
showed severe limitations. Their rule not only presented some problematic aspects, insofar as
the democratic question is concerned, but displayed a scarce capacity to institutionalise their
electoral successes and irradiate a different political culture in their countries at large. In
Ecuador, the Citizens' Revolution showed a blatant reluctance to take its initially bold
progressive moves much further. Even more importantly, the victory of Correa's designated
successor in 2016 was followed by the immediate distancing of the latter from the former,
thus evidencing a stark discontinuity that put under discussion the whole rule of Correa. But,
as hinted, such problems do not pertain only to Ecuador. In this sense, the widespread
difficulty displayed by left populisms to engender sustainable projects and to think beyond the
electoral dimension begs a detailed study. This study is all the more necessary if one considers
that in Laclau we find a conceptual proximity between the two notions that runs the risk of
limiting the analysis of concrete situations and hampering the elaboration of sounder
emancipatory strategies. While both have to do with the construction and stabilisation of
meaning, is it not the case that populism and hegemony designate two entirely different
things? Is it not the case that emancipation should be thought both populistically and
hegemonically, maintaining them as two different and yet indispensable horizons in order to
guide our action? Is it not the case that left populism has in certain instances given rise to a
lessening of democratic deliberation and fallen victim to the cult of the personality of the
leader? Possibly, the work of Laclau on this last question has been too lenient.
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With this in mind, this work sets itself the task to analyse the ways in which populism and
hegemony are thought in Laclau throughout his corpus and pinpoint some of the limitations
that emerge through both a theoretical and empirical reading. As for the empirical dimension,
the cases used are the trajectory of the PCI from 1944 to 1984 and the Citizens' Revolution
under Correa and its aftermath from 2006 to 2018. The work is thusly divided: in chapter 1, I
will provide a literature review of some of the most renown interpretations of populism and
hegemony, along with a presentation of the approach and methodologies used for the
analysis in the rest of the work. Subsequently, I will also include a preliminary introduction to
the empirical cases. Chapter 2 will feature a genealogical reading of how the notions of
populism and hegemony have evolved in Laclau's work. In chapters 3 and 4, I will explore the
PCI and Citizens' Revolution cases respectively. Chapter 5 will attempt to provide an answer to
all the theoretical puzzles raised in chapter 2, reinforced by the empirical cases. By way of a
return to the work of Antonio Gramsci, I will furnish a re-elaboration of the notions of
populism and hegemony whilst maintaining intact the philosophical thrust of Laclau's
theoretical edifice. And finally, through the foregrounding of the contribution of Chantal
Mouffe, Jacques Derrida, William Connolly and Jacques Lacan, I will argue for the adoption of
an agonistic, radical-democratic and ethical left-wing populism. My conclusion will then
summarise the most significant theses put forward in this work.
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Chapter 1: Literature review, research methods and approach
This chapter lays out the contours of the research more clearly. Specifically, it presents the
strands of literature concerned with the notions at stake here - namely populism and
hegemony -, sets out the research strategy and methods that will be employed, and
introduces the basic historical facts concerning the PCI and the Ecuadorian Citizens'
Revolution. The following pages are then aimed at clarifying for the reader the terrain of
intervention of this work, situating it among the different - and often incommunicado -
strands of literature that it takes issue with. Finally, the chapter lays the cards on the table
insofar as the intellectual and methodological approaches are concerned - approaches that
are not intended here as a straightjacket, but as a starting point that enables the opening up
of new theoretical horizons.
The chapter is divided in two broad parts, organised in turn into different sections. The first
part consists in two sections, each of which consisting of a survey of what different authors
have said on the questions of populism and hegemony respectively, with a critical evaluation
of such takes. As for populism, some space is dedicated to the thorny question of its
relationship with democracy. These conceptual literature reviews are not to be considered as
comprehensive, but rather as an attempt to present a broad overview of how the two notions
have been defined, treated and operationalised in different accounts, including in the work of
Laclau, which will be the focus of a more in-depth analysis - both theoretical and empirical - in
the following chapters.
The second part is concerned with the research strategy. Here, the first section ‘Populism and
hegemony combined’ specifies the reasons why populism and hegemony ought to be
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analysed in tandem. The second section ‘Foucault and Skinner to unravel the theoretical
tangle’ introduces the theoretical methodological orientation derived from the contribution of
Michel Foucault and Quentin Skinner, which will be used in order to re- and de-construct the
development of the notions of populism and hegemony in Laclau's corpus. Thirdly, in ‘The
case for a case-based strategy: retroduction at play’, it is advanced how the case studies are
to be used in the general economy of this work. In applying the notion of retroduction to the
social sciences, it is claimed that empirical investigations should be understood as integral to
the development of an ontology, rather than as findings meant to fit a pre-established
ontology. Borrowing from the repertoire of the Essex school of Discourse Theory, the fourth
section ‘A note on empirical methods and corpus’ introduces how exactly the empirical work
will be conducted, while throwing light in parallel on the questions of normativity and ethics
in relation to the empirical research. The fifth section ‘Why these cases’ establishes the
reasons for picking precisely the cases of the PCI and the Citizen's Revolution, explains how
they relate to the notion of populism and hegemony and furnishes a few contextualising
elements by reference to some relevant interpretative works.
A conceptual literature review: populism
The term populism has become increasingly widespread as commentators and intellectuals
alike have either employed it in the attempt to make sense of specific political phenomena or
engaged in discussions over its nature. To the layman however, the term remains elusive and
porous as different practitioners attribute different features and meanings to it, with the
tendency among journalists and politicians to employ it as a derogatory word to discredit
certain political forces or leaders. Despite certain definitional agreements having been
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reached, contention among populism scholars has persisted and intensified in the relevant
literature with no hint as to the possibility of this coming to an end in the near future. Of
course, such controversies do not limit themselves to what populism is about, but crucially
involve theoretical presuppositions (often sidelined, if not utterly overlooked by some) and
methodological repercussions for the conduct of empirical research.
Far from conducting an in-depth survey on the subject, this brief section intends to introduce
the main contemporary positions in the literature. Four main strands that define populism as
ideology, strategy, style and political logic can be devised, with the latter two sharing
particularly strong affinities to the point of being sometimes conflated into the same category,
often under the name of discourse (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013: 17). As it will be made
clearer below, it is also important to note that the first three strands are not uniform ‘schools’
of thought on populism but constitute categories in which only loosely correlated accounts
are clustered together.
The ideological approach centres around the work of Cas Mudde, who defines populism as a:
thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004: 543).
This move permits Mudde to break away from many past accounts that attributed fixed
normative features or particular policies to populism, and to conceptualise it as a
phenomenon that can occur across the political spectrum, across continents and across time.
In this sense, populism is seen as necessarily parasitic upon some more structured ideology,
thus freeing it from any static connotation - often the upshot of a regional bias in a specific
period - and making comparisons between different contexts possible (Moffitt and Tormey,
2014: 383). Nevertheless, one cannot but remain unconvinced by the underlying theoretical
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operation that accompanies Mudde's definition. The notion of ideology that Mudde employs
is explicitly borrowed from the morphological approach set out by Michael Freeden, whereby
ideology is treated as a bundle of loosely interrelated ideas. More specifically:
A thin ideology is one that, like mainstream ideologies, has an identiﬁable morphology but, unlike
mainstream ideologies, a restricted one. It severs itself from wider ideational contexts by deliberately
removing or replacing many concepts we would expect an ideology to include. It does not embrace the
full range of questions that the macro-ideologies do, and is limited in its ambitions and scope (Freeden,
2003: 98).
But, as also noted by Moffitt and Tormey, populism cannot fall under this rubric as it lacks any
sort of 'ideational density' of its own, unlike other thin ideologies such as feminism and
ecologism, which are still endowed with a distinguishable conceptual core (Moffitt and
Tormey, 2014: 383). Populism blatantly lacks even the smallest normative coordinate and any
attempt to find one is typically overwhelmed, as Laclau would put it, by an avalanche of
exceptions (OPR: 117). This way of conceptualising populism has repercussions not only in
terms of a deficient definition, but extends, as hinted above, to theory and method. Insofar as
the former is concerned, if populism is treated as an ideology, it follows that a political subject
is or is not populist, giving way to a rigid dichotomy that does not admit any other in-between
possibility. Populism is thus treated as a property inherent to a particular subject, thereby
making it difficult to account for potential variation. The subject is then endowed or not with a
populist essence, making diachronic changes and synchronic nuances difficult to grasp. The
impact upon the way to go about empirical research is no less equivocal: defining populism in
ideational terms means focusing primarily on programmatic statements and party literature
(Gidron and Bonikoski, 2014: 7), be it through traditional qualitative content analysis (Mudde,
2007; Arter, 2011) or, more recently, through computational text analysis (Rooduijn and
Pauwels, 2011). Such a restriction of the object of inquiry however, leaves out much of the
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rich phenomenology that is intuitively associated with populism and seems to be too narrow
to say anything significant about the populist character of a political subject. Official party
literature is often too arid and sometimes even at odds with other meaningful aspects of a
political practice. This single-minded focus thus seems to lead astray both an understanding of
populism itself and an ability to make comparisons across different cases.
Another approach tries to come up with a minimal definition, so as to encompass populist
phenomena occurring in different regions and permit comparison, is that which defines
populism as a strategy. It is Kurt Weyland's work on Latin American politics which has set the
pace here. In distancing himself from radial and cumulative conceptualisations of populism
that take into consideration many factors and provide 'gradations' of populism, for the sake of
clarity he prefers to concentrate on a single domain, that of politics (Weyland, 2001: 10-11). In
particular:
populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises
government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of
mostly unorganized followers. This direct, quasi-personal relationship bypasses established intermediary
organizations or deinstitutionalizes and subordinates them to the leader's personal will (Weyland, 2001:
14).
The chief characteristic then is only one aspect pertaining to the political domain, i.e. the
relationship existing between a leader and their constituents, thereby conflating the meaning
of populism to that of leaderism, caesarism and the elimination of the intermediate social
bodies. It should be noted that the utility of a concept in casting light upon a political
phenomenon is strongly reduced when other, older terms already occupy the same notional
territory. The reluctance to allow for a non-binary conception of populism is also clear here: in
the search for clarity, excessive simplification is just around the corner. As Roberts notes,
'[t]he organization of populist constituencies can be durable or fleeting, formal or informal,
19
with variation both across cases and over time within the same case' (Roberts, 2006: 130).
While subscribing to the thesis that populism should be located within the realm of strategy
and organisation, to overcome such difficulties Roberts suggests disaggregating the concept
into different organisational manifestations (Roberts, 2006: 128). By devising two major areas
of inquiry - civil society and party system's organisation -, he introduces a taxonomy of
populism with four distinct subtypes: organic, labour, partisan and electoral. As succinctly
summarised by Gidron and Bonikowski:
High partisan and civil society organization leads to organic populism; high partisan organization and low
civil society organizations gives rise to partisan populism; high civil society organization and weak
partisan structures is associated with labor populism; and low levels of organization in both dimensions
is linked with electoral populism (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2014: 12).
While this seems to be a more promising path that avoids treating populism as a monolith by
way of differentiating a number of varieties, the definition is still somewhat wanting. In an
assessment of the 2000s populist wave in Latin America, populism is defined as 'the top-down
political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite
groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or ‘the people.’' (Roberts, 2010: 5). The admittedly
mass character of mobilisation however does not quite accord with the insistence on the top-
down approach. What is utterly missed here is the relational character between a populist
actor and its followers. If we admit that all politics is always already an exercise of
representation and that the will of the people is not just there ready to be implemented, then
all political actors are to an extent characterised by a top-down approach. As Laclau clarifies in
developing a Freudian argument:
whenever the need for a strong leader meets the individual only halfway, the leader will be accepted
only if he presents, in a particularly marked fashion, features that he shares with those he is supposed to
lead. In other words: the led are, to a considerable extent, in pari materia with the leader — that is to
say, the latter becomes primus inter pares (OPR: 59).
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Three more elements need to be considered. Firstly, an excessive focus on the strong leader
betrays the Latin etymology of the word populi, which means people. Alan Knight is certainly
right here in reminding us that 'the etymology is sufficiently clear, recent and compelling for
us to take it seriously' (Knight, 1998: 226). In fact, populism needs not to be necessarily
accompanied by the presence of a strong leader, but can accommodate different
organisational features, as Roberts himself admits in his text. Whether the leader is a strong
one, or there exist more leaders, or the populist subject remains substantially leaderless is
entirely contingent.1 Despite being a recurrent feature of the Latin American populist
experiences, the prominence of strong leaders may be better explained by reference to other
features relating to the local political culture, such as caudillismo, on which more will be said
in the Ecuadorian case study. Secondly, the people is not necessarily ill-defined in a populist
discourse, but can on the contrary be extremely well-defined by reference to specific social
sectors that are appealed in the call against a political adversary. While the people is in it and
of itself vague, and can in theory apply to anybody, such a confusion is dispelled in singular
populist instantiations where the contours between those who are deemed to be part of the
people and those who are not are particularly stark. As we shall see in the empirical cases, the
definition of who is in and who is out acquires a certain precision when a particular populist
discourse is deployed. Thirdly and most importantly, resorting to a populist taxonomy is as
problematic as an exclusively binary classification from the point of view adopted here. The
attempt to treat political and social phenomena by forcefully inscribing them into rigid
categories can at best be a descriptive exercise that approximates some of their coordinates,
but hardly explains them. This formalism of box-like categories, let alone its single-minded
1 In this regard, Knight bluntly points out that: '[a]ll political movements of any scale or duration have
involved some kind of functional network, if not hierarchy, which necessarily transcends a simple
leader/mass dichotomy' (Knight, 1998: 228).
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focus on political organisation that leaves out many other spheres that concur to create the
populist phenomenology, runs the risk of missing the nuances of the concrete cases and of
failing to account for their fluidity.
Another strand is that which proposes to identify populism with style, or alternatively, with
rhetoric or discursive frames (for the latter see Aslanidis, 2015). Advocates of such a definition
are Alan Knight (1998), Pierre-André Taguieff (1995), Michael Kazin (1998), Margaret Canovan
(1981; 1999) and Carlos de la Torre (2000). As put by de la Torre:
I see populism as a style of political mobilization based on strong rhetorical appeals to the people and
crowd action on behalf of a leader. […] It is a rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical
struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy. Populist discourse transmutes politics into a
struggle for moral values without accepting compromise or dialogue with the opponent. Populist politics
is based on crowd action (de la Torre, 2000: 4).
The style to which adherents of this strand refer to has to do with the simplicity and
directness of the appeals of the populists, as well as the policy solutions that are offered
(Canovan, 1999: 5). What is particularly remarkable about this approach is the introduction of
degreeism, that is the recognition that political subjects can display different levels of
populism. As aptly put by Canovan: '[s]ince the advent of mass political mobilisation, virtually
any modern regime, however repressive, needs to have some populist elements, even if these
do not go beyond rhetoric' (Canovan, 1981: 148). This has particularly positive theoretical and
methodological repercussions: 'considering populism as a discursive style lends itself to its
operationalisation as a gradational property of specific instances of political expression rather
than an essential attribute of political parties or political leaders' (Gidron and Bonikowski,
2014: 8). Other issues, however, remain. One of them is the persistence of the focus on the
leader, still treated as a necessary ingredient of populism. Another is the association of
populism with mobilisation, which seems to be unwarranted. Indeed, it is often the case that
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'[t]he people emerge as the source of legitimacy for the populist movement without the
necessity of political action' (Westlind 1996: 104). Although frequent, these attributes are not
strictly inherent to populism and their presence impedes reaching a minimal definition, thus
exposing it to a number of exceptions. Francisco Panizza does well in highlighting that
populism can contingently articulate with other logics, thereby making it necessary to
evaluate such features on a case-by-case basis (Panizza, 2008: 92). The attempt to minimise
the definition of populism to an us-them differentiation is thus undermined by the
attachment of likely but not strictly necessary features of populism. Another example in this
sense is the rigorous correspondence drawn between the ‘them’ and the elites. Even though it
is arguable that the elites do represent the adversary of the people in the majority of populist
discourses, some of them, typically the exclusionary types of populism, identify the ‘them’ as
some sort of external intruder, typically immigrants (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013: 160).
While the majority of scholars pertaining to this approach maintain a rather classic focus on
rhetorical and communicative features, others have introduced more innovative tools. Moffitt
and Tormey, for example, speak of populism in terms of political style by bringing in
interesting insights on the performative and relational elements inherent to populism. For
them, 'populism is a style that is performed and enacted' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 388),
with the performance of the populists being one that does not simply 'capture' an 'already
existing people', but rather one with perlocutionary effects that 'produce what they [the
populists] claim to represent by covering up the aesthetic gap and claiming to have direct,
immediate contact with ‘the people’' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 389). In this way, the authors
stress the structuring character of representation. This aspect is further reinforced through
their attention to the relational features of populism, whereby claim-making is analysed in
rapport with the receivers' reaction of such claims (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 388). As a
23
result of this, they import conceptual tools from dramaturgical approaches to politics, which
consistently enrich the methodology employed to make sense of populism (Moffitt and
Tormey, 2014: 389-390). The refinements do not end here but extend to the recognition that
populists are not always against the elites, as the target may sometimes be other groups in
society (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 391). Other novelties are of more dubious validity instead.
Their emphasis on the stylised character of contemporary politics goes along with the
recognition of the diminished legitimacy of ideological and class politics, and the declining
reputation of mainstream political parties (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 387-388). Such remarks
lead the authors to affirm that 'the political style approach is not rooted in a set ahistorical
ontological framework as such, but instead is sensitive to the contours of the contemporary
political landscape' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 390). In principle, this move rules out the
possibility of applying the category of populism to political subjects of the past: the Russian
Narodniks, the People's Party in the United States and Argentinean Peronism - examples of
which there is a broad consensus across the various approaches that can be defined as
populist - all of a sudden find themselves outside the applicability of this category.
But how exactly do we draw a line between periods in which populism can be deployed and
periods in which it cannot be deployed as a valid instrument of analysis? What is the amount
of ‘stylisation’ that permits us to employ the notion of populism? While the march of time
certainly imposes an enlargement of the analytical tools to make sense of concrete situations,
some categories are more fundamental than others as they pertain to the dimension of the
political, that is the underlying premises inherent to social life and more specifically to the
'ever present possibility of the friend-and-enemy groupings, regardless of the aspects which
this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics and economics' (Schmitt, 2007: 35). Thus, the
position of Moffitt and Torney - and that of Canovan whereby populism is associated with
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mass mobilisation, for that matter - unwarrantedly discards the intuition that populism could
tell us not only something about the actual confrontations between political subjects, but,
regardless of space and time, about the ontological characteristics of the political.
Methodologically, rejecting their restriction of populism to contemporaneity also means
maintaining the possibility - explored in this work - of comparing and contrasting, with due
precautions, political subjects that have made their appearance in very different epochs.
The fourth strand treats populism as a political logic and refers exclusively to the approach of
Ernesto Laclau. Although the notion of populism as intended by Laclau is treated at greater
length in the next chapter, a few general remarks will be introduced here. It is worth stressing
once more that the boundaries between populism as style and populism as a political logic are
taken by some to be quite loose, to the point that the two approaches are at times taken as
one under the rubric of style, or that of discourse (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2014: 10, 17). Most
especially, this is the case when discourse is treated in the narrow sense of linguistic
discourse. In the account provided by Ernesto Laclau however, the meaning of discourse is
much wider. To begin with, for Laclau discourse is 'a meaningful totality which transcends the
distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic' (Laclau, 1993: 545). As put
elsewhere, '[t]he notion of discourse could, if you prefer, be replaced by that of practice'
(Laclau, 1998: 9). This entails that, methodologically, all manifestations of a political actor, be
them linguistic or not, are deemed relevant and worth to be analysed when characterising the
actor itself. In terms of definition then,
we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject,
and the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is […] the building up of an internal frontier
dividing the social space into two camps. But the logic of that division is dictated […] by the creation of
an equivalential chain between a series of social demands in which the equivalential moment prevails
over the differential nature of the demands. Finally, the equivalential chain cannot be the result of a
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purely fortuitous coincidence, but has to be consolidated through the emergence of an element which
gives coherence to the chain by signifying it as a totality. This element is what we have called empty
signifier (Laclau, 2005b: 43-44).
Although some of the intricacies inherent to such a complex definition will be dispelled only in
the next chapter, let us unpack some of the main coordinates. Along with the other
approaches, populism is about the advancement of an us-them differentiation. Accordingly,
such a differentiation is obtained by articulating, i.e. linking together, a number of unsatisfied
social demands on the basis of their common rejection of an adversary. In other words, this
unification is made possible by the power holders or some other adversary systematically
frustrating such demands. Of all these elements, one of them, which Laclau calls the empty
signifier, plays a structuring role that confers homogeneity to the new camp, that is to the
new people that is thereby formed by the coalescing of these demands. More fundamentally,
Laclau sees populism as a political logic by picturing it as a form of institution of the social,
counterposed by its opposite, that is institutionalism (OPR: 117). Drawing from rhetoric,
populism is about the intensification of the equivalential moment by which a plurality of
demands is rendered analogous with respect to a common adversary. Oppositely,
institutionalism entails the foregrounding of difference, by which demands are kept apart
from each other and where 'the limits of the discursive formation coincide with the limits of
the community' (OPR: 81) - the very antithesis of the Manichean antagonism predicated by
populism. However, populism and institutionalism are only to be seen as two unreachable
reductio ad absurdum, two extreme poles that draw a continuum along which actual political
practices find a dialectic and unstable compromise (Laclau, 2005b: 45-46).
Let us now bring to the fore the points of friction between the account of Laclau and the other
approaches. Unlike the ideological approach defended by Mudde, for Laclau the contents of a
populist practice are irrelevant, making it clear that populism is rather a political logic that
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tells us about the form and not about the ideology, no matters how thinly defined, of the
political actor under scrutiny. In a far-reaching conclusion, Laclau goes as far as to claim that:
If populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space, a choice at the
crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with
politics? The answer can only be affirmative (Laclau, 2005b: 47).
This sentence reaffirms the distance from any attempt to pin down an ideological core of
populism, collocating the notion at the ontological level. This puts us in a position to discern
yet another difference that Laclau maintains, both with the ideological and the strategic
approaches this time. Unlike Mudde, Weyland and Roberts, Laclau indeed conceptualises
populism as a gradational property. Along with the proponents of the style approach, it is held
that populism is not about a binary choice. In other words, the level of populism displayed by
a particular political subject can vary across time; not a taxonomy then, but 'an area of
variations within which a plurality of phenomena could be inscribed' thus making comparisons
possible (OPR: 175). Despite being often clustered together, conspicuous differences also exist
with respect to the style approach. This is mostly evident with the theses of Moffitt and
Tormey, and to an extent with that of Canovan: for Laclau populism is not a strictly
contemporary phenomenon but an ontological category as it aims at pinpointing the formal
characteristics of the political game as such, which are independent of the ontic, that is the
actual, empirical contents of a particular practice or actor. This formalism also targets the
definition of populism provided by de la Torre, for whom the political opponent of populists is
defined in terms of the oligarchy (de la Torre, 2000: 4). While this may often be the case,
Laclau prefers to speak of the ‘them’ in abstract terms, recognising that in principle it can take
up different faces, as it becomes evident in the cases of exclusionary types of populism that,
as seen before, make immigrants the chief adversary of the ‘people’. Finally, populism as a
political logic refrains from necessarily attributing a prominent role to the leader. In this
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sense, unlike all other approaches, the coherence of a populist discourse is not given by a
leader, but by an empty signifier that may or may not be a leader.
As we can see, Laclau divests populism from unnecessary features and, as a result, achieves a
minimal definition of populism much better than others. This renders populism a cornerstone
in the general theory of politics that he advances. As it will be further detailed in the next
chapter, he even ties populism to a political project, where the focus on the leader resurfaces,
although with a shift in emphasis. In this regard, certain kinds of problems emerge. But there
is another related and more general aspect of Laclau's theory of populism which is susceptible
to criticism. The relationship that populism maintains with democracy remains in fact
undertheorised in his account. This will also be a theme to be dealt with under a critical light.
For now, it is time to turn to a brief survey on the matter.
The existing accounts span from conceptualisations that see populism as intrinsically inimical
to democracy to those that rescue some of its aspects and provide a more balanced account.
On the former side of the spectrum, Stefano Bartolini treats populism in Europe as a 'virus'
infecting the party system and spreading its 'epidemic effects' (Bartolini in Gidron and
Bonikowski, 2013: 17-18). In criticising Laclau, Slavoj Žižek is equally pessimistic on the
prospects of populism: 'insofar as, in its very notion, it displaces the immanent social
antagonism into the antagonism between the unified people and its external enemy, it
harbors in the last instance a long-term protofascist tendency' (Žižek, 2006: 557). In a rather
unhelpful characterisation of populism, Nadia Urbinati adds her voice to the chorus by
claiming that populism in Europe has only been about the creation of new oligarchies who
take advantage of popular dissatisfaction (Urbinati, 1998: 113). In particular, she sees
populism as having a positive impact only in those societies that are not yet democratic;
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otherwise, its unmediated approach to politics and its allergy towards institutions are
conducive to a despotic attitude with negative repercussions for democracy (Urbinati, 1998:
116-117).
As anticipated, other authors prefer a more nuanced stance. Kaltwasser and Mudde hold that
the implications of populism for democracy vary consistently (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012).
Populism is not necessarily anti-democratic: '[w]hile it is true that the solutions offered by
populist forces to those democratic dilemmas are controversial, the question about the
impact of populism on democracy should be answered ﬁrst and foremost empirically rather
than based on normative and/or theoretical arguments' (Kaltwasser, 2013: 483). Even
recognising the oft problematic relationship with the liberal component of liberal-democracy;
the representation and mobilisation of marginalised groups, increased accountability and
revitalisation of public opinion and social movements, are listed among the positive effects
that populism may engender (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 21). In this view, populism
becomes 'both a corrective and a threat to democracy' (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 16).
Within the realm of political theory, a similar position is expressed through particularly well
elaborated lines of reasoning by Margaret Canovan and Benjamin Arditi. Drawing on the work
of Michael Oakeshott who distinguished between a politics of faith and a politics of
scepticism, Canovan claims that democracy presents two different and yet interdependent
faces: one redemptive - amounting to the ideal of popular power and sovereignty - the other,
pragmatic - consisting in the necessity of maintaining peace and stability through institutions
(Canovan, 1999: 9-10). It is when a too wider gap opens up between the two, i.e. when
democracy excessively slides towards its pragmatic side at the expense of the redemptive
one, that an opportunity arises for populism to appear. In this sense, Canovan argues that
populism follows democracy like a shadow (Canovan, 1999: 10). Arditi complements
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Canovan's take by suggesting that populism is better understood in terms of a spectre rather
than a shadow. Accordingly, the notion of spectre upheld by Jacques Derrida suggests both
visitation and something that can haunt us (Arditi, 2004: 141). The spectral logic, in other
words, allows for the latent possibility of populism that, while accompanying democracy, may
also threaten it. But there is another inbuilt connotation to which Arditi only hints in his
article, but that he does not quite develop when mentioning the notion of spectre. As he puts
it:
if the gap is a structural feature, there is no reason to think that it will father only populist offspring.
Many other movements could arise there too, so instead of being the condition of possibility of
populism it turns out to be the space of appearance of the impulse of political reform in general (Arditi,
2004: 139).
As opposed to a shadow, the spectre may or may not appear, even when conditions are ripe.
Arditi certainly has in mind all those social movements that, while severely questioning the
status quo, have - often purposefully - avoided undertaking a populist path. This insight carries
important consequences when analysing Laclau's ontology. While I share the insight that all
politics is to an extent populist, the continuum along which political practices operate drawn
by the two extreme poles of populism and institutionalism as posited by Laclau is more
dubious (Laclau, 2005b: 45).
In a similar vein, Panizza also proposes a balanced picture of the relationship between
populism and democracy. In his view, 'populism is neither the highest form of democracy nor
its enemy, but a mirror in which democracy can contemplate itself, warts and all, and find out
what it is about and what it is lacking' (Panizza, 2005: 30). Elsewhere, he also clarifies that the
compatibility between populism and democracy is given by the relations that the former
contextually establishes with other logics that are also constitutive of democracy (Panizza,
2008: 92).
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Both analytically and strategically then, much is to be gained from those approaches that,
while acknowledging that populism is a phenomenon inherent to democratic life, it can
sometimes turn against democracy itself. However, these approaches are recalcitrant to tie
the notion of populism to a strategic perspective, even when some of its authors do display
normative preoccupations in their writings (as in the case of Arditi). In particular, what is
entirely missing is a connection between populism and hegemony, which is instead present in
Laclau. For now, let us turn to a review of the different takes on the category of hegemony.
A conceptual literature review: hegemony
According to Giuseppe Cospito, the noun 'hegemony' was firstly employed in the texts of a
number of ancient Greek historians, where its meaning alludes to the predominance of a polis
(city) within the context of a military alliance. However such supremacy is not limited to
military considerations, but can also involve considerations of a political and ideological sort
(Cospito, 2016: 49). The term, which did not find an equivalent in Latin, disappeared until it
was rediscovered in modern languages with reference to its initial meaning in ancient Greek
documents. However, it soon found a new and privileged application in German and Italian, in
order to describe the leading role of Prussia and Piedmont in the processes of national
unification of their countries (Cospito, 2016: 50).
It is in the Marxist debates of the late 19th century in which the notion of hegemony started
to take up new meanings and nuances. Friedrich Engels first mentioned hegemony to exhort
the German Social Democrats into gaining the sympathy of the agricultural labourers, while
Antonio Labriola, who did not speak openly of hegemony, reflected on the nexus between
consent and domination, thus anticipating a central theme of Antonio Gramsci's reflection on
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hegemony (Cospito, 2016: 51-52). The term gained particular currency within the Russian
Social Democracy, with Georgi Plekhanov credited as the first to introduce it as a way to refer
to the necessity for the working class to launch not just an economic struggle, but also and
most importantly a political one against Tsarism (Anderson, 1976: 15). Such an intuition was
predicated upon the recognition that the Russian bourgeoisie was too weak to carry out by
itself the bourgeois-democratic revolution that the stagist conception of history envisaged by
Marxism attributed to this class. Uneven development of the economic world system was
deemed to be responsible for the alteration of the historical path predicted by the schemata
put forward by historical materialism, thus allowing for some deviations from the norm. A
national approach was thus justified in the name of the need to garner the support of all the
exploited groups in society. It was Pavel Axelrod who took the idea further by suggesting that,
in the struggle against absolutism, the working class would even have to play the primary role
(Anderson, 1976: 15) and thus become the leading force in a task that was not its own.
In Lenin, the notion of hegemony reached a more structured development, even though it
never became part of his customary political lexicon (Di Biagio, 2008: 381). For the Russian
revolutionary, hegemony alluded to the imperative to leave economism behind - a theme
developed in his 1902What is to be done? (Lenin, 1969) although the term hegemony was not
employed here. This meant that a bigger social bloc was to be built by transcending the
immediate, corporative attitude of the working class. As aptly put by Laclau and Mouffe: 'for
Leninism, hegemony involves political leadership within a class alliance' (HSS: 55).
Nevertheless, talk of hegemony faded in the light of the Bolsheviks' restructuring of their
priorities, as they opted for a direct transition to socialism, thereby sidestepping the
bourgeois-democratic stage in the name of the extreme deviation of the Russian course from
the ‘normal’ development of capitalism in advanced countries and the insurmountable
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weakness of their incipient bourgeoisie. Accordingly, there was no longer a task for the
working class to hegemonise and take upon itself. Trotsky himself severed the question of
hegemony in the democratic revolution from the dictatorship of the proletariat, which his
permanent revolution thesis made the central goal in the Bolsheviks' quest for power (Trotsky
in Anderson, 1976: 17). The term was still upheld by the Communist International (Comintern)
in the following years however, where it alluded to the necessity for the working class to
gather other exploited groups under its leadership, with the further conceptual extension by
which, as contained in the final theses of its 4th Congress held in 1922, hegemony was
employed to refer to the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, insofar as the
former managed to separate the economic struggles from the wider political aims of the latter
(Anderson, 1976: 18).
Influenced by these debates, Gramsci made hegemony the distinctive hallmark of his
theoretical contribution. It is commonly recognised that the first explicit elaboration of
hegemony, after he had used the term somewhat contradictorily in his previous writings,
came in 1924 with the obituary that Gramsci published in the newspaper Ordine Nuovo which
paid tribute to Lenin (Cospito, 2016: 57). Here, hegemony is conceptualised as the alliance
between urban workers and rural peasants; a key passage in the project of overthrowing
capitalism. Gramsci was keen to highlight that it is the urban worker who has the upper hand
within this alliance, as:
politically he is stronger and more capable than the peasant: he lives in the city, is concentrated in great
masses in the factories, is capable not only to overthrow capitalism, but also to impede, by socialising
industry, the return of capitalism (Gramsci, 1971: 16).
However, it is with his prison writings that a much richer conception of hegemony emerges
within a vast theoretical apparatus. Because of this, the notion of hegemony is tied to a series
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of adjacent categories and interpretations that Gramsci came up with in parallel and that, as a
consequence, also deserve a brief mention here in order comprehend the full extent of his
theorisation on hegemony. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the term hegemony, partly
as a reflection of the fragmented nature of the writings themselves, is often used in different
ways throughout his corpus. Yet this lack of coherence should not deter us from extracting
some ‘organic’ lessons and general orientations from Gramsci's prison writings.
As hinted above, the core of Gramsci's notion is dependent upon questions of consent and
force in the exercise of power. In particular, Gramsci advances the idea that for a class to be
dominant, a combination of both is needed. The author wanders on whether hegemony
should be intended as simple consent or consent and domination (Cospito, 2016: 62). As
opposed to more traditional Marxist accounts however, the point here is the recognition of
the importance of politics - or, to put it more broadly, of the superstructures - in the shaping
of social relations. This aspect also reveals that, in line with the 1922 theses of the Comintern,
Gramsci makes of hegemony not only a strategic category, but also an analytical one that
helps to better understand the function of power in society. Hegemony then refers to the
relationship that a social group establishes with other classes and forces. As he emphatically
puts it:
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power
(this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as
well (Gramsci, 1971: 57-58).
Gramsci does not rule out the need to resort to force, but 'without force standing above
consent too much, on the contrary appearing as supported by the consent of the majority'
(Gramsci, 1975: 59). How is this leadership obtained then? Gramsci contends that a system of
alliances needs to be established with other social groups. However, as opposed to the
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Leninist conception that entails a much more external relationship with the other sectors
involved,2 for Gramsci this move presupposes that the leading group accommodates the
interests of such sectors through the creation of an ideological synthesis. This is possible only
if a class transcends its economic-corporative phase and leaves behind the pursuit of its
sectional and most immediate interests. Thus, such a synthesis - in the strategic perspective of
Gramsci - is successful insofar as it manages to transform the consciousness both of the
working class and the other sectors involved through an intellectual and moral reform. It is
important to dwell on the far-reaching character of this type of reform. For Gramsci, the
question does not merely end with the interception of the interests of the subordinate
groups, but also, and most crucially, involves the modification of their ideological orientations,
whereby the term ideology does not simply convey mere ideas, but encompasses a material
aspect, made up of the communal modes of living and acting (Simon, 1982: 25). This type of
struggle, which attempts to articulate a historic bloc of social actors around a class that plays a
fundamental role in the sphere of production, falls under the name of war of position and
mainly takes place in the field of civil society. Specifically, the war of position needs to be
understood in opposition to the war of movement, a term used to indicate a blitzkrieg type of
seizure of power. Although Gramsci did not exclude the possibility of a war of movement
altogether, he thought that in Western society a long struggle was firstly needed in order to
disentangle the allegiances that the bourgeoisie has constructed in the terrain of civil society:
in Russia the State was everything; civil society was primordial and gelatinous. In the West, there was a
proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil
society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch behind which there stood a powerful
system of fortresses and earthworks (Gramsci, 1971: 238).
2 This is well captured by Laclau and Mouffe (HSS: 65-68).
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It is in the diffuse web of social relations established by private entities such as the Church,
political parties, trade unions, mass media, and voluntary associations that a particular
hegemony is sanctioned and where the struggle to build a different hegemony is to be
undertaken. From these intuitions, Gramsci started to conceptualise the state in enlarged
terms: the state is not to be intended as the simple collection of state institutions that
exercise force, but rather as the sum of political and civil society. The notion of integral state
thus refers to the links existing between the two spheres, shedding light on the nature of
power, summed up in the expression of 'hegemony armoured by coercion' (Simon, 1981: 27).
Both from an analytic and strategic point of view, the nuances that the notion of hegemony
takes up in the theorisation offered by Gramsci no doubt represent a leap forward compared
to the still tentative formulations of the Russian debates. His contribution permits to fully
supersede the two obstacles posed by the economistic stance of many Marxist accounts,
namely epiphenomenalism, that is the causal link postulated to exist between base and
superstructure, and reductionism, i.e. the attribution of a class belonging to each and every
ideological element (Mouffe, 1979: 169). Nevertheless, the recasting of the base-
superstructure relationship that Gramsci advances is still susceptible to criticism. In particular,
Laclau and Mouffe identify in the necessary class character of the unifying hegemonic
principle the last traces of essentialism in Gramsci (HSS: 69). It is the dogmatic ontological
privilege ultimately attributed to class that the two authors question. From here, Laclau builds
a novel conception of hegemony, which owes much to Gramsci, but which also transcends
him. As for populism, the next chapter is dedicated to the careful discernment of how
hegemony developed throughout his corpus, though a few preliminary remarks are advanced
here. The starting point is that, already weakened by Gramsci, the base-superstructure
dichotomy is entirely abandoned. More specifically, Laclau suggests that no particular space of
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the social occupies the moment of universality. In other words, there exists no foundational
ground that orders society and assigns fixed identities to the subject. As he puts it:
Against this essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the social, that is, the fact
that any structural system is limited, that it is always surrounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is
unable to master and that, consequently, ‘society’ as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its
own partial processes is an impossibility (Laclau, 1983: 22; also in NR: 90).
However, the 'impossibility of society' does not mean that any kind of fixation is impossible,
for that would be a psychotic world. Rather, the social is the attempt to 'domesticate
infinitude' and bring some form of stability within an otherwise infinite play of differences
(Laclau, 1983: 22; also in NR: 90). Laclau calls this ‘game’ of providing a partial limiting to
disorder hegemony and goes as far as equating it with the political as such (HSS: 193). What is
more, he claims that 'people need an order, and the actual content of it becomes a secondary
consideration. '‘Order’ as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in
which it is actually realized' (Laclau, 1994: 176; also in E: 44). It is precisely the capacity of
temporarily filling order with a particular content that is captured by the term hegemony. To
put it differently, hegemony consists of representing the totality through the articulation of
various elements under the aegis of one of those very elements, which he calls the empty
signifier. Here, Laclau argues with Gramsci that such a process entails a synthesis that
modifies the identities of the elements that are involved. However, contra Gramsci, he
contends that the empty signifier, the element that is able to cement around itself other
elements by playing the function of the universal, is not the emanation of a structure, but the
contingent and unpredictable product of the unevenness of the social (Laclau, 1994: 175; also
in E: 43).
Another original elaboration of the concept of hegemony starting from the thought of
Gramsci is that advanced by Raymond Williams. The attempt of the Welsh academic and
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novelist is rather different from that of Laclau. By providing a materialist conception of
culture, Williams tries to eschew the pitfalls of reductionism to be found in many strands of
Marxism. Yet he does not, as opposed to Laclau, entirely abandon the notion of
determination, but attenuates its scope. Determination then is not to be intended as a cause
that enables prediction and prefiguration, thereby entailing total control. Rather,
determination is to be taken as a notion that suggests the setting of limits and pressures
(Williams, 1973: 4). This insight is paralleled by an unconventional move insofar as the
base/superstructure dichotomy is concerned. Williams broadens the notion of the base so as
to encompass not simply the relations ordering the primary work of materials, but 'the
primary production of life itself, and of men themselves, the material production and
reproduction of real life' (Williams, 1973: 6). What Williams conveys here is that the role of
what has been called the superstructure is in actual fact primary and basic in the sustenance
of a particular social reality. At the same time, he is careful to avoid the claim that the
superseding of the crudest version of the base/superstructure topology ends up in the
endorsement of a concept of social totality devoid of determination. For Williams, the
coexistence of different social practices - and the due recognition of their roles and complex
interrelations - should not lead to the removal of the notion of social intention from the
picture; it is only by clinging to such a notion that the class character of a particular society
can still be appreciated (Williams, 1973: 7). It is at this point in which Williams revives the
Gramscian notion of hegemony. Its relevance is given precisely by its bivalent nature: on one
side, it evokes a totality 'which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an
extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the substance and limit of common
sense for most people under its sway'; on the other, it sheds light on class rule (Williams,
1973: 8). In other words, hegemony is so pervasive that it constitutes a sense of reality and a
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sense of absoluteness insofar as it is made of a body of practices and expectations that
impregnate the whole of living, thereby making explanations in terms of simple
'manipulation', 'corruption' and 'betrayal' obsolete and misplaced (Williams, 1977: 110); yet
this does not obscure the processes of domination and subordination. However, hegemony
cannot be properly understood unless one recognises its dynamic character. As Williams puts
it:
hegemony is not singular; indeed […] its own internal structures are highly complex, and have
continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token […] they can be continually
challenged and in certain respects modified. That is why instead of speaking simply of ‘the hegemony’,
‘a hegemony’, I would propose a model which allows for this kind of variation and contradiction, its sets
of alternatives and its processes of change (Williams, 1973: 8).
Such a variation takes the form of a continuous process of incorporation, by which other
experiences and practices are accommodated prior their reinterpretation and dilution, thus
permitting the dominant culture a continual making and remaking of itself (Williams, 1973: 9).
It is in this sense that the notion of hegemony comprises and goes beyond those of culture
and ideology: with respect to the former, hegemony accounts for the inequalities in power
and influence; with respect to the latter - which Williams intends as a formal and conscious
set of ideas and beliefs - hegemony recognises that practical consciousness does not take the
form of an articulated and formal system (Williams, 1977: 108-110). Finally, Williams specifies
that hegemony is better suited at accounting for epochal, rather than historical questions,
'[t]hat is to say it is usually very much better at distinguishing the large features of different
epochs of society, as between feudal and bourgeois, or what might be, than at distinguishing
between different phases of bourgeois society' (Williams, 1973: 8). In other words, hegemony
defines the broad periods in which a central system of practices, meanings and values are
dominant and effective.
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All in all, the route chosen by Williams in order to escape economicism is innovative and
powerfully convincing insofar as it casts light on hegemony, culture and ideology as a material
necessity for the reproduction of the conditions of a particular social formation. Nevertheless,
Williams is wavering on the question of whether the base-superstructure division should be
retained or not; at times, he seems to dismiss it altogether, at others he shows himself
reluctant to do so. What lies at the heart of this ambiguity is the insistence to put at the same
level - that of the base - practices which are still ranked in terms of importance by upholding
the notion of determination. In this way, base and superstructure are surreptitiously
reintroduced. In nuce, this amounts to the same defect that Laclau spots in Gramsci, that is
the apodictic proposition of a point of hegemonic irradiation. Moreover, while Williams,
following Gramsci, is certainly right in affirming that hegemony defines epochal as opposed to
historical periods - a theme that will be of utmost importance in the fifth chapter where a
critical reappraisal of Laclau is advanced - epochal and historical remain ill-defined and too
tied to the notion of mode of production. Hegemony's import should, in other words, be put
to good use so as to cast light also on variations within itself (for otherwise the claim that it is
not singular remains empty), but also, and most importantly, so as to deliver an assemblage of
meanings, values, and practices that is not a simple synonym of a production mode.
On this point another author working in the Gramscian tradition, and co-founder along with
Williams of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, holds a different view. Indeed, Stuart
Hall analyses hegemony in shorter temporal terms, as he specifically applies the notion in
order to critically appraise the advent of Thatcherism in Great Britain. In this sense, Hall's
work situates itself at a slightly lower level of theoretical abstraction, without making it
necessarily less interesting or fruitful. His reference to Gramsci is avowedly heterodox as he
refuses to transfer the teachings of the Sardinian mechanically from one context to another,
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but rather - following the recommendation of Gramsci himself - he insists on the necessity to
‘translate’ them to the specific conjuncture (Hall, 1987: 16). In particular, hegemony is
employed by Hall in order to make sense of the construction of a conservative historic bloc in
Great Britain that managed to appropriate a number of slogans and signifiers that had been
part of the popular patrimony of the left (Filippini, 2011: 76). That Hall does not make
hegemony coincide with a mode of production is clear in the way he treated Thatcherism as a
hegemonic enterprise:
Thatcherism was a project to engage, to contest that project [that of the Keynesian welfare state], and,
wherever possible, to dismantle it and to put something new in place. It entered the political field in a
historic contest, not just for power, but for popular authority, for hegemony (Hall, 1987: 17).
Hall is also emphatic that the struggle for hegemony is constructed on different fronts. This is
to be intended in two different and yet interrelated ways. On one side, hegemony is fought on
a variety of planes; as Hall puts it: '[t]he nature of power in the modern world is that it is also
constructed in relation to political, moral, intellectual, cultural, ideological and sexual
questions. The question of hegemony is always the question of a new cultural order' (Hall,
1988: 21). Here, Hall is apt to recognise the plurality of spheres evoked by the Gramscian
expression 'fortresses and earthworks' mentioned above. On the other side, Hall also sees in
such a diversity the necessity to articulate the different antagonisms and subjectivities. On the
latter point and on who is to lead a hegemonic project, Hall demonstrates to be on the same
page with Laclau: for the cultural theorist, there is no unitary subject of history and the points
from which hegemonies can be constructed are cashed out in terms of political projects as
opposed to fundamental classes (Hall, 1988: 17). As opposed to Williams' insistence on
determination then, identities and ideological complexes are more provisional and cannot be
determined in advance:
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I don't think the ideological field is divided into elements of ideological discourses that have a necessary
class connotation. In societies like ours, ideological contestation does not take place between fully
formed, competing worldviews - theirs and ours. The field of ideology is not divided in that way. It's a
field in which there are many different discourses and social forces in play at the same time (Hall, 1988b:
58).
Nevertheless, as opposed to Laclau, Hall still recognises with Gramsci that hegemony is
unachievable 'without the decisive nucleus of economic activity' (Hall, 1988: 156). Unlike
Laclau then, there is the important recognition that not only the proliferation of the sites of
antagonism should be heeded, but also the variety of spheres of the social in which hegemony
should be fought and conquered, including the economic. This is an important point that will
be stressed again when analysing the empirical cases and critically engaging with the notion of
hegemony in Laclau more concretely. Finally, Hall has the merit to forge his concept of
hegemony with explicit reference to the tasks for the left, thereby foregrounding the strategic
nature of his contribution. For him, the left 'does not see that it is possible to connect with the
ordinary feelings and experiences which people have in their everyday lives, and yet to
articulate them progressively to a more advanced, modern form of social consciousness' (Hall,
1988: 21). In conclusion, Hall is to be praised for an original and convincing application of the
notion of hegemony to the British context as it illuminates many aspects of the Thatcherist era
(and even beyond that). However, he remains elusive on a number of theoretical questions
that do not seem to be properly elaborated throughout his corpus. As he advances also the
notion of authoritarian populism to define Thatcherism, one aspect that is undertheorised is
precisely the nexus between populism and hegemony - one of the central themes of the
present work.
A radically different approach to the question of hegemony is that of negating its validity and
usefulness. This strand, which comprises a number of authors, falls under the name of post-
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hegemony and takes issues especially, though not exclusively, with the theorisations on
hegemony formulated by Laclau. I shall mention here the most recurrent arguments. A light
version of post-hegemony is that propounded by Richard Day, as it situates itself purely at the
strategic level. By questioning that 'effective social change can only be achieved
simultaneously and en masse', Day praises the politics of what he terms the Newest Social
Movements, which prefer to operate non-hegemonically rather than counter-hegemonically
(Day, 2005: 8).3 The dissatisfaction that Day expresses towards Laclau points to the fact that
the construction of hegemonic blocs implies 'a logic of representation of interests within a
state-regulated system of hegemonic struggles' (Day, 2005: 75) - thereby remaining within the
logic of neoliberalism (Day, 2005: 8). In particular, Day thinks that a politics based on the
advancement and articulation of demands, as that of Laclau,
is rather like pursuing the latest in automobiles, clothing or refrigerator styles. […] Just as no product
can ever provide satisfaction in the consumption of goods and services, no state-based system of
representation can be an adequate substitute for the autonomous creation of a just life lived in
community with human and non-human others (Day, 2005: 83).
Of a more analytic import is the contribution of Scott Lash, who suggests that hegemony 'has
had great truth-value for a particular epoch', but 'power now, instead, is largely post-
hegemonic' (Lash, 2007: 55). The gist of the argument is that 'power enters into us and
3 Despite the stance of Day openly aims at postulating the validity of a path for emancipatory action over
another, it is possible to concur with the fact that a plurality of paths does exist and that the
populist/hegemonic logic does not exhaust the panoply of avenues at disposal for those who wish to
challenge the status quo from an egalitarian position. Just as in the case of Arditi a few pages above, the
Laclauian scheme fails to accommodate, from an analytical point of view, the possibility of a protest that
maintains itself at a horizontal level, without any sort of verticalisation. What is at stake here is not the
desirability of such a politics, but the very possibility of conceiving it through the instruments offered by
Laclau. In this sense, the multitudinous solution put forward by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Hardt and
Negri, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2004) constitutes a plausible alternative that has been practiced by a variety
of movements. For some, a hybridisation is also possible. As put by Alexandros Kioupkiolis: 'Laclau’s ‘uneven
power’, ‘logic of equivalence’, ‘representation’ and the dialectic of ‘particularity/universality’ are alive and
kicking amidst the constituent politics of the multitude' (Kioupkiolis, 2014: 162). Similarly, Katsambekis
states: '[m]y hypothesis is that we might not even have to choose between the two categories, since
collective subjects do not crystallize into stable concrete entities but are rather mercurial in form and in
action and can manifest themselves in diverging ways' (Katsambekis, 2014: 177).
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constitutes us from the inside' (Lash, 2007: 61) as it is endowed with a far-reaching generative
force (Lash, 2007: 66). What is confuted is the representational and mediated character
encapsulated in the notion of consent: rather, power is ontological and bypasses cognitive
judgements (Lash, 2007: 56). Jon Beasley-Murray is more categorical instead, as he avoids the
temporal characterisation put forward by Lash: '[m]y aim is a more comprehensive critique of
the idea of hegemony' (Beasley-Murray, 2010: xi). Accordingly, 'we have always lived in
posthegemonic times: social order was never in fact secured through ideology. […] consent
was never really an issue. Social order is secured through habit and affect' (Beasley-Murray,
2010: ix). For Beasley-Murray, habit and affect are immanent processes that 'incarnate a logic
from below that requires neither representation nor direction from above' (Beasley-Murray,
2010: xi).
Some of the intuitions contained in these accounts are valuable, but they are by and large too
a priori dismissive of the notion of hegemony, however intended. Day is certainly right in
stressing the role of the movements from below and putting emphasis on the question of
horizontalism. Nevertheless, since his intervention is mainly pitched at the empirical level, it
would be fair to respond with the counter-empirical claim that it is only when heterogeneous
struggles have united and launched a vertical assault on the status quo that some consistent
strides towards the undoing of injustice have been taken. The examples of the Italian
Communist Party and the Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution that will be treated in this work are,
despite many limitations, quite revealing in this respect. Equally, it seems little plausible to
reduce social demands to the neoliberal logic underlying the unlimited and insatiable demand
for goods and services. As for the positions of Lash and Beasley-Murray, it is paramount to
highlight that the dichotomies that they introduce between, for example, representation and
real, discourse and affect, meaning and being, 'fail to realize that dimensions, which can - and
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should - be conceptually distinguished, can simultaneously function within a historical
dialectics of mutual engagement and co-constitution' (Stavrakakis, 2014: 122). The focus on
the biopolitical character of politics, on the fact that domination is inscribed in bodies through
affect and habit, is of utmost importance, and yet:
such regulation of bodies […] can establish itself as an unspoken ‘second nature’ only to the extent that
it becomes associated with a dominant representation of what is considered ‘civilized’ and what is not,
only to the extent, in other words, that it becomes associated with a hegemonic social valorization
(Stavrakakis, 2014: 125).
Stavrakakis also notes that the incorporation of the affective dimension, the dimension of the
Real in the Lacanian vocabulary, not only in its negative connotation as dislocation and
impossibility of a universal, but also in its positive meaning, has been taken up and
incorporated by Laclau (Stavrakakis, 2014: 127-129). Although Laclau has effectively made
some advancements in that direction, I shall later demonstrate that such an incorporation
remains incomplete insofar as it fails to recognise the persistence of the hegemony enshrined
in affect and habit and the difficulty of its dislodgement.
Populism and hegemony combined
Much has been said on how populism and hegemony are characterised and put to use by a
variety of authors. Yet populism and hegemony are categories hardly analysed in tandem.
While the former is nowadays employed, although with different accents, by a variety of
accounts that cut across the academic spectrum - both normatively and subject-wise -
hegemony is by and large still confined to accounts of critical import in spite of its ever bigger
analytical role, which would make it in principle also importable by schools that bear no
normative relationship with Marxism. Be that as it may, both categories imply a sense of
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construction of the social, of construction of political meaning and social relations in the face
of an ineffable contingency, be it within a limited sector or in society at large. Intuitively then,
they seem to indicate something about the political, intended here in the broadest possible
manner as the very way in which society is instituted (Mouffe, 2005: 8-9). In other words, they
both seem to bear a particularly powerful import when thinking about ontological questions
in relation to the political domain. The impression is that their adequate theoretical
combination could shed light on different aspects and dimensions pertaining to the political.
This of course does not mean that they need to be confined to the ontological terrain and be
an exclusive property of political theorists. That would simply negate the retroductive
approach endorsed later in the chapter, which invokes a more dynamic connection between
the theoretical and the empirical. In other words, such concepts also need, Heideggerianly, to
display a ready-to-hand-ness for the empirical research.
The only author who blends the two categories in a rigorous fashion is, as we have seen
already, Ernesto Laclau. Both notions play a key role within his account and are closely
intertwined. However, if the definitions of each of these categories are in themselves
contested in academic debates, their combination cannot but raise an equal amount of
questions and interrogations. However, this remark is not advanced in order to dispute the
validity of their pairing but is rather aimed at contributing to the betterment of the terms of
such an engagement. Moreover, such a debate cannot leave aside other related issues that
throughout the text will resurface as of paramount importance. As we have seen in the case
of populism, the question of the relationship between populism and democracy has more
often than not sprung up as a problematic aspect, especially when populism is not simply
advocated as an analytical category, but also as a strategic one, which is what Laclau does.
Equally, the strictly related theme of the leadership deserves a nuanced treatment, which will
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be carefully pondered. What is in need of assessment here is the triple relationship between
populism, leadership and democracy and its weight on strategic considerations. As for
hegemony, I have mentioned that the most contentious issue has to do with the kind of time-
frame that it defines. However, questions of space also arise - where is it exactly that a
particular hegemony is sanctioned? As we shall see, all these conundrums haunt Laclau's
attempt to combine the two categories and the present work should be seen as an attempt to
dissipate some of the difficulties that his nonetheless praiseworthy enterprise has given birth
to. It is to the different pathways that my questioning will undertake that I now turn.
Foucault and Skinner to unravel the theoretical tangle
The focus on Laclau's political ontology stems from both the recognition of its merits and the
intuition of its limits from an analytic and strategic viewpoint. Setting out the latter is a
process that, as suggested by the retroductive method presented below, requires an overall
movement from side to side, straddling inquiries at both theoretical and the empirical levels.
Nevertheless, each of the two poles necessitates a work of its own, for the tensions do not
simply derive from the juxtaposition of the theoretical with the real world in order to assess
the plausibility of its claims, but can also be inferred from theory itself and thereby making the
to-and-fro shift more fruitful. This is why the development of Laclau's thought, insofar as the
notions of populism and hegemony are concerned, needs a careful discernment of its own.
However, since the enterprise conducted here is a critical one, the work cannot be confined to
a simply descriptive history of how concepts have evolved throughout his corpus. This is why
the problematisation method espoused by Michael Foucault and the methodological insights
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on the history of political thought of Quentin Skinner are brought in here as valuable
instruments to assist the theoretical research.
The former method condenses the two approaches Foucault has developed, namely
archaeology and genealogy. While archaeology provides a description of practices, the second
'diagnoses and offers cures for the problems of contemporary societies by examining their
historical emergence and formation' (Howarth, 2000: 72). Even though what is at stake here is
of a more restricted and less far-reaching character, the gist is still valid, for problematisation
is first and foremost a type of inquiry that focuses on the terms of reference within which an
issue is cast (Bacchi, 2012: 1). In other words, 'the practice of problematization focuses on the
question of problem-definition in a particular field or domain, the various problematizations
of this problematization, and the efforts of an analyst to problematize these
problematizations' (Howarth, 2009: 324-325). This type of analysis, which involves
'demonstrat[ing] how things which appear most evident are in fact fragile and that they rest
upon particular circumstances' (Foucault in Mort and Peters, 2005: 19), necessarily involves
making reference to a plurality of aspects, thereby giving rise to a multi-level approach. The
scope clearly differs from classical historiographical questions, as it is mostly concerned with
the uncovering of the oft forgotten origins of practices and the disclosure of alternative paths
and possibilities (Howarth, 2009: 326). If we think of Laclau's thought as a discourse, as a
meaningful and open-ended totality, problematisation helps us to examine the complex
relations and effects of its operations, allowing us to trace connections, encounters, supports,
blockages, play of forces and so on (Bacchi, 2012: 2). It can thus shed light on the ways in
which Laclau appropriates the works of other authors while expunging or neglecting some of
their key insights. It facilitates the understanding of how his framework fits within the broader
political theory environment of critical import and even beyond. It situates the theoretical
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work of Laclau within the network of pressures, stimuli and inducements arising from real-
world developments. It permits access to a number of nuances and subtleties that only a
study of the situated character of Laclau's intervention can disentangle. Finally, it puts us in
the position to re-activate possibilities that were excluded or ignored by Laclau. The re-
mobilisation of theoretical paths that went overlooked by the Argentine theorist does not
necessarily mean questioning his whole framework, but rather to initiate the exploration of
potentially rewarding avenues insofar as the comprehension of political phenomena and the
design of effective emancipatory strategies are concerned.
The Cambridge School of the history of political thought offers a complementary apparatus. In
order to elude the pitfall of inferring eternal and unhistorical truths from specific texts,
Skinner usefully distinguishes between three types of meaning. One is related to the mere
understanding of what words and sentences mean. The second assesses the type of impact a
particular text has had on the reader; a kind of phenomenological approach, in other words.
The third points instead to what the writer may have meant through allusions, rhetorical
figures and puns of various sorts (Skinner in Tully, 1988: 70). From the point of view of the
purposes of this research, it seems that the third meaning is what we are after,
notwithstanding the first one that will have to assist its pursuit. By following John Langshaw
Austin's classical analysis, Skinner states that any serious utterance will carry a certain
illocutionary force, that is a force that indicates what the agent was doing in saying (or
writing) something, and not simply as a consequence of what is said (or written) (Skinner in
Tully, 1988: 83). According to Skinner then, 'an understanding of the illocutionary act being
performed by an agent in issuing a given utterance will be equivalent to an understanding of
that agent's primary intentions in issuing that particular utterance' (Skinner in Tully, 1988: 74),
which in turn means comprehending 'the work as an attack on or a defence of, as a criticism
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of or contribution to, some particular attitude or line of argument' (Skinner in Tully, 1988:
76).4 As already introduced above, the situatedness of Laclau's contribution is essential in
order to comprehend the motives behind his different theoretical moves and a valuable ally
for devising new possibilities that were left out of the picture. A few helpful rules are
suggested by Skinner. In the first place, we need to gain knowledge of the prevailing
conventions underpinning the treatment of the themes under discussion. In other words, it is
only by framing the intentions against their background that it becomes possible to grasp the
particular position an author is taking (Skinner in Tully, 1988: 77). However, Skinner warns us
that the prevailing conventions of discourse should not be intended as a limit to utterances,
for the aim of the agent may be that of extending, subverting or altering such conventions
(Skinner in Tully, 1988: 105). This is to say that we should be wary of straightforwardly
pigeonholing a given author according to the vocabulary he employs and the tradition he may
appear to be connected to. However, the contextual language is not all we should focus on.
Skinner's second recommendation invokes the necessity to look at the 'writer's mental world,
the world of his empirical beliefs' (Skinner in Tully, 1988: 78). The beliefs held by a particular
agent provide a particularly solid ground in order to retrieve his intentions, and in this sense
some biographical and contextual information will be often needed to grasp what was the
point of a specific utterance (or action).
Skinner is thus very keen to highlight the connections between political thought and action,
which - it needs to be emphasised - for him run both ways, although here we are principally
concerned with understanding how Laclau's ontological reflections were affected by both the
4 It should also be noted that, in line with the Wittgensteinian premises of discourse theory, Skinner (again via
Austin) concedes that the study of the illocutionary force should not be strictly confined to the verbal or the
linguistic, but should also encompass non-linguistic actions, such as rituals and ceremonial acts (Skinner in
Tully, 1988: 84-85).
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personal and wider context. As for how the real world should give us a hand in thinking about
ontological problems instead, I need to turn to the retroductive method applied to the social
sciences.
The case for a case-based strategy: retroduction at play
In his response to David Howarth's contribution contained in the volume Laclau: A Critical
Reader, Laclau points out:
The first and main criticism is that I have concentrated on the ontological dimension of social theory
rather than on ontical research. Now, this is a charge to which I plead happily guilty, except that I do not
see it as a criticism at all. I have located my theoretical intervention at the theoretical and philosophical
level and it is at that level that it has to be judged (Laclau, 2004: 321).
Implicit in this answer is a certain disconnection between the two registers or, rather, the
non-necessity of looking at the ontic when developing an ontology or treating issues of
political philosophy. This attitude seems unwarranted, especially in light of the way in which
the post-Marxist paradigm that Laclau gave life to was developed. The urgency to articulate a
new ontology of the political derived precisely by the empirical inconsistencies that Marxism
encountered. It was the ‘surprising’ phenomena that did not fit the Marxist framework that
spurred Laclau to abandon that camp and direct his thought elsewhere. As he states along
with Mouffe at the very beginning of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (HSS):
Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The ‘evident truths’ of the past - the classical forms of
analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left's
struggles and objectives - have been seriously challenged by an avalanche of historical mutations which
have riven the ground on which those truths were constituted. [...] What is now in crisis is a whole
conception of socialism which rests upon the ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of
Revolution (HSS: 1-2).
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Such an attitude was later reinforced:
Any substantial change in the ontic content of a field of research leads also to a new ontological
paradigm. [...] To put the argument in a transcendental fashion: the strictly ontological question asks
how entities have to be, so that the objectivity of a particular field is possible. There is a process of
mutual feedback between the incorporation of new fields of objects and the general ontological
categories governing, at a certain time, what is thinkable within the general field of objectivity (Laclau
and Mouffe, 2001: x).
Yet, despite taking cues from a number of empirical problems, Laclau seems not to have
heeded this dimension with sufficient care anymore. As a result, it is not surprising that his
references to concrete historical situations have often been ad hoc illustrations that, despite
illuminating certain aspects, lack a sustained and refined engagement with the subtleties and
intricacies of each case. In relation to the historical instances brought up in On Populist
Reason (OPR), Beasley-Murray can hardly be proven wrong when he affirms that 'each
[historical case] is treated simply as an example, almost an anecdote or parable, to confirm a
system whose principles are developed endogenously rather than through empirical
investigation' (Beasley-Murray, 2006: 305). As the chapter on the PCI will show, the
engagement of Laclau with this political actor (Laclau, 1973; PIM; Laclau, 1980b; Laclau,
1980c; Laclau, 1981; Laclau and Mouffe, 1981; OPR; Laclau, 2014) is also marked by a number
of generalisations that smoothed out the historical terrain.
However, the claim raised here is not just that the empirical deserves a more nuanced
treatment. After all, Laclau may well be right when he says that it is a task that others could
take up (Laclau, 2004: 321). What is questioned much more fundamentally is the neglect of
the empirical when dealing with theory. In order to argue against this approach, I appeal to
the notion of retroduction as operationalised in the social sciences by Glynos and Howarth
(2007). Their intervention is aimed at devising a methodology for research in the social
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sciences that transcends the now dominant causal law paradigm. Specifically, a great deal of
their efforts is devoted to the debunking of the mistaken attempt to import into the social
sciences the sharp division drawn between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of
justification' typical of the natural sciences. The former 'involves all those activities that result
in the positing of a hypothesis H […] and which therefore contribute to the development of
theoretical tools with which to explain a phenomenon X'. The latter instead 'draws a boundary
around those activities that result in the acceptance of hypothesis H, which usually takes the
form of theorems or empirical predictions that are deductively inferred, tested, and then used
to explain X' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 31). However, in the realm of social sciences, the
forms of reasoning involved in positing a hypothesis and accepting it cannot be differentiated
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 27). In particular what is contested is the possibility of reducing
testing and explanation to prediction, at the expense of contextual factors (Glynos and
Howarth, 2007: 19). The authors invoke a minimal hermeneutical requirement, which involves
taking seriously the self-interpretations of the actors at stake and incorporating them into the
explanation, without reducing the former to the latter (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 36). It is at
this point they introduce:
the logic of retroductive explanation and theory construction, which involves a to-and-fro movement
between the phenomena investigated and the various explanations that are proffered. In this way, an
initially chaotic set of concepts, logics, empirical data, self-interpretations, and so on, at varying levels of
abstraction, are welded together, so as to produce an account which, if it removes our initial confusion,
can constitute a legitimate candidate for truth or falsity (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 34).
While retroduction is primarily aimed at permitting a fruitful transition from a positivist to a
truly post-positivist methodology in the social sciences, insofar as the objectives of this work
are concerned it also highlights that:
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there is a danger of paying short shrift to the necessary and complex connection between the empirical
and ontological levels of analysis, that is, the realm of lived experience and action, on the one hand, and
the underlying structures and modes of being, on the other hand, that make the former possible (Glynos
and Howarth, 2007: 30).
Accordingly then, 'the problem, the theory and its ontological presuppositions, as well as the
positing and accepting of proto-explanations, all find themselves articulated in an ongoing
dialectic' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 40). The cases employed in this work are thus intended
to work in tandem with some intuitions about certain deficiencies in the work of Laclau and
the urge to work on them. It is precisely the appearance of a number of 'stumbling blocks' - to
use Laclau's felicitous expression - in the Ecuadorian left-wing populist experience and in the
practice of PCI that have led me to question some of the theoretical tenets informing Laclau's
ontology. It is this back-and-forth movement between empirical analysis and theoretical
reflection enshrined in the retroductive approach that is at the base of this work and, more
specifically, of the choice to enlarge the scope for empirical analysis towards the refinement
of Laclau's ontology. However, before looking at the cases themselves, we need to define a
few more coordinates regarding the methodology employed to make sense of the empirical.
A note on empirical methods and corpus
The cases of the PCI and the Citizen's Revolution shall be analysed in the light of Laclau's
theorisation on hegemony and populism in order to assess its validity and limits. The bulk of
the analysis thus rests on the application of Laclau's categories to the two empirical contexts
at hand in order to evaluate how far they conduce an understanding of these political
phenomena and how promising they turn out to be from an emancipatory perspective.
However, since this enterprise intends to problematise some of the coordinates of Laclau's
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theoretical scaffolding, the application of such categories will not be devoid of a critical edge.
It is not a question of testing the validity of a hypothesis as in a positivist framework, where
different conjectures are falsified against the background of hard reality that either proves or
disproves. In this sense, no conclusive answer of that sort is advanced here. Rather, the aim is
that of throwing light on the potentialities and limits of Laclau's framework, with the special
task of devising areas where his theorisations explain less than what they could have if some
different theoretical choices had been made; risking leading us down some dead-ends insofar
as the strategic dimension is concerned. By applying his framework to concrete cases, one can
capture whether this particular ontology - whose final aim is after all that of permitting a
better and more explicative analysis of reality - is actually able to account for its different
nuances.
Having clarified this aspect, the themes of normativity and ethics still need to be addressed. In
order to tackle these issues, it will be necessary to resort to the four dimensions of socio-
political reality that the Essex School of discourse analysis offers. Two axes draw the four
dimensions: an ethical-ideological one and a political-social one. The former has to do with
the ways in which radical contingency is tarried with by the subject. In short, an ethical
response entails attentiveness and sensitivity towards the dislocated character of social
relations. By contrast, an ideological response means denying an acknowledgement of radical
contingency, even when this is laid bare by dislocatory events (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:
110-111). The latter axis instead revolves around the concept of public contestation, that is
the contestation of norms which constitute an existing social practice in the name of a value
or a principle (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 111). The political dimension in this case
corresponds to making visible the instituting moment of a social practice, either through
public contestation or its active absorption. Oppositely, the social dimension here captures
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the lack of public contestation, thereby alluding to those aspects of a practice that are
sedimented and forgetful of their political origins (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 111). If this is
so, 'practices can be understood in terms of the way different dimensions of social relations -
comprising the social, political, ideological, and ethical dimensions - are foregrounded or
backgrounded, how they articulated, and so on' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 120).
What concerns us here however is the singling out of the perspectives from which the critique
is levelled. Discourse theory is not after the simple description or explanation of facts but is
also concerned with inserting a critical edge that permits an understanding of how things
could be (or could have been) otherwise - a stance that in this occasion is even pitted against
the theoretical framework itself. This posture is predicated in the name of the intimate
intertwinement between facts and values, as well as between analysis and critique (Howarth
and Stavrakakis, 2000: 7; Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 196). A discourse analyst, as is any other
social or political researcher no matter how objective she professes to be, is thus always
enmeshed in a particular historical and political context and, by the same token, in a
hegemonic battle that attempts to stabilise meaning (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 7;
Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 194). The critical apparatus of discourse theory is thus twofold,
consisting of the ethical and the normative dimensions.
The ethical critique, which appeals to the ontological foundations of discourse theory and thus
has lexical priority over the normative that is instead intrinsically contestable and revisable, is
concerned with a detailed analysis of the kind of fantasies underpinning social and political
practices (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 198).5 The particular commitment informing the ethical
5 What does fantasy mean in this context? As the the two authors clarify at the outset of their text, the logic
of fantasy is borrowed from the Lacanian repertoire and 'shows how subjects are rendered complicit in
concealing or covering over the radical contingency of social relations' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 15).
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critique has to do with a 'an alternative ethos which signals a commitment to recognizing and
exploring the possibilities of the new in contingent encounters' (Glynos, 2008: 291). It is the
politics of 'traversing the fantasy', which predicates a libidinal investment more faithful to the
positive/negative dialectics (Stavrakakis, 2007: 282) or, put differently, a jouissance feminine
whereby the subject is taken to recognise contingency and pursue a type of enjoyment that
does not follow the impuse to 'complete' or 'totalise' (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008: 265).
As for the normative critique, the position adopted by discourse theory springs from the
principles of radical democracy (HSS; Mouffe, 1992, 1993, 2000). These alternative values are
openly projected into the object of study in order to produce a fuller critical explanation
(Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2007: 193). In this regard however, it is paramount to note that the
normative options informing the social logics through which a practice is described are not
pure projections, but typically exist in incipient form and are thus opened up and supported
by the analyst (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 196).
A last methodological disclaimer is needed in the light of the ethical and normative
‘guidelines’ that have just been expounded. Against the positivist, naturalist and rationalist
conceptions of knowledge and method which conceive research in terms of determinative
judgements, a reflective type of judgement is herein advanced (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:
182-183). This entails adopting an approach based on intuition, theoretical expertise and the
practice of articulation. In other words, 'having immersed oneself in a given discursive field
consisting of texts, documents, interviews, and social practices, the researcher draws on her
or his theoretical expertise to make particular judgements as to whether something counts as
an ‘x’' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 184).
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In this regard, both primary and secondary sources have been consulted in relation to the
empirical cases. As for the PCI, a good part of the work on primary sources has been
conducted at the archives of the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, where all the available party
documentation, chiefly consisting of meeting minutes, newsletters, pamphlets, speeches,
public statements, videos, recordings, personal diaries, PCI newspapers and journals, is
stored. As the emphasis of the analysis falls on the initial structuring of the PCI which was to
determine much of its subsequent politics, documents of this sort have been consulted
especially in relation to the first few years of the post-war PCI. Many of the political
autobiographies of the PCI's leaders have also been looked at, in this case with reference to
the whole period under consideration. The same applies to the secondary bibliography, which
is very voluminous and that has provided the greatest wherewithal for the analysis of the
period from the early 1950s onwards. The most renown explicative and interpretative works
of different political persuasions and with diverging attitudes toward the PCI have been taken
into consideration. Other less known works have been considered insofar as they cast light on
aspects of interest. In the case of the Citizens' Revolution instead, the availability of first-hand
documents - mainly speeches, state and party documents, newspapers - has been much
greater and easier given the advent of the internet and my personal involvement in it. No
particular time differentiation applies here, also thanks to the much shorter period under
review. The secondary bibliography on the Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution is instead pretty
scant. It is also worth emphasising that most of it, especially that available in English, is
notably adverse to Correa and the political process as a whole.
In order to reinforce the hermeneutical passage which is considered here to be vital in
retrieving the political grammar of a practice (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 134), four extended
interviews with former political leaders have been carried out for the PCI case, namely with
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Luciana Castellina, Maria Lisa Cinciari Rodano, Alfredo Reichlin and Aldo Tortorella. In
Appendix A, further information about the interviews is provided. Such phenomenological
accounts, that are hard to find in party materials, have been very important in order to
characterise many aspects of the discourse of the PCI. Although only a few references are
present in the text, they have been precious in reconstructing the historical parabola of the
party. The interviews with political leaders have been crucial in order to infer certain pieces of
contextual information that enabled me to situate their own interventions and that of other
political figures. In other words, they have been particularly helpful to reconstruct internal
divisions and battles. They have also been important in directing my research toward
determined factual aspects, bibliographies or materials. The interviews have all initially been
fairly open in the periods under discussion, and then narrowed down the focus on specific
questions that were of particular interest for the research. As a relatively well-situated agent
in the Italian public debate, my position may have had a certain weight in determining the
answers of some of the interviewees. I have tried to neutralise this as much as possible by
maintaining an agnostic stance on the questions under scrutiny. As for the Ecuadorian case,
no interview has been realised. The reason for this is that during the time of the research, my
exposure in the Ecuadorian context as a political columnist of a widely circulated national
newspaper made interviews with political leaders unwise. Nevertheless, the fact of having
worked in different occasions for the government of Correa in the past has provided, though
only informally, insights of utmost interest and value insofar as the hermeneutical exercise is
concerned.
Why these cases?
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The cases chosen for the empirical analysis offer interesting material in order to reflect
critically upon the notions of populism and hegemony. The two cases have in fact sparked talk
of both populism and hegemony. The Italian Communist Party has been mostly treated as an
exemplar of a counter-hegemonic force. This is in part due to the avowed goal of its leader
Palmiro Togliatti to make Gramsci's notion of hegemony the cornerstone of the PCI's strategy.
Togliatti and Gramsci were not just friends and colleagues during the years of the editorial
experience of Ordine Nuovo in the 1910s in Turin and co-founders and leaders of the Italian
Communist Party from the 1920s onwards. Following the end of WW2, Togliatti adopted the
old friend, who died in 1937, as the founding father, greatest theoretician and leading
historical figure of the Italian communist movement. This move was accompanied by the
progressive publication of Gramsci's prison diaries, Notebooks and early writings in the late
1940s, coordinated by Togliatti himself. Through a seemingly endless number of writings and
speeches, Togliatti was also the main interpreter of Gramsci's legacy in a context in which
different views animated a rich debate on the Sardinian thinker. Togliatti’s politics became
then known as the embodiment of Gramsci’s intellectual heritage and its political
continuation. As put by Sassoon:
In 1944 Gramsci was for Italian communists little more than a name, the name of their most famous
martyr. The notes he wrote in jail had not yet been published or circulated, but Togliatti had been
acquainted with them and had tried to assimilate them, putting himself in the position to present them
to his party as a new and rational theoretical position in order to develop a national strategy (Sassoon,
1980: 27).
Yet hegemony was not simply a strategic goal. To the extent that it permitted the PCI to
exercise a wider degree of influence, it also speaks of the party's actual capacity to take root
within civil society and have a bearing on political outcomes. Following WW2, the Italian
Communist Party experienced a rapid increase in its popularity. The elections held in 1946 for
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the Constituent Assembly testify a profound mutation of the electoral allegiances once the
experience of Fascism came to an end. The PCI gained a stunning 18.93% share of the national
vote, corresponding to more than 4 million votes. That was certainly a considerable leap
forward if compared to the last available result before Mussolini banned elections: in 1924
the PCI got 3.74%, less than 300,000 votes. In the following decades, the PCI managed to turn
itself into one of the key political actors in the country, becoming the largest communist party
in the western world, both in terms of members and votes. It peaked at 36.4% of the vote in
the general elections of 1976 and from 1963 until its dissolution in 1991 it never went below
25%. Despite it never reached power at a national level, it governed many local councils and
regions, and has been treated as one of the most exemplary communist parties in a liberal-
democratic context in terms of political influence, theoretical elaboration and good
governance (Sassoon, 1980: xi-xii and Putnam et al, 1993: 119). The degree of penetration of
the PCI into different spheres of the social by way of an institutional and cultural
‘craftsmanship’ is indicative of the relative success of this strategy and thus talk of hegemony
also takes up an analytical connotation here. Although it could not be said that the PCI
became hegemonic tout court, it certainly created a mass party that was able to exert its sway
among many different social classes, attract many prestigious intellectuals, turn its newspaper
into one of the most widely read and mobilise a huge number of citizens even beyond its
traditional electorate (Sassoon, 1980: xii).
However, the PCI has also been associated with the notion of populism, although less
decidedly and in fewer instances. Ernesto Laclau hints at this in an explicit engagement with
the PCI, by referring to Togliatti's conception as one 'which sees in the socialist political
struggle an effort to articulate these democratic antagonisms around a popular hegemonic
pole' (Laclau, 1980b: 252). Here we have a reference to both the notion of hegemony and that
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of populism. In a later iteration, Laclau suggests that Togliatti attempted to constitute 'a
people' by incorporating a plurality of sectors around the centrality of the working class, but
that this did not become fully fledged populism because of a number of structural limitations
(OPR: 182-186). Yet the recognition of a populist tendency is evident. Workerists and post-
workerists have also labelled the politics of the PCI as populist, although this was given a
negative inflection. In his polemics against the cultural expressions of the Resistance and post-
Resistance period, Asor Rosa defines them as carrying populist characteristics in a way that is
indicative of a political discomfort with the whole Togliattian enterprise. In particular, the
participation of various social strata clearly tells the PCI apart from proper class struggle (Asor
Rosa, 1988: 129-130). The PCI also taps well into the question of leadership and democracy.
Associated as it was with international communism, the PCI was often accused of hiding its
real intentions, portrayed as authoritarian in character. The preponderant role of Togliatti
within the party also begs an in-depth scrutiny of its role and entailments. However, over time
it became clear that the 'Italian road to socialism' which put emphasis on democracy and
parliamentarian bargaining was more genuine than some of its critics thought, even though
the question is far from settled; some stressing the anti-democratic world-view of much the
PCI's grassroots and the fundamental incompatibility between Marxism and democracy
(Pellicani, 1990: 134, 163-164).
As for the Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution, there is a broad consensus in the relevant
literature to define it as a populist political practice, although with different accents. Why
populist? The personalistic and unmediated leadership of Rafael Correa has been taken by
many as the defining character of his populist politics. A fairly distinguished heterodox-leaning
economics professor in the national scene, Correa was appointed as Finance Minister in 2006
by the then interim President Alfredo Palacio. While in the post, he took a number of
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controversial redistributive measures that brought about turmoil in the country and after
which he was ousted. As a result, he gained much visibility and media coverage, and decided
to found a political movement, which gathered different pre-existing political groups and
urban intellectuals, and discursively put together a number of unmet demands, thereby
appealing to different social segments. Initially considered as the underdog, Correa managed
to win the following electoral round and became President in January 2007 giving birth to
what he emphatically termed the Citizens' Revolution. He then pushed for the institution of a
Constituent Assembly, resulting in the 'Montecristi Constitution' - approved in 2008 - which, in
the project of Correa, was meant to pave the way out of neoliberalism. Since then, Correa was
then re-elected other two times, in 2009 and 2013. In 2017, Lenin Moreno, his designated
successor, replaced him in power following a tight electoral race.
Carlos de la Torre points out that 'Correa positions himself as a left-of-center politician with a
special concern for the poor and marginalized, though his is a populism with a curiously elitist
and technocratic bent' (de la Torre, 2013: 33). The former aspect has to do with his policies.
Correa's executive consistently delivered in terms of poverty alleviation (CEPAL, 2014;
SENPLADES, 2013: 113-114) and reduction of inequalities (SENPLADES, 2013: 114-115),
especially thanks to an extended welfare provision in the areas of education and health-care,
and also promoted the construction of major infrastructures in the country (with special
emphasis on connectivity and electrical power production). A heterodox economic policy with
anti-cyclical macromanagement was also adopted, including the set-up of a debt-audit
commission that finally resulted in a huge relief of its burden (SENPLADES, 2013: 15, 53-58,
428). As for the technocratic qualification, it owes to Correa's extensive reliance on many
collaborators coming from the academic world. The reliance on highly qualified personnel has
not spared Correa from accusations concerning his scant regard for democracy. In a recent
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paper, de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos argue, following the thesis of Guillermo O'Donnell, that the
weakening of liberal institutions in Ecuador could lead to 'the slow death of democracy' (de la
Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016: 221). In particular, they focus their attention on how Correa's
government related to social and indigenous movements and the media, as well as on the
shaping of state institutions under his rule. As for the latter, the authors highlight that despite
the fairness of all electoral processes, 'Correa skewed the playing field' (de la Torre and Ortiz
Lemos, 2016: 227) thanks to the hold on all the relevant institutions of control, a favourable
electoral re-engineering and the pursuit of redistributive economic policies. As for the
relationship with social and indigenous movements, these were tamed on the one hand by co-
opting their mid-level leaders and some of the bases, and on the other by repressing the most
critical voices (de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016: 228).
Other scholars lay emphasis on the beneficial ruptures that the Citizens' Revolution was able
to operate, with stress on the socio-economic policies that improved the conditions of the
most vulnerable sectors of society in a context of marked inequalities. In particular, Franklin
Ramírez stresses the importance of the dismantling of the neoliberal agenda through the
reappearance of the state (Ramírez Gallegos, F. 2012: 85). Errejón and Guijarro advance a
more positive appraisal of populism in their assessment of the political changes occurred in
Ecuador and Bolivia:
It is no coincidence that political change struck in both countries through a movement that broke with
the political system, granting new positions to political actors and substantially changing the distribution
of power. The means of building political power in the midst of a severe organic crisis was populism, the
discursive production of a dichotomous order that opposed the “people” to the incompetent, corrupt,
and selfish elites. Charismatic leadership played a key role in consolidating a developing political identity
characterized by a rejection of the previous elitist order (Errejón and Guijarro, 2015: 3).
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The two authors go on to introduce the notion of hegemony in relation to both cases, in terms
of the degree of institutionalisation of the leadership and political supremacy of the two
respective governing parties. Despite acknowledging the more comprehensive character of
the hegemony obtained by the Bolivian MAS, they are still willing to consider PAIS, the
governing movement of the Citizens' Revolution, as hegemonic (Errejón and Guijarro, 2015:
17). Writing from a Laclauian perspective, they seem to conflate populism and hegemony,
reinforcing the suspicion of their conceptual overlapping. In order to dissipate this and other
dobuts, let us now proceed to analyse the corpus of the Argentine thinker insofar as the two
notions are concerned.
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Chapter 2: Populism and hegemony in Laclau: a genealogy
The terrain of the analysis has now been set. The first task is that of plunging into Laclau's
corpus and scrutinising the precise evolution of the notions of populism and hegemony
throughout his work. This exercise poses a dilemma: what is to be reviewed and taken into
consideration for this type of exercise? Despite not being boundless, as is the case with many
other authors, Laclau's production is certainly considerable in terms of extension. Equally,
much has been written about his political theory by a variety of authors, some of whom have
contributed to extend, improve and review some of the nuances of Laclau's theory while
maintaining intact the overall philosophical orientation - an approach that, as made clear from
the very introduction, also inspires the present work.
As for Laclau's texts, the choice adopted here is that of following his beginnings step by step,
that is considering (almost) every piece of work for the first few years of his trajectory, until a
certain sedimentation of his thought took place. In fact, from the point of view of the notions
of populism and hegemony, it is possible to claim that a more oscillating and exploratory
attitude was maintained until the mid-1980s. Despite some considerable revisions taking
place after this time, the necessity to track every single piece of work is considerably
diminished in this regard. After that period then, the analysis provided here is mostly
concerned with his most notable and well-known pieces of work. Insofar as the choice of
which authors concerned with Laclau to include in the discussion, the approach has been that
of dedicating more although not exclusive attention to those internal to the Essex school.
Precisely because their polemical thrust is similar to that pursued here, their interventions
provide the best available material. They also display an unrivalled degree of knowledge of
the subject at hand. In this sense, it is also to be admitted that much of the literature that
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maintains a polemical attitude towards Laclau, though by no means all of it, is often
recalcitrant to engage with the nitty-gritty and the intricacies of his thought. Many authors
indeed limit themselves to cursory interventions that take issues only with the general post-
Marxist theoretical architecture of the Argentine and only take into account some of his most
visible works, while failing to engage with the evolution of his thought and with its internal
subtleties.
The chapter is divided in four sections. The first section ‘Laclau, strategy and political
ontology’ is a brief reflection on why the thought of Laclau ought to be considered as
strategic. This is an important aspect, as I seek to justify the particular reading that I make of
Laclau. The increasingly abstract character of his writings has induced many to suspect an
ever-greater detachment from partisan politics. This section is thus aimed at explaining why
the political ontology that he develops is instead chiefly aimed at catering emancipatory
theory and practice; not simply a theory of the political then, but a theory of the political with
a project behind. In particular, what is claimed is that it is the post-foundational thrust of
Laclau's ontology captured by the Heideggerian 'difference as difference' to provide a way out
of metaphysics and make it possible to think of emancipations strategically. The remaining
three sections correspond to the long work of inquiry into Laclau's thought by way of a
genealogical reading. Informed by the Skinnerian and Foucauldian instruments introduced in
the previous chapter, the section traces the genesis, evolution, changes of mind, deviations
and afterthoughts regarding populism and hegemony in his corpus. By teasing out both the
merits and the impasses that his conceptions engender, the section also looks at the
interlocking between the two notions and other fundamental categories that Laclau makes
use of. The second section ‘Hegemony and populism: thinking out of the box’ looks at the
early Laclau and how the emergence of the two notions was conducive to a heterodox
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thought within the Marxism paradigm. The third section ‘Hegemony: the only game left in
town’ analyses the post-Marxist Laclau where the radicalisation of the notion of hegemony
from the early 1980s onwards went hand in hand with the almost complete disappearance of
the notion of populism. Finally, the fourth section ‘Populism and hegemony reloaded’ deals
with the latest Laclau who, from the publication of OPR, rescues populism once again and
conjugates it with hegemony, while further developing some of the insights developed in the
previous decades.
Laclau, strategy and political ontology
Even though Laclau cannot be considered a philosopher strictu senso - argues Oliver Marchart
in a brief but incisive compendium - his work maintains a philosophical kernel that Marchart
terms 'the strictly philosophical', whose presence is nevertheless inextricable from the
articulation and mutual contamination established with science (intended as linguistics and
discourse analysis) and the political practice/theory dyad (Marchart, 2004: 54-56). It is
particularly important to note at this point that, for Laclau, the separation between political
theory and political practice 'is largely an artificial operation' as 'theoretico-political categories
do not only exist in books but are also part of discourses actually informing institutions and
social operations' (Laclau, 1994b: 2). It is undoubtedly through the encounter with the work of
Gramsci that the operation of framing his militant experience into a coherent theoretical and
analytical framework is made possible (Marchart, 2004: 55). All of this unequivocally defines
the overall thrust of Laclau's intervention: '[d]espite its crystal-clear and ‘logical’
argumentative procedures, [...] the very nature of his thought is decisively strategic'
(Marchart, 2004: 55). Here, of course, the strategic refers to the roads that Laclau envisages
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for emancipatory action, an interest already evidently manifest from the title of the 1985
book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (HSS), co-authored with Chantal Mouffe, in which the
three fields are brought to the fore.6
Yet what Marchart calls the 'strictly philosophical' in Laclau is precisely what prevents the
political practice/theory complex from descending 'into a manifesto for blind activism'
(Marchart, 2004: 69). Be that as it may, Laclau returns to where he departed from. Or did he
ever distance himself from it? As he explains in an interview about his initial political
engagement and its constant influence thereafter:
That's the reason why I didn't have to wait to read post-structuralist texts to understand what a ‘hinge’,
‘hymen’, ‘floating signifier’ or the ‘metaphysics of presence’ were: I'd already learnt this through my
practical experience as a political activist in Buenos Aires. [...] Throughout his life Joyce returned to his
native experience in Dublin; for me it is those years of political struggle in the Argentina of the 1960s
that come to mind as a point of reference and comparison (NR: 200).
Although no longer a political activist, Laclau purposefully avoided engaging in pure, abstract
philosophy exempt of political reverberations and tried to carve his insights so as to stimulate
the renovation of the emancipatory/socialist repertoire and to further the analysis of concrete
political and social phenomena. This could not have been clearer in the purchase and
influence that his last monograph on populism (OPR) exercised amid the Latin American pink-
tide of progressive projects of the 2000s and 2010s, not to mention the proximity that he has
openly maintained with these governments, with special emphasis on his native Argentina
(see Garcia Sigman, 2013).7 Yet, it is also true that the reflections of Laclau are ever more
markedly ontological and oriented towards the definition of a general theory of politics - with
6 Laclau's previous interventions are also clearly oriented towards the political/strategic but lack the fusion of
the above mentioned fields. Even more importantly, Laclau had not yet moved beyond the Marxist
paradigm.
7 However, this connection should not be exaggerated as various Argentinean media have done. As confirmed
to me by Chantal Mouffe and Paula Biglieri, Laclau met Néstor Kirchner only once, and Cristina Fernández
de Kirchner two or three times.
69
the result giving birth to a theoretical system that Perry Anderson has not hesitated to define
in a recent article as 'of often forbidding technicality' (Anderson, 2016: 81) - while neglecting
the normative aspect that continues instead to be central in the work of his wife and
intellectual partner Chantal Mouffe. More generally, the reference to ‘partisan politics’
becomes rarer, though never entirely absent in the individual books, while emerging more
clearly in ‘minor’ interventions, such as journal articles and interviews, and in the collective
books (see Laclau, 2000; Laclau 2000b).
Of course, it is not the presence of a normative project that makes a difference here.
Normativity and ethics as traditionally understood8 do not entail in and of themselves a
strategic approach. To be even blunter, ethics utterly excludes strategy. The moral
universalism which ethics is imbued with 'privileges a particular version of the good on the
basis of a theoretical claim about the nature of all life, that is an ontology of the social; it
cannot admit any other good and ignores its own contingency in linking a theory of knowledge
to a theory of morality' (Devenney 2004: 169). Under pure universalism, the room for strategy
is eliminated, as universalism comes necessarily with a more or less robust teleological
account of the human and the world. It follows that if the place of the universal is a given, we
are faced with a deterministic account that leaves little space for discrepancy from the alleged
linear development of things or from how things ought to look like. At best, it can make sense
to speak of tactics as a way to facilitate the natural course of History or to steer events within
the little area left up to indeterminateness. The unfolding of events is by and large already
traced: thinking strategically does not pertain to this field. If it is not a specifically normative
project then, it is legitimate to wonder what it is that makes Laclau's corpus as particularly
8 As we have seen in the previous chapter, a different use of the term 'ethics' and its derivative 'ethical' is
made within the Essex school of discourse theory.
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useful for thinking the strategic. The answer is precisely the 'strictly philosophical' kernel to
which Marchart alludes, which confers a strategic character to Laclau's thought. What is this
kernel, then? For Marchart, this needs to be framed in the ontological difference, that is in the
'difference as difference' as understood by Heidegger (Marchart, 2004: 56).
In the article The Impossibility of Society, originally published in 1983, Laclau points to the
'crisis of the concept of social totality' which 'operated as an underlying principle of
intelligibility of the social order' (Laclau, 1983: 25; also in NR: 90). In other words, what is
banned from Laclau is the concept of an immutable essence, a positive object whose
knowledge can tell us what is really behind 'the empirical variations expressed at the surface
of social life' (Laclau, 1983: 25; also in NR: 90). Laclau contrasts to this grounding totality 'the
infinitude of the social', that is, an uncontrollable 'excess of meaning' that points to the
limitation of each structure, and hence the impossibility of society as a unitary and intelligible
object. Society therefore cannot fix its meaning once and for all, as it is constantly
overwhelmed by the 'infinite play of differences'. If the argument were exhausted here, we
would have to add Laclau to the likes of postmodern or anti-foundationalist thinkers, à la
Lyotard or Feyerabend. However, this is not the case. The impossibility of a universal is
coupled with its necessity, paving the way to the productive aspect of Laclau's political theory,
and making it post- rather than anti-foundationalist. A fixed universal is thus impossible, but
at the same time always and necessarily sought, thereby becoming, in Derridean fashion,
undecidable; impossible to determine a priori. For Laclau, in fact, a universe devoid of any
fixation of meaning would be a psychotic universe. 'The social is not only the infinite play of
differences. It is also the attempt to limit that play, to domesticate infinitude, to embrace it
within the finitude of an order' (Laclau, 1983: 25; also in NR: 90). What Laclau calls 'suture',
which stands for the definitive closure of social, is therefore impossible, but the tension to
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reach it serves as a condition of possibility for partial and relative fixations by virtue of the
establishment of nodal points, which cannot, however, be fixed a priori. Therefore, instead of
being completely swept away, universalism is maintained through the attention to the
contingent foundations and the constituent processes of these nodal points (Laclau, 1994b:
2).
The further steps that add complexity to this line of reasoning will be clarified along the
course of the discussion on the notions of hegemony and populism. What we need to cast
light upon at this stage is the three pairs of differences that derive from the post-
foundationalist argument of Laclau.9 The first has to do with the distinction between the social
and the political, which Laclau borrows from Husserl's couplet sedimentation vs. reactivation,
to which I hinted in the previous chapter. The social is the terrain of what is presented as
objective, as natural: in other words, sedimented, routinised discursive practices, which have
an interest in concealing and forgetting their origins, their moment of institution and
contingency so as to avert the emergence of alternatives (NR: 34). To use Laclau's language
and at the same time introduce his notion of space, these are hegemonic fixations of meaning
in topographies. His notion of time, on the other hand, involves the so-called dislocation of
these topographies in what he considers as a process of reactivation, through which the
acquired meanings are dissolved (NR: 41-42). It is the moment of the political that, through
antagonism, is manifested by the questioning of existing social relationships and by the
possibility of establishing new hegemonic configurations. There emerges, by Laclau's very
admission, the ontological significance of his own apparatus: 'The distinction between the
social and the political is thus ontologically constitutive of social relations' (NR: 35).
9 See Marchart, 2007: 138-149.
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The second pair of differences reflects the first, as the term 'the political' is maintained, as
well as the underlying idea concerning the impossibility of closure, but this time is opposed to
politics. The distinction is more resonant in the writings of the theorists close to Laclau,
remaining almost sketched in his texts (Marchart, 2007: 142). It is Mouffe, who firstly and
most convincingly approached the thought of Carl Schmitt from which this pair is borrowed,
to provide the most complete description:
By 'the political', I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism
that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. 'Politics', on the other side,
indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order
and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are
affected by the dimension of the 'political' (Mouffe, 2000: 101).
While 'the political' defines a horizon, a logic that provides the quasi-transcendental
coordinates through which sedimentation and desedimentation of meaning take place,
politics represents the order of the real institutions, of concrete practices that are affected by
the previous logic. In this way, the political and politics never come to coincide, remaining
necessarily confined to different planes. Doing otherwise would mean resuscitating the notion
of a universal foundation.
It is the same difference which exists in the third pair between the ontological and the ontic
levels, the former concerning the impossibility of a definitive reconciliation, the latter
equivalent to the empirical register. To be sure, this pair generalises the line of reasoning of
the previous pair, projecting it out of the regional character in which the political/politics
difference is proposed. In this way, it vividly comes to the fore that Laclau's discourse theory
cannot be reduced to a theory of political meaning, since it is rather a theory of meaning tout
court. The political logic of signification is not limited to the subset of politics, but it also
indicates the political character of systems of non-political significance (Marchart, 2007: 146-
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147). Ultimately, there is an insurmountable hiatus between the two levels, which makes
them nonetheless dependent on one another: the ontic register cannot be enclosed in itself,
while the ontological can only show itself through the ontic (Laclau and Zac, 1994: 30).
However, this distance remains fundamental:
If we had a dialogical situation in which we reached, at least as a regulative idea, a point in which
between the ontic and the ontological dimensions there would be no difference, in which there would
be a complete overlapping, then in that case there would be nothing to hegemonize because this absent
fullness of the community could be given by one and only one political content (Laclau, 1999: 135).
Therefore, no specific and determinable content can hegemonise representation indefinitely.
This is also captured by the relationship between contingency and necessity. In fact, for Laclau
it 'is not one of exteriority between two domains, but one of mutual subversion: contingency
exists within necessity, preventing the consolidation of the latter but, precisely because of
that, contingency is also absolutely necessary' (Laclau 2004: 309).
Returning to the motive that led to the opening of this digression, why does the strictly
philosophical discourse allow us to think strategically? As Laclau tells us emphatically:
Once undecidability has reached the ground itself, once the organization of a certain camp is governed
by a hegemonic decision - hegemonic because it is not objectively determined, because different
decisions were also possible - the realm of philosophy comes to an end and the realm of politics begins
(Laclau, 1991: 98; also in E: 123).
The statement reaffirms the sense of the ontological difference as mentioned above and, in
assimilating the hegemonic character of society, opens up unexplored potentialities for
political action. In fact, Laclau defines the theory of hegemony as the precondition for
strategic thinking. It is the unfinished and non-finite nature of social relations which forces us
to think of the construction (always radically contingent and therefore not absorbable by a
higher order process (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 109)) of the universal in terms of political
74
articulation and the forging of ever-new political identities. As we know, it is hegemony and
populism that Laclau invokes in order to give substance to the strategic nature of his ontology.
It is to a detailed study of their development in Laclau's corpus that I now turn.
Hegemony and populism: thinking out of the box
We have seen that Ernesto Laclau owes much of his fame to the re-elaboration of the
concepts of hegemony and populism. Even though the two concepts owe their final status to
the 'strictly philosophical', this should not induce us to think that they descend directly from
it. In other words, it is not the case that the 'strictly philosophical' was firstly and
autonomously developed, only to be then somehow instrumentally fitted to the concepts at
stake. In reality Laclau had already concentrated on populism and hegemony in the 1970s
when, in what is traditionally referred to as his ‘Althusserian phase’, he had not fully
developed his post-foundational reflections. What is the connection then? It was the
‘encounter’ with the analytical and the political limitations imposed by economic determinism
and class reductionism, and the intuition that populism and hegemony conveyed something
that helped to overcome those obstacles, that facilitated the very process of leaving the
perimeter of Marxism and the embracement of some key post-structuralist insights. It would
thus be more appropriate to say that the development of the 'strictly philosophical' and the
notions of populism and hegemony have moved pari passu. However, this is a curious type of
pari passu: while Laclau devotes most of his initial energies to scrutinise the conception of
populism (see the essays Fascism and Ideology and Towards a Theory of Populism in PIM), it is
hegemony which pervades much of his subsequent work from HSS onwards, with populism
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finding a place again, after a long omission of the concept10, in his last monograph On Populist
Reason (OPR) and his subsequent works. But let us proceed with order and be more precise as
to the steps of Laclau's intellectual trajectory.
In the early Laclau - and by early it is meant anything that appeared before HSS (1985) - it is
possible to identify three cumulative breaking points. The first few writings of Laclau did not
yet delineate a clear theoretical orientation other than a broad allegiance to Marxism, a bent
for historic mentalities and political economy, the fondness to elucidate the distinction
between feudalism and capitalism, as well as the application of the latter preoccupation to
the South American context and the Argentinean one in particular (Laclau, 1963; Laclau,
1969). Though certainly very erudite and original in their own right, prima facie these writings
do not seem to anticipate anything of his later works, as populism and hegemony are
nowhere to be found and the questions that he deals with seem to have little to do with the
purely theoretical themes that have subsequently become the hallmark of his academic
production. However, it is important to note his sophisticated awareness of the uneven and
combined development of Latin Americas economies, although understood in terms that
differ from those of dependency theory. This differentiation is made explicit in the 1971
polemic with Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein Feudalism and Capitalism in
Latin America (Laclau, 1971; also in PIM). In reality, these original insights on political
economy can be legitimately considered the ‘forgotten origins’ of Laclau's thought as, upon
closer examination, they prove fundamental in the comprehension of his theoretical
development. Such writings anticipate his impatience towards the most deterministic versions
of Marxism and his allergy for the political options influenced by such reflections. As Laclau
10In this period, there exist only a couple of very minor exceptions in which Laclau made explicit reference to
populism (Laclau, 1987; NR: 201).
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himself later affirms, it is in the phenomena connected to unequal and combined
development that one finds the avenue to deconstruct the rationality, positivity and
transparency inherent to Marxist categories (Laclau, 1986: 332; also in NR: 95).
But before looking at these insights, where do such inclinations come from? A look at the
political christening of Laclau in the 1950s and 1960s is thoroughly helpful in framing his
intellectual evolution. Here, the biographical inspection suggested by Skinner is key. As Laclau
himself reveals in a 1988 interview, he joined the Partido Socialista Argentino (Argentinean
Socialist Party) in 1958 and became deeply involved in student struggles. As the party split, in
1963 Laclau joined the Partido Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional (Socialist Party of the
National Left), led by the Trotskyist Jorge Abelardo Ramos, and became the editor of Lucha
Obrera (Workers' Struggle), the party's weekly journal (NR: 197-198). Abelardo Ramos is a
crucial figure here, as he was the ideologue of the so-called Izquierda Nacional (National Left),
an anti-imperialist and democratic current that attempted to update the concept of the
'permanent revolution' (NR: 198) and which gained currency also in Uruguay, Chile and
Bolivia. In a context where the Left was predominantly opposed to Peronism, the critically
supportive stance of Abelardo Ramos and his party was to deeply influence Laclau's
understanding of the phenomenon: for them, Peronism 'had started [the anti-imperialist
revolution] under bourgeois banners […] but it was only through a socialist hegemonization of
the democratic banners that it could achieve stability and make up for lost ground' (NR: 198).
In this sense, the task of the socialists was that of consolidating and, by siding with workers
and offering a socialist perspective, advancing on the path that Perón had undertaken but was
reluctant to carry forward because of his bourgeois leanings. Laclau would later reflect
critically on this experience, as it was still vitiated by class reductionism and an interpretation
of politics in terms of the mere representation of interests (NR: 199). Besides this aspect,
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Peronism was seen as representing the possibility of linking the democratic-bourgeois and the
socialist revolutions, in a swift transition from feudalism to socialism, which substantially
differs from Laclau's later thesis, according to which an agrarian type of capitalism had already
firmly taken hold in the country (Laclau, 1969: 391-400; Laclau, 1973: 122-125). Yet we cannot
but trace in the choice of this type of militancy, and in a fairly generous evaluation of
Peronism, the genesis of Laclau's propensity to think in national-popular terms as well as
beyond the rigid boundaries imposed by the crudest versions of Marxism and to see
emancipation as something exceeding the proposition of too narrow identities.
It is not a coincidence that Abelardo Ramos, along with Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, Arturo Jauretche
and the whole FORJA group, a political subject of populist-nationalist orientation coming from
the Argentinean radicalism who likewise supported Perón in opposition to Argentinean
liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s, appear in the text that is taken here as marking the first
discontinuity in Laclau's thinking. In Argentina - Imperialist Strategy and the May Crisis (Laclau,
1970), he decidedly puts forward for the first time an endorsement of the populist road:
The populism of the working-class and the jacobinism of the petty bourgeoisie will then be combined
and surpassed in a form adequate to the tasks of the revolution: the destruction of the capitalist state
and the elimination of imperialism (Laclau, 1970: 20).
How does Laclau come to this first rescue of populism and associate it with the working-class?
What is the nexus? It is here where the connection with his previous reflections on political
economy becomes most evident. For Laclau, the Argentinean Liberal state had differed from
other Latin American export-led growth experiences between 1860 and 1930. The differential
rent yielded by the fertility of pampa's soil, the monopoly of land and the scarcity of work
force enabled the early development of capitalist relations of production and a generation of
wealth unheard of in neighbouring countries. This surplus made for a marked distributive
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capacity of the Argentinean oligarchy, the development of artisan industries designed to cater
oligarchic consumption, a certain stratification of the social order with a nascent middle class,
as well as a rapid process of urbanisation. Politically, this translated into the fact that even
those who challenged the oligarchy and pushed for a more radical redistribution of the
surplus, tended towards an internal reform of the system rather than the questioning of the
socio-economic model as a whole (Laclau, 1969: 291-300; Laclau, 1970: 10). But with the
Great Depression the model was in tatters: the dependent character of Argentinean
capitalism had become evident, with liberalism increasingly becoming 'an ideological cover for
the penetration of British capital into the country' and with the 'affirmation of the necessity
for autonomous industrial growth based on expropriation of the wealth of the oligarchy'
(Laclau, 1970: 11-12). Here, the cleavage within the Argentinean left comes neatly to the fore.
On one side, the main nuclei of the Argentinean Left, chiefly comprising the Socialist and
Communist Parties, welcomed imperialism as a civilising event, sided with the liberal forces in
the attempt to re-establish and democratise the Liberal state that was shattered in 1930
through a military coup, and later conceptualised Peronism as a sort of Fascist movement. On
the other, the national and third-worldist Left that saw Peronism as containing promising anti-
oligarchic and anti-imperialist traits, somehow recognised that 'all those social groups linked
to internal domestic production, which had developed since the 1930s as a result of import-
substitution policies' (Laclau, 1970: 12) experienced their first direct mass involvement under
Peronism. However, not only the working-class of recent formation, but also that which
emerged out of the older artisanal workshops - as well testified by the classical sociological
work of Murmis and Portantiero (1971) - were part of the social bases of Peronism. Thus,
while no precise definition of populism is given at this point, what Laclau conveys is the
peculiarly distinct type of political mobilisation of the working class, which remained distant
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from the classical ‘political outlets’ of the Left and found expression in a charismatic
leadership, with clear nationalist tendencies. It comes as no surprise that in the following text
dedicated to exploring the connections between Peronism and revolution, Laclau defines
nationalism 'as the highest level of working class revolutionary consciousness' (Laclau, 1973:
128).11 At this stage, Laclau is still very much influenced by his Trotskyist experience. This is
explicit in his appraisal of Trotsky's exhortation to focus on national peculiarities and the
intolerance towards the subordination towards the interests of the Soviet Union imposed by
Stalin on communist parties (Laclau, 1973: 118, 128). It is also to be noted that, although no
longer persuaded by the thesis of the democratic-bourgeois step, Laclau's perspective remains
decidedly revolutionary as the above quotation well testifies.
Still revolutionary, but much more nuanced is the take of Laclau in the second breaking point
identified here with the two 1977 essays published for the first time in PIM, Fascism and
Ideology and Towards a Theory of Populism. The two essays display the emergence of the first
traits that will define Laclau's contribution: categories such as ideology, dislocation and empty
signifier make their initial debut; but most importantly for our purposes hegemony and
populism appear here in a considerably refined theoretical configuration. A minor detail
reveals the shift: an extensive quote of Trotsky is reported, but this time the primary intention
of Laclau is that of revealing his class reductionism, his incapacity to think beyond the
conception of a mere proletarian revolution (PIM: 130-131). Rather, the two essays sanction
the broadening of Laclau's horizon and his preoccupation for the articulation of the middle
classes, which happens at a political and ideological level. As he puts it:
11Although such an explicit appraisal of nationalism will no longer find space in the oeuvre of Laclau, it is
possible to claim that the possibilities for emancipation remain decidedly tied to the horizons of the nation
and of the state. This is so despite some later mild and not particularly well-argued openings toward the
necessity 'to open up new spaces for popular struggles' in supranational communities (NR: 59).
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The struggle for the articulation of popular-democratic ideology in class ideological discourses is the
basic ideological struggle in capitalist social formations. [...] This means that the middle classes are the
natural arena for democratic struggle, and at the same time, as we have seen, the arena par excellence
of political class struggle (PIM: 114).
But let us look more specifically at how the two concepts that we are concerned with figure in
the two essays. The treatment of hegemony is still at a very embryonic level. As he puts in a
footnote of the penultimate text Fascism and Ideology: '[t]he concept of hegemony, such as it
was defined by Gramsci, is a key concept in Marxist political analysis and one which needs to
be developed in all its implications' (PIM: 141). He then goes on to mention a number of
remarks developed in a (by then) unpublished work by Chantal Mouffe, which would come to
light only a little later (Mouffe, 1979). It is important to stress the importance of Mouffe in
this respect, because it is precisely her early interest in the work of Gramsci that will then
spark Laclau's attention towards the insights of the Italian Marxist.
It is in the following essay Towards a Theory of Populism that a somewhat vague notion of
hegemony is initially put forward, along with an extensive elaboration of the concept of
populism. In a nutshell, the hegemony of a dominant class rests on its capacity to articulate
non-class interpellations and contradictions as well as some elements of the discourses of the
dominated classes. This move is predicated on the key recognitions that there is no such thing
as a causal link between base and superstructure as postulated in the vulgar versions of
Marxism and that not all existing ideological elements have a class belonging, as some of them
have a popular-democratic character (PIM: 158). However, it is paramount to highlight that
hegemony here does not presuppose the imposition of a uniform conception of the world, but
rather an articulation of different visions in such a way that their potential antagonism is
neutralised (PIM: 161-162). On this point, it could be observed that there exists a certain
tension with the position of Gramsci, for whom, as noted in the previous chapter, hegemony
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does entail a moral and intellectual reform that brings about a general modification of the
ideological orientation.
As for populism, it is defined in terms of 'the presentation of popular-democratic
interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology’
(PIM: 172-173). Let us note that it is not simply the predominance of popular-democratic
interpellations that constitute a populist discourse. As stated above, these are also present in
the hegemonic discourse of a dominant class, but they do not make such a discourse populist.
While in the discourse of the dominant class these ideological elements are absorbed and
blunted, and in such a way rendered as simple differential particularities, their potential
antagonism is instead fully developed in a populist discourse as such interpellations are
directly pitted against the state (PIM: 172-173). It can thus be said that populism is
characterised by Laclau in terms of the prevalence of non-class, popular-democratic
interpellations and antagonism against the current political framework.
Another proviso is needed. This prevalence needs indeed to be characterised in a more
nuanced manner, as it is only quantitative, but not qualitative. Laclau upholds at this point
that only certain classes can meaningfully lead the articulation of non-class ideological
elements. Laclau indeed retains the notion that the antagonism at the level of the relations of
production determines in the last instance the historical processes (PIM: 159-160). Such
classes are defined as those that perform a basic role in the relations of production - thereby
restricting the scope to the bourgeoisie (or fractions thereof) and the working class. What
exists between them is a fundamental and irreducible antagonism, whose actual
confrontation, however, can only be played out at the political and ideological level, where
non-class elements intermingle, thereby ruling out as reductionist any attempt to present
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classes in uncontaminated terms (PIM: 160). Laclau thus refers to such classes as the
articulating principles of ideological discourses: while the principles do not determine a priori
the actual and precise contents of a given discourse, they do have a bearing on the form and,
by the same token, on the direction of the discourse as a whole. Clearly, the influence of
Gramsci and Althusser are decisive here, as well as the concomitant political orientation
directed at putting forward a more refined version of socialism (Howarth, 2004: 272 -
footnote 4).
Laclau also draws a distinction between two general kinds of populism: on one side, a
reactionary populism when it is led by a new fraction of the dominant bloc that wants to
assert its dominion; on the other an emancipatory one when it is launched by the working
class (PIM: 173-174). Summarising the above then, populism can be captured as the attempt
of each fundamental class to present itself in antagonistic fashion as the true incarnation of
the 'people' or of the 'national interests' (PIM: 161). Straddling between the two is instead
Peronism, on which Laclau's take seems to appear more critical if compared to a few years
before. He qualifies Peronism as a Bonapartist regime, whereby populism becomes the
articulation of different -isms, a move which concretely entailed the state becoming the
mediator between different groups in their antagonism against liberalism. This in turn
resulted in the proverbial ideological vacuity of Peronism (PIM: 197-198).
But how do hegemony and populism exactly relate though? Let us quote this revealing
passage:
classes cannot assert their hegemony without articulating the people in their discourse; and the specific
form of this articulation in the case of a class which seeks to confront the power bloc as a whole, in
order to assert its hegemony, will be populism (PIM: 196).
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The two terms are linked in such a way that populism becomes the road to hegemony of
those subjects that, as of yet, do not hold it. What changes once hegemony is attained? It can
be inferred from Laclau's text that once a class and its allies transform into the hegemonic
power bloc, the antagonistic dimension fades. In any case, and to sum up somewhat
schematically, populism amounts to the only realistic bid for power for a fundamental social
subject that intends to alter the existing political framework by way of a different and
antagonistic articulation of the existing elements.
However, as we have seen, the subject is still a social subject. In this sense, we are still of
course very much within a conception by which 'the anatomy of civil society is Political
Economy' (Marx, 1970: 20), that is a view of history as history of production. A view that, as
we know, Laclau would later condemn with explicit reference to this phrase (Laclau and
Mouffe, 1987: 91; also in NR: 111; OPR: 144) and with a noticeable disengagement from
political economy, which starts to make itself visible already at this stage. Thus, ideological
elements may not have a specific class belonging, but 'the level of production relations always
maintains the role of determination in the last instance in any social formation' (PIM: 108) and
'[p]opular-democratic struggle is subordinate to class struggle and democratic ideology only
exists articulated as an abstract moment in a class discourse' (PIM: 170-171). However, it is to
be admitted that the take expressed in the two essays is a fairly original one, allowing for
variations of the 'deeper movement' of history and thus anticipating further moves in the
development of his thought.
Such moves would not take long before they made their emergence. The sociological
inflection and the emphasis on class and predetermined actors more generally are entirely
demolished in what is identified here as the third breaking point. Commonly, it is Hegemony
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and Socialist Strategy (HSS) to be taken as the watershed between the Marxist Laclau and the
post-Marxist Laclau. However, a look at his writings between 1977 and 1985 reveals that
Laclau had already undertaken this shift at the beginning of the 1980s, with Populist rupture
and discourse (Laclau, 1980) introducing a number of significant novelties. The notion of
discourse and its correlate discursivity are officially introduced into the Laclauian perspective:
By 'discursive' I do not mean that which refers to 'text' narrowly defined, but to the ensemble of the
phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble which
constitutes a society as such. The discursive is not, therefore, being conceived as a level nor even as a
dimension of the social, but rather as being co-extensive with the social as such (Laclau, 1980: 87).
Such an elucidation is functional to a new way of conceptualising antagonism. For Laclau,
antagonism is neither an empirical real opposition à la Kant nor a dialectal contradiction à la
Hegel, but a relation of contradiction which emerges within discourse, that is through a
contextual positing of an ensemble of positions as opposed to another pole. In other words,
neither the positivity of every object is guaranteed nor can the logical opposition between
different objects be assumed. Antagonism arises as a meaningful creation through a series of
discursive operations. It follows that subordination does not naturally engender its
resistance.12 Rather, it is only to the extent that a series of equivalences between diverse
elements is antagonistically created in relation to a dominant force that a subject is born and
a populist rupture is carried out (Laclau, 1980: 88-90). However, while populism is about the
exacerbation of antagonism, bourgeois hegemony is about the re-absorption of antagonism
through systems of co-optation. In other terms, populism works towards the construction of a
new hegemony by way of constructing a chain of equivalences between positionalities that
12This is well conveyed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy where Laclau and Mouffe clearly differentiate
subordination from oppression. While the former merely conveys an actual hierarchy, whereby 'an agent is
subject to the decisions of another', the latter designates the moment when 'those relations of
subordination […] transformed themselves into sites of antagonism' (HSS: 153-154).
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thereby become popular through their insertion into a dichotomous division of society. On the
contrary, a hegemony based on transformistic moves tries to maintain such positionalities as
merely democratic - i.e. they are differentially satisfied so as to impede their coagulation in a
broader popular identity (Laclau, 1980: 92-93). The argument is further extended in Socialist
Strategy. Where Next? (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981), an explicit introduction to HSS in which
Laclau and Mouffe directly confront Marxism and make explicit that the centrality of the
working class in a hegemonic project cannot be a given (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 22).13 At the
same time, in the aforementioned text The Impossibility of Society, the open-endedness of
any social formation is explicitly formulated and the remaining traces of a topography of the
social are eliminated. Here, society has no ground, no law of motion, and yet it is
characterised by continuous and partial attempts 'to act over that social, to hegemonize it'
(Laclau, 1983: 22; also in NR: 91). It means that that different discourses will attempt to fix the
identities of a system and will prevail only contingently.
Hegemony, the only game left in town
In the following years, other writings set up the ground for the appearance of HSS. Before I
plunge into scrutinising its contents, it is important to register two major novelties that, in the
early 1980s, constitute the background of stimuli and inducements which influence Laclau.
The first is the deepening of Laclau's engagement with the work of Gramsci, the debates
around his legacy taking place in Italy and their impact on the politics of the PCI. One of his
works is entirely dedicated to the figure of Togliatti (Laclau, 1980b), and most of them actively
and positively engage with the Gramscian notions of war of position, integral state and
13However, the book was published four years after the article.
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historic bloc (Laclau, 1980b: 257; Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 20; Laclau, 1981: 53-54). Tellingly,
Laclau quotes some passages of Gramsci that were already available in the English translation
but does so by translating them himself from the Italian edition (Laclau, 1980c: 134). The
question of hegemony here becomes increasingly central and overshadows the theme of
populism. Hegemony is cashed out not in terms of mere political leadership, but as a
progressive modification of common sense and the attainment of a general rearticulation of
society (Laclau, 1981: 54), in a way that maintains a similarity with the Gramscian
interpretation provided by Williams. For Laclau however, hegemony emerges as a rejection of
the revolution/reform dichotomy and the recognition that socialism can be achieved only as a
result of partial ruptures (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 20; Laclau, 1981: 54). The second novelty
is Laclau's increasing attention to the proliferation of new antagonisms and, as we have seen,
the concomitant suspension of the apodictic privilege previously granted to class (Laclau
1980b: 258; Laclau, 1980c: 102, 125; Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 21-22; Laclau, 1981: 57). Here,
Laclau is attracted by the opening of new sites of confrontation with capitalism that from the
late 1960s onwards sprang up - feminism, environmentalism, pacifism, anti-imperialist
struggles, minority groups' claims - and the necessity to find a synthesis between them under
a clearly emancipatory perspective. Moreover, '[t]hird World societies have never been
comprehensible in terms of a strict class analysis' (Laclau, 1985: 30). At the same time, there
emerges a particular sensibility for the autonomy of these emerging demands. As he states
with Mouffe:
this unity can in no way proceed via the imposition from above of a unifying principle that seeks to
obliterate the differences and homogenise the social field in authoritarian style [...] It cannot be simply a
question of adding women's demands to the existing list of those demands considered as socialist; the
articulation between socialism and feminism must involve a radical transformation in the way socialism
is customarily viewed (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 22).
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It is also worthwhile noting the connection between the distancing from populism and the
question of autonomy of the new social movements. In relation to their recent emergence in
Latin America, Laclau notes how the totalising moment inherent to populism, one of the two
most relevant political matrices in the continent up to that point, is called into question.14
This, he claims, puts an end to the crystallisation of mobilisation in terms of equivalence, and
rather opens up a number of new and unexplored political spaces (Laclau, 1985: 41). Yet he
affirms in relation to the Brazilian political scenario that '[t]he task of the opposition […] is to
try and construct a broader system of equivalences, i.e. where democratic positionalities are
not assimilated separately, but where they can unite around new popular subjects' (Laclau,
1985b: 87-88).15
Be that as it may, the terrain is set for HSS. Let us recapitulate the main moves undertaken by
Laclau and Mouffe in this fundamental theoretical cornerstone of post-Marxism. The book
sets itself the purpose of tracing a genealogy of the notion of hegemony with the aim of
further radicalising it. Hegemony, the authors maintain, initially creeps into Marxist debates as
a result of the reflections of 'the broken mirror of 'historical necessity'' (HSS: 8). In particular,
it is two empirical stumbling blocks that made their appearance towards the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th century that spurred the development of the notion: on one
side, the need to overcome the fragmentation between different struggles and subject
positions that impeded the working class' transformation from a ‘class in itself’ into a ‘class for
itself’, on the other the 'uneven and combined development' of the Russian context, which
14In another coeval text, such a distancing takes a more nuanced form by specifying that his perplexity is
addressed to the military developmental politics that obliterated difference (Laclau,1985b: 84-85).
15Similarly, a couple of years later he warns against the danger of 'a world of purely autonomous movements'
as 'it will not be a democratic place at all' (Laclau, 1987b: 32). Such an ambiguity is further reinforced by
another 1987 text where it is claimed that contemporary forms of resistance in Latin America have
politicised social relations, while not going towards a 'popular dichotomous unification'. This is deemed by
Laclau as a fragmentary and plural enhancement, but at least 'can give more political stability to the
regimes that build themselves on the ruins of the anti-popular dictatorships' (Laclau, 1987: 38).
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posed to the local working class the ‘need’ to take upon itself – to hegemonise - a task that
was not meant to be its own in the Marxist schemata, namely the democratic-bourgeois
revolution (HSS: 8-10, 48-49).
Let us now consider the two moves that the authors put forward and which qualify their re-
elaboration of the concept. The first one corresponds to the complete abandonment of the
base/superstructure distinction. Accordingly, there are no mechanical or causal relations
between different planes of the social, or to cash it out in Marxist jargon, what goes on in the
political and ideological realms cannot be traced back to the economy. The privilege granted
to the relations of production is then withdrawn and consequently the hierarchical and
topographical differentiation between different spheres of the social is suspended. The latter
point shows how radical this move is, as it projects the contribution of Laclau and Mouffe well
beyond those formulations which allow for a larger space of indeterminateness and limit the
efficacy of the inherent laws of the ground, while ultimately maintaining a topographical
structuration of the social and postulating the determination in the last instance of the
economy (as in the case of Althusser and Williams). As put by Laclau and Mouffe in order to
distinguish their account:
the debate between economist and anti-economist tendencies within Marxism was necessarily reduced
to the secondary problem of the weight that should be attached to the superstructures in the
determination of historical processes. Yet the most ‘superstructuralist’ of conceptions retained a
naturalist vision of the economy - even when it attempted to limit the area of its effects (HSS: 76).
As a corollary of this, and as anticipated above, the centrality of the working class is discarded
in the name of the impossibility to attribute objective interests to it: 'fundamental interests in
socialism cannot be logically deduced from determinate positions in the economic process'
(HSS: 84). While in PIM non-class elements acquire a certain political direction only insofar as
they are articulated to a fundamental class (whose interests are treated as a given), what
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emerges in this seminal text is that no element has a secured identity. This is precisely so
because there is no ontologically privileged point of irradiation, or a pervading essence, which
determines, neither strictly nor in tendential fashion, the movements of the other planes.
Hence, not only is teleology debunked, but also the very possibility of fixing a necessary
identity of a given agent is severely questioned. In this sense, identity becomes purely
relational and contingent, as it finds its origin in the articulation that is established with other
elements (HSS: 86). Clearly then, Laclau is also implicitly criticising his own previous account,
where the working class and the bourgeoisie represented necessary points of anchorage. In
parallel, the authors recognise the multiplication of positions of which a subject can be a
bearer. The entailment for emancipatory action is clear:
a variety of other points of rupture and democratic antagonisms can be articulated to a socialist
'collective will' on an equal footing with workers' demands. The era of ‘privileged subjects’ - in the
ontological, not practical sense - of the anti-capitalist struggle has been definitively superseded (HSS:
87).
And yet none of these subject positions are inherently progressively oriented, as in the case of
the working class. As mentioned, the push exerted on the authors by the concomitant
proliferation of the new social movements and its respective burgeoning literature can be
clearly appreciated in this text and is later openly admitted by Laclau (Laclau, 1988: 12; also in
NR: 180). This influence is clear not only in the final chapter of the text where their normative
proposal comes across as somewhat tailored to the new social movements, but also and most
importantly in the setting out of a new political ontology. Clearly, it was not only the social
movements to have had a bearing in this re-orientation. The parallel decline of working class
influence in post-industrial countries, the initial fading of the Fordist system, the penetrating
effects of capitalist relations of production into new spheres of social life, the
bureaucratisation inherent to the welfare state model, the appearance of mass protests in
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Third World countries that owed little to traditional class struggle, the clear signs of
exhaustion of the Soviet model and other ‘actually existing socialism’ experiences have also
had an admitted impact on the shaping of HSS (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 80; also in NR: 97).
However, we should not forget to take into account the strong influence exerted by a series of
theoretical breakthroughs taking place in those years, such as Derrida's deconstruction and
Foucault's genealogical method (Howarth, 2004: 272 - footnote 4).16
In this sense, HSS occupies a central role as it confirms the will of Laclau and Mouffe to
demolish any foundational ground. Where does this formulation take us? Given that no
positive essence exists, we are faced with an openness of the social - intended as the
expansion of meaning through the proliferation of differences - making it possible to speak of
a 'negative essence'. In such a framework, various social orders attempt - but ultimately fail -
to domesticate the field of differences (HSS: 96). As hinted above, these attempts are
conducted by way of an articulating practice that establishes a relation among elements,
which are in turn modified as a result of their joining. Here, we are given an additional
definition of discourse: it is the totality resulting from such an articulation (HSS: 105). A
discourse is not a given and delimited positivity though, as the relation established between
differences 'will be incomplete and pierced by contingency' (HSS: 110). Only partial fixations
will be possible thanks to the intervention of privileged discursive points - the so called nodal
points - which fix the meaning of a signifying chain (HSS: 112). Such points, however, cannot
be defined a priori but emerge only contextually. Further to this, Laclau and Mouffe formalise
the political logics of equivalence and difference; in nuce, such logics account for the
16In Teorías marxistas del Estado: Debates y Perspectivas (Marxist Theories of the State: Debates and
Perspectives), Laclau anticipates his interest in Foucault's theory of power and the necessity to include
psychoanalysis and linguistics into the field of political theory (Laclau, 1981: 57-58). In HSS, there is an
incipient engagement with Lacan that, as we shall see, will become more sustained in the 1990s and 2000s.
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processes of collective mobilisation that give birth to, defend and naturalise new political
frontiers, as well as the opposite process, that is the attempt to interrupt or break up the
drawing of frontiers (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 141). In short, Laclau and Mouffe devise the
logic of equivalence when the political space is simplified through the substitutability of the
elements of a system, and the logic of difference when it becomes increasingly complex
through the expansion of the elements of the system (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130). I shall
return to this when approaching Laclau's renewed notion of populism.
Only here can Laclau and Mouffe fully unravel the upshot of their line of reasoning insofar as
the notion of hegemony is concerned:
The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory practices, that is, a field where
the 'elements' have not crystallized into 'moments' […] It is because hegemony supposes the incomplete
and open character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated by articulatory practices
(HSS: 134).
It would seem at this point that the notion of hegemony retains the same core meaning of
Laclau's previous attempt to define it. This is true, but only up to a point: while the deep (and
continuing) sense of the notion lies in the practice of articulating disparate elements, other
two conditions are introduced here by Laclau and Mouffe. Firstly, hegemony clearly
designates the instability of any system as it lays bare its contingency. Secondly, 'in order to
speak of hegemony, the articulatory moment is not sufficient. It is also necessary that the
articulation should take place through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices'
(HSS: 135). The contrast with the previous account by Laclau is sharp:
The ideology of the dominant class, precisely because it is dominant, interpellates not only the members
of that class but also members of the dominated classes. The concrete form in which the interpellation
of the latter takes place is a partial absorption and neutralisation of those ideological contents through
which resistance to the domination of the former is expressed. The characteristic method of securing
this objective is to eliminate antagonism and transform it into a simple difference (PIM: 161).
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In PIM antagonism is, so to speak, withheld, retired. In HSS instead, hegemony becomes a
synonym of articulation cum antagonism, that is the creation of sharp (and yet always
susceptible to variation) frontiers with other discourses. While before hegemony represented
the apex of a successful articulation which then suspends (or at least assuages) antagonism,
now antagonism is seen as playing a crucial role in the sustenance of hegemony.17 This is
because antagonism becomes the very index of the limit of objectivity, of its susceptibility of
being undermined and reconstructed. Moreover, antagonisms are conceptualised as occurring
because social agents are prevented from achieving their identities (HSS: 125). It may seem a
minor matter, but deep repercussions follow from this. In fact, under this new theorisation, it
becomes difficult to conceptualise those social orders that while abiding to the Lefortian
empty space of power (without falling, that is, to the temptation to 're-establish the unity
which democracy has shattered between the loci of power, law and knowledge' (HSS: 187)),
still manage to some extent to 'naturalise' social relations. Postulating that the limits of
objectivity are given by the antagonism established with what lies outside, is defied by the
plausible circumstance of having an exteriority which is presented as non-antagonistic. As a
result, conceptualising hegemony as strictly tied to antagonism obscures the possibility of the
institutionalist discourse, precisely because it fails to consider that power blocs tend to
neutralise differences in a non-antagonistic fashion, while remaining ultimately hegemonic
(that is, articulatory and unstable in nature). In other terms, what is obscured in making
hegemony necessarily antagonistic is that any system will attempt to conceal its contingency
to some degree, and this will be done by way of assuaging the antagonistic thrust inherent to
its initial irruption. The welfare state is a neat example: while it is perfectly possible to tell
17On this point, a certain ambivalence is still present though. In another 1985 text, Laclau states that
'[h]egemony can present itself in two forms: by way of transformism, or by way of popular rupture. The first
one is based on transforming antagonisms into differences' (Laclau 1985b: 75). This clearly implies a
softening of antagonism.
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apart those ‘inside’ from those ‘outside’, the constitution of the limit is not necessarily
antagonistic (Stäheli, 2004: 226).
The theoretical move just described is tied to the further historico-theoretical step which they
name democratic revolution. 'This decisive mutation took place two hundred years ago and
can be defined in these terms: the logic of equivalence was transformed into the fundamental
instrument of production of the social' (HSS: 155), where by equivalence the authors intend a
process of constituting a signifying system through the dissolution of the internal differences,
which can become enchained and establish a commonality posited on their shared opposition
to a negative object external to them (HSS: 127). Accordingly, articulation becomes possible
only in modern times with the end of closed societies, which, regulated as they were by a
theological-political logic, determined in transcendental fashion fixed differential positions for
individuals. Politics in that context could not be anything but a continuous repetition of
hierarchical relations in a clearly delimited space. As he puts in a coeval text: 'a medieval
peasant community reproduced itself on the basis of a very rigid articulation of positionalities,
which precluded any reshaping or rearticulations. The hegemonic form of the political was
absent' (Laclau, 1985b: 73). Only the introduction of the democratic horizon made it possible
to think of articulating different forms of resistance to subordination, thereby ushering the
possibility of a continuous play of differences. As this play now cannot be frozen, it necessarily
implies the drawing and redrawing of boundaries - transforming the antagonism in the very
factor presiding over both the possibility and instability of any system of differences. This is
why hegemony now defines the modern form of politics, rather than being synonymous with
the articulatory supremacy of a power bloc - even though this meaning is subtly retained too
(HSS: 138, 154-155). As put some time later: '[a] society is democratic […] insofar as it refuses
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to give its own organization and its own values the status of a fundamentum inconcussum'
(Laclau, 1988: 19; also in NR: 187).
However, the line of reasoning pursued by Laclau and Mouffe that makes this transformation
possible needs to be problematised: if the lack of ground is an ontological property and not an
ephemeral historical condition, it must also underlie the periods governed by transcendental
politics. In other words, contingency must be necessary and trans-historical in order to be
truly ontological, otherwise it falls back into the ontical registry. The high degree of closure
displayed by past societies was not the reflection of an objectively pre-determined script,
whereby a positive essence really existed back then, whereas now it does not: what the
democratic revolution sweeps away is the coercive sedimentation of social relations, that is, a
particularly resistant positivity only passed off as immovable. But, if the democratic revolution
was possible in the first place, contingency must be upheld through and through. As
convincingly put by Critchley, all societies are tacitly hegemonic, but only some of them make
it explicit (Critchley, 2004: 115). To put it differently, it is not that the logic of contingency is
made possible/necessary by the equality imaginary unleashed by the French Revolution, but
rather that the logic of contingency is institutionalised. In these two senses then, HSS
represents a step back as compared to PIM.
The first of these two antinomies is only partly dispelled some time later, starting with New
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (NR). Let us begin from the end of the book. In NR,
an intervention by Slavoj Žižek is published as the closing chapter. In it, the Slovene issues a
warning to Laclau: if we hold that social subjects are threatened by the antagonism of ‘others’
and that their identity is so destabilised, the risk of essentialism is still around the corner, for
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this conception 'implies that that antagonistic relations could ultimately be transcended in the
name of a final emancipation' (Howarth, 2004: 260). As aptly put by Žižek:
it is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity with myself, but every identity
is already blocked, marked by an impossibility, and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest
of reality upon which we ‘project’ or ‘externalize’ this intrinsic, immanent impossibility (Žižek, 1990: 251-
252).
Rather, the lack is ontological and lies at the heart of subjectivity, a failure which cannot be
redeemed and which extends to social structures too. There is no need for antagonism in
order for us to conclude that a system is intrinsically unstable. However, the warning is only
partially taken onboard by Laclau. On one side, he recognises that 'every identity is dislocated
insofar as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions
of possibility at the same time' (NR: 39), thus suggesting that the introduction of dislocation
now replaces the function previously attributed to antagonism. Dislocation is defined by
Laclau in three ways: as the very form of temporality, that is the exact opposite of space,
where space is intended as a structural law of necessary successions; as possibility, in the
sense that a dislocated structure opens up a panoply of equally accessible avenues, and yet
the one chosen is undecidable a priori; and as the very form of freedom, understood as the
absence of determination, making the subject the bearer of a failed structural identity which
propels her to continuous acts of identification (NR: 41-44). Put otherwise, dislocation is that
primary ontological terrain which reveals that there is no structural identity as any subject is
the bearer of an always already failed structural identity, and that understanding society does
not amount to understanding it for what it is, but for what prevents it from being (NR: 44).
However, the replacement of antagonism by dislocation as the index of the limit of objectivity
is not fully accomplished, for at other junctures of the text Laclau clearly states otherwise. For
example: '[t]he crucial point is that antagonism is the limit of all objectivity' (NR: 17) and, a
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few pages later, the antagonising force 'blocks the full constitution of the identity' while also
being 'part of the conditions of existence of that identity' (NR: 21). Years later, Laclau would
bluntly recognise the errors committed in HSS and allegedly emended in NR:
antagonism is already a form of discursive inscription - i.e. of mastery - of something more primary
which, from New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time onwards, I started calling ‘dislocation’. Not
all dislocation needs to be constructed in an antagonistic way' (Laclau, 2004: 319).
As we have seen however, this is not so. In this sense, Urs Stäheli is perfectly right in affirming
that 'Laclau cannot escape from a circular construction of the relation between antagonism
and dislocation'. Consequently, the proposition to decouple the two notions such that it
becomes possible to think of the impossibility of a system prior of its antagonistic
symbolisation seems a convincing way to step out of this impasse (Stäheli, 2004: 234).18
Otherness should instead be substituted by the Derridean 'constitutive outside', which merely
conveys, as put by Norval in a text inserted in NR, that:
If any identity is necessarily contaminated by otherness and, as Lacan clearly shows, becomes what it is
only by reference to this otherness, it means that any discursive formation, in order to signify itself as
such, has to refer to something which is exteriorized in its formation (Norval, 1990: 137).
How about the location of hegemony as the form of political modernity? According to Frosini,
dislocation:
now extends the contingent structure to any social system which in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
emerged instead as peculiarly liked to the modern age. […] If dislocation has always been there, there
has always been myth, there has always been a process of reconstitution of social objectivity starting
from its "constitutive outside", there has always been "hegemony"; as a consequence, the transition to
modernity does not mark a radical discontinuity, it does not introduce a new form (Frosini, 2009: 154).
18A similar argument is also developed by Aletta Norval, who claims that the general logic of individuation
should be sundered from the notion antagonism: 'the general logic of individuation tells us nothing about
where and how political antagonisms may arise' (Norval, 1997: 70).
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This is not necessarily so and the fact that Laclau did not entirely solve the
antagonism/dislocation conundrum is responsible for this. To be fair, parts of the text may in
effect let us feel entitled to deduce what Frosini suggests, for example when Laclau states that
'a society from which the political has been completely eliminated is inconceivable - it would
mean a closed universe merely reproducing itself though repetitive practices' (NR: 35).19
Nevertheless, if we scratch the surface a little, when it comes to radicalising this line of
thought, Laclau recoils to the position expressed in HSS:
both the fragmentation and growing limitation of social actors, and the permanent dissociation between
social imaginaries and the mythical spaces capable of embodying them, are a process that is deeply
rooted in the democratic revolution of the last two centuries, as well as in the overall state of
contemporary societies.20 In relatively stable societies there is no distancing between inscription
surfaces and what is inscribed in them. 'Order' is immanent in social relations (NR: 81).
How about the explicit treatment of hegemony? Although hegemony is not the central theme
of the text, there emerges what Howarth calls the third (and final) model of hegemony of
Laclau (Howarth, 2000: 110). What defines it in contrast to the previous model where only the
contingency of the ideological elements was recognised, is the awareness that also the
subjects of hegemonic projects and social structures as such are contingent (NR: 28-29). With
this move, the connotation that Laclau had initially attributed to hegemony is once again
foregrounded: '[e]verything depends […] on who is in command. It is a question of hegemony
in the strictest sense of the term' (NR: 29). The question of command - and of power, one of
the most central notions in NR - is key here, as the coherence of neither the hegemonic
19This passage is echoed in another 1988 passage: 'no social practice, not even the most humble acts of our
everyday life, are entirely repetitive. 'Articulation', in that sense, is the primary ontological level of the
constitution of the real' (Laclau, 1988: 16; also in NR: 184).
20Despite locating the genesis of hegemony in the French revolution, Laclau now highlights that under
modern capitalism dislocatory relations inherent to processes of commodification, bureaucratisation and
globalisation create 'an accelerated tempo of social transformation' which requires 'continual rearticulatory
interventions', thus making the notion of hegemony ever more relevant (NR: 39).
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project nor of society can be assumed, and thus 'the hegemonic act will not be the realization
of a rationality preceding it, but an act of radical construction' (NR: 29). However, power of
whom? There is in this sense an ever-greater detachment from the literality, from the
contents, an irreconcilable split between the signifier and the signified. This comes
emphatically to the fore in the proposition of the notions of myth and social imaginary. While
the former consists in a 'space of representation' that sutures a dislocated system and thus
recreates a new objectivity (NR: 61), the latter is 'a crystallized myth' that becomes the very
form of fullness, 'an unlimited horizon of inscription of any social demand and any possible
dislocation' (NR: 61, 64). Both are presented as hegemonic operations, but one is led to
deduce that the latter is more radical, for its elasticity is greater, even though this happens, as
hinted above, at the cost of having 'the literal content […] deformed and transformed through
the addition of an indefinite number of social demands' (NR: 67). Nevertheless, this
formulation begs the question: hegemony of what? Hegemony here becomes simply the
byword for the chronic instability of any system in modern times, not the predominance of a
however flexible and malleable political project. If a particular project lends its name to a
social imaginary but whose normative essence becomes unrecognisable if compared to what
it used to be, then we should rather wonder whether it has suffered the hegemony of another
project. Surely, it is important to assume that any political project that incarnates fullness will
necessarily be contaminated and will not be able to impose itself in its purest form, but if an
ultimate anchorage with some substantial contents is not maintained, then speaking of
hegemony eludes the point. The bearing of Gramsci on Laclau here becomes ever more faded.
This paradox becomes is visible in the proposition that, as a dislocated structure is
constitutively decentred, then it also entails the existence of a plurality of power centres,
'each with different capacity to irradiate and structure' (NR: 40); not wrong at all as an
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assertion, but it should be precisely the augmented capacity of irradiating and structuring of a
particular project that constitutes the fulcrum of hegemony. Nevertheless, in the general
economy of Laclau's text, this argument is subservient to the point that the contemporary
world is ever more dislocated and thus offers a myriad of points of rupture. The 'accelerated
tempo of social transformation' (NR: 39) makes the ground on which capitalism relies ever
less stable, in turn making hegemonic constructions ever more central and opening a vaster
range of alternative possibilities (NR: 56). Here of course we are very far from William’s
interpretation of the Gramscian temporality, by which hegemonies tend to be lasting and
strictly associated with the mode of production. Maybe a more balanced view seems to be
that of Hall, according to whom, contra Williams, the length of a hegemonic principle is not
associated with the mode of production, but, contra Laclau, is not deemed to shift so
abruptly. A more detailed and conclusive discussion on this question of primary importance is
conducted in the fifth chapter.
Insofar as the broader context in which Laclau wrote this text is concerned, there seems to
appear here an optimism which runs counter to the depressed mood that affected the left in
those years after the fall of the Berlin wall, and amid the ongoing dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the triumph of capitalism on a global scale. This confirms that Laclau has always
been keen to shatter many of the prevailing conventions of the world he came from.
Significantly, the above mentioned events vindicated some of the fundamental theses of
Laclau - the rejection of the aprioristic privilege granted to the working class, the decline of
the classical leftist repertoire as a surface of inscription of new demands, the collapse of a
mechanistic understanding of the economy - and only in the sense of a possible
reconstruction of socialism, on healthier bases, that Laclau's mildly hopeful tone can be
understood. Yet the insistence on this plurality of spaces, of dislocations, of struggles, leads
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him to question what he terms the myth (intended here as plain illusion) of the monopoly
corporations' limitless capacity for decision-making (NR: 59). Almost thirty years later, it is
possible to claim that it was such an emancipatory optimism based on the simple
acknowledgement of the plurality of antagonistic sites to rely on a very frail ground rather
than capitalism. Here, the point is that dislocations - whose increasing weight he rightly
analysed - per se mean very little, as the possibility to turn them into antagonistic sites is
offset by the growing transformistic abilities of the current system. As we know, this
mechanism is well captured in the logic of difference which Laclau himself proposes, but
which receives in this text only a scant treatment. Moreover, as we shall see in more detail in
the fifth chapter, the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism seems well anchored to actual
contents, to a rationality whose influence we may deem as truly hegemonic, often without
being nominally particularly visible from the point of view of the signifier.
It is only later that Laclau comes to separate antagonism from dislocation slightly more visibly
and takes some strides toward the resolution of the above mentioned impasse. As he puts it
in his famous essay Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics: 'we are trying to signify the
limits of signification – the Real, if you want, in a Lacanian sense – and there is no direct way
of doing so except through the subversion of the process of signification itself' (Laclau, 1994:
170; also in E: 39). The Lacanian Real here amounts to the very disruption of any symbolic
network, which manifests itself through kinks and inconsistencies of representation.
Nevertheless, since a system in itself lacks a positive ground, the limits of a discourse cannot
be adequately represented and come to the fore only by way of an antagonism which grounds
a new system (Laclau, 1994: 169; also in E: 37-38). In other words, antagonism pertains to the
imaginary-symbolic order of reality, whereas dislocation is located in the Real, signalling its
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negative dimension as a limit of discourse (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004: 206). Or, as stated
by Frosini, antagonism is the 'becoming-action' of dislocation (Frosini, 2012: 179).
Yet the question is still not entirely exempt of ambiguities. On the question of
difference/equivalence, Laclau writes that: 'on the one hand, each difference expresses itself
as a difference; on the other hand, each of them cancels itself as such by entering into a
relation of equivalence with all other differences of the system' (Laclau, 1994: 169; also in E:
38). So far so good, but, in this inextricable tension, antagonism is invoked as necessary for
objectivity to be in place: '[o]nly if the beyond becomes the signifier of pure threat, of pure
negativity, of the simply excluded can there be limits and system (that is an objective order)'
(Laclau, 1994: 170; also in E: 38). Or, to put it another way, it is precisely the prevalence of the
equivalential dimension at the expense of the differential one that permits the representation
of the system as a totality (Laclau, 1994: 173; also in E: 41). What when the differential
moment prevails? What seems to be missing here is the recognition that a stable system does
not need antagonism to signify itself. It is the project that intends to subvert a stable system
that resorts to an antagonistic thrust by way of an equivalential enchainment of the excluded
categories. But the excluded categories are not necessarily expelled by the stable system in
antagonistic fashion, as the latter often tries to re-incorporate them or at least to assuage
their potential antagonism. In other words, the struggle between the will of antagonism and
the will to avoid antagonism is not well conveyed here. When Laclau states that '[i]f the
exclusionary system dimension was eliminated, or even weakened […] the system would be
blurred' (Laclau, 1994: 170; also in E: 38), it is precisely that which a system wants in order to
perpetuate itself.
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There is a further step in Laclau's conceptualisation of hegemony at this stage, which has to
do with the positive rendering of the Lacanian Real, for 'although the fullness and universality
of society is unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through the
presence of its absence' (Laclau, 1994c: 14; E: 53). The bottom line here is that:
[I]n a situation of radical disorder 'order' is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty
signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their
efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To
hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function (Laclau, 1994: 176; also in E: 44).
Precisely because the fullness is not a given and does not lie in an infrastructural ground, 'it
cannot have any form of representation of its own, and has to borrow the latter from some
entity constituted within the equivalential space' (Laclau, 1994: 174; also in E: 42). In this
sense, one of the elements of the equivalence is 'emptied' of its differential content, that is of
its specific signified, and comes to incarnate the universal function of representation of the
whole system. This empty signifier then is what in HSS Laclau and Mouffe term the nodal
point. The peculiarity inherent to this new terminology lies not only in the formality that the
linguistic tools he employs confer to his line of reasoning, rather it is the answer to the
question: 'what […] does determine that one signifier rather than another assumes in
different circumstances that signifying function [that of the empty signifier]?' (Laclau, 1994:
171; also in E: 40). The answer is the unevenness of the social, which means that different
struggles display different capacities to play the role of the empty signifier. In turn 'the result
of processes in which logics of difference and logics of equivalence overdetermine each other'
(Laclau, 1994: 175; also in E: 43), making the study of a particular conjuncture necessary in
order to determine what the empty signifier is.
While this dynamic is persuasively described, other perplexities - some of which will be made
explicit only in the fifth chapter - emerge when one observes that Laclau deems the relation
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by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent communitarian fullness as a
hegemonic relationship (Laclau, 1994: 175; also in E: 43). This 'victory', Laclau holds, is a
dangerous one, because the hegemonic operation tends to do away with the actual
promoters and beneficiaries of the signifier that is emptied of its own differential content.
What Laclau means here is that the banner under which a particular operation takes place
often tends to be sacrificed. Nevertheless, two problems stand out for comment at this stage
of the analysis. Firstly, this position is rather static, because by treating the empty signifier as
something necessarily pertaining to a specific camp, the frontier is rendered as immobile. At
this point of Laclau's trajectory, the theorisation of the floating signifiers is still not well
developed. As Laclau later puts in OPR: '[a] situation where only the category of empty
signifier was relevant, with total exclusion of the floating moment, would be one in which we
would have an entirely immobile frontier - something that is hardly imaginable' (OPR: 133).
This is not hard to understand: any demand, even the most prominent, if it is treated as a
claim and not as an actually organised political project, can be disputed by rival groups.
Secondly, we are once again faced with a totally ephemeral type of hegemony, whose
difference with Gramsci's version makes itself particularly palpable. It is certainly true that for
the Sardinian thinker the historic bloc is a hegemonic operation that entails that the promoter
(in his case, infrastructurally inferred) divests itself from its corporate interests, but this does
not mean that all those interests can be sacrificed, while in Laclau's rendering we are entitled
to suppose that this is quite a concrete possibility. Rather, at least some of the crucial tenets
put forward by a political project will need to be concretised in order to make talk of
hegemony legitimate. Once again, we are faced with an excessive privilege granted to the
signifier, while the signified becomes almost totally irrelevant. Curiously, we shall see that the
PCI moved over time precisely in the direction of sacrificing much of its raison d’être in the
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name of a debatable interpretation and application of the Gramscian legacy that entailed the
introjection of the political arguments of its adversaries.
What needs to be stressed is that what Laclau does here is a doubling of the notion of
hegemony, a move which - as we shall see - is not exempt of ambiguities. While the notion of
hegemony marginally retains the meaning of a contingent predominant articulation with a
particular normative orientation, the specificity of the empty signifier tells us about the
hegemonic dynamics of a particular element both within a single discourse and in society at
large. In fact, the empty signifier is nothing but the name of an absent fullness, a lacking state
of plenitude which cuts across society as a whole. Hegemony thus is the hegemony of a
discursive assemblage, but also the hegemony of a particular element within the community,
whose association with a certain camp however should not be treated as a given.
Populism and hegemony reloaded
Many of these themes are picked up and extended in On Populist Reason, where the author
rescues the notion of populism and attempts to conjugate it with that of hegemony. In this
sense, it is possible to say that the work represents the apex of formalisation of his own
political theory and it is to this version that the later problematisation will mostly refer. The
emphasis placed on populism throughout the text is no less unequivocal: 'populism is the
royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as
such' (OPR: 67). In terms of the political logics spelled out above, populism is defined as the
expansion of the equivalential logic at the expense of the differential one, an operation which
involves the drawing of an antagonistic frontier (OPR: 78). Again, it would seem that the only
game in town is antagonism. Yet, this is mediated by the recognition that, in stark contrast to
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populism, 'an institutionalist discourse is one that attempts to make the limits of the
discursive formation coincide with the limits of the community' (OPR: 81); conceding in this
case the privilege to the differential logic. In other words, while populism attempts to
articulate a number of elements in an equivalential chain on the basis of their shared
opposition to an enemy, institutionalism tries to deal with all the elements distinctly in order
to maintain the status quo and avoid the emergence of antagonism. In a sense, populism is
presented as an antagonistic articulation, just as in PIM. However, we never have an entirely
populist or entirely institutionalist discourse, to the extent that every identity is split between
its differential nature and its equivalential incorporation (OPR: 78) and thus '[e]quivalences
can weaken, but cannot domesticate differences' (OPR: 79). As a result, equivalence and
difference are fundamentally incompatible but both are required - and constantly at play - in
the constitution of the social, which in turn determines that any political intervention is by
necessity always populistic to an extent, no matters how little (OPR: 154).
This conclusion may seem in tension with the assertion that antagonism may indeed be
altogether absent if dislocation does not in the first place intervene to generate those
demands that will become the wherewithal of any populist experiment. As put by Laclau:
'[w]ithout this initial breakdown of something in the social order - however minimal that
something could initially be - there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, or, ultimately,
‘people’' (OPR: 85). The two takes may be accommodated by saying that antagonistic
challenges from rival projects may always emerge - thus obliging those in power to counter-
react - but that antagonism has no real condition to flourish and to constitute a new people
unless some sort of dislocatory experience takes place. Moreover, it should be noted that the
necessity of a breakdown in the social order for a truly (but by no means foregone) populist
intervention to take place, indicates that antagonism has been finally replaced by dislocation
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as the limit of objectivity and that the latter now functions as a mere possibility for
antagonism to emerge.
What about hegemony? Let us make a short digression on the basic elements of articulation.
In the text, Laclau refers to them simply as demands (OPR: 73)21. More specifically Laclau
introduces a tripartite distinction: initially a demand may emerge as a simple request, often
corresponding to a very punctual and narrow problem expressed by the population; if the
request is satisfied by the institution, it is the end of the story. However, requests may turn
into claims when they remain unsatisfied for a period and they are advanced more forcefully
(OPR: 73). As he details in a coeval text, while in English both fall under the umbrella of
'demands', in other languages they are more easily distinguished, such as in Spanish where
the word reivindicación takes up the meaning of imposing a request (Laclau, 2005b: 35). At
this point, Laclau discriminates between different types of claims (or reivindicaciones): they
can either be democratic demands, that is demands that tend to remain isolated, or popular
demands, i.e. those which in an inchoate manner start to come together so as to form a new
'people', but without yet forming a stable system of signification (OPR: 74). The distinction
between democratic and popular demands permits us to make a first inference as to what the
relationship between populism and hegemony would be: 'the first [democratic demands] can
be accommodated within an expanding hegemonic formation; the second [popular demands]
21As a side note, it is possible to observe that Laclau restricts the scope of the basic constituents of his
political ontology at the ontical level. In some of his previous accounts, signifiers of much more abstract
import are also employed (‘democracy’, ‘justice’, narrower ideological categories such as ‘militarism’ and
‘anti-Semitic racism’, but also much more context-specific symbolic references such as - as we shall see - the
Partisan resistance during WW2 and the Italian unification process (Risorgimento) in the case of the Italian
Communist Party, or Bolivarianism and the Liberal Revolution of Eloy Alfaro in the Ecuadorian Citizens'
Revolution). In a sense, this position seems to dispel a certain indeterminateness in this regard which is to
be found throughout the corpus of Laclau before OPR (Howarth, 2000: 117; Howarth, 2004: 268), but rules
out the legitimate possibility for a discourse to coalesce not only demands strictu senso, but also symbolic
references.
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presents a challenge to the hegemonic formation as such' (OPR: 82). To an extent, there is a
similarity with his early formulation: ‘[a] class is hegemonic […] to the extent that it can
articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is
neutralised' (PIM: 161). In fact, if we let alone that the element to be articulated is - as I have
just analysed - expressed differently (visions of the world vs. demands) and that discourse,
following the post-foundational turn, now replaces the apodictic role attributed to class, we
have a certain congruence between the two takes. Institutionalism then is a hegemonic
formation which seeks to accommodate demands (which thereby stop to be such or are at
least cushioned) and deter antagonism.
Is populism also hegemonic? Or is it only a road to hegemony? OPR presents a number of
novel theoretical moves, which entail a deepening of Laclau's engagement with both
linguistics and psychoanalysis, and suggest a way to conceptualise the relationship between
populism and hegemony. To begin with, Laclau equates hegemony with the rhetorical trope of
catachresis (OPR: 71-72). Catachresis is the 'naming [of] something which is essentially
unnameable' (OPR: 71), i.e. the employment of a figural term when a literal one is lacking. As
any political discourse is nothing but a contingent assemblage of elements which cannot be
conceptually apprehended, the attribution of a name follows the same dynamic that the
hegemonic logic is meant to embody: more precisely, 'the operation of taking up, by a
particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification' (OPR: 70). As further argued by
Laclau, the catachrestic operation is at the basis of the political construction of the people
(OPR: 72). At this point, if hegemony = catachresis and catachresis = populism, one is entitled
to deduce by transitive relation that populism is already in it and for itself hegemonic. Yet, a
margin for ambiguity remains. This is paralleled by the incertitude that I previously
highlighted: is the empty signifier the nodal point of a discourse or is it what already
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incarnates the absent fullness of society? In his distinction between the three models of
hegemony present in Laclau's corpus (the first corresponding to the one set forth in PIM, the
second one in HSS and the third from NR onwards), Howarth problematises the status of the
empty signifier in a similar vein:
while the second model implies a plurality of nodal points linked together in a discursive formation or
historical bloc by hegemonic practices, the third model suggests that the unity of a social formation is
constituted by an empty signifier that establishes the meaning of the other signifiers, that is to say, it
performs the totalizing function of linking together the elements of the system (Howarth, 2004: 268).
The answer to our previous question as to whether populism is in it and for itself hegemonic
or not clearly depends on how we conceptualise the empty signifier: if it is something that
keeps together the popular camp only, then we may talk of the hegemony of that signifier
within a particular chain of equivalence but not necessarily in society at large. If it is instead
the name of an absent fullness that the popular camp manages to incarnate and make its own
by temporarily filling it with its own contents, then it is inexorably hegemonic in the whole
social formation. The ambiguity remains as the empty signifier shifts from the leader (OPR:
100) (as the ultimate expression of a singularity that keeps together the people, while hardly
embodying a fullness that pre-exists the formation of the popular camp itself) to nationalism -
just to make an example - whereby '[i]t is not only that ‘nationalism’ can be substituted by
other terms in its role as empty signifier, but also that its own meaning will vary depending on
the chain of equivalences associated with it' (OPR: 227). The meaning of an alive leader - we
shall return to this point below - will hardly shift, as he/she can actively resist being
incorporated into different chains of equivalences. Moreover, the uncertainty is once again
reinforced by two factors: on one side, as already mentioned, the empty signifier is
considered simply as a privileged surface of inscription with no inherent normative vector.
Against this background, it would make more sense to speak of a hegemonic operation when
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a project with a substantive world view manages to fill that signifier with its own contents,
rather than when a particular signifier occupies a privileged societal position, since the latter
remains always susceptible of being appropriated by other projects, thus rendering talk of its
hegemony as a symbol entirely spurious. On the other, the possibility for a singularity
becoming the only point of anchorage, the only object conveying an absent fullness orienting
a whole social formation amid the 'accelerated tempo of social transformations' of post-
modernity, is particularly dubious.
Coming back to the employment of linguistics, Laclau operates a particularly important
deepening of his line of reasoning. When a popular symbol becomes the site of inscription of a
number of aspirations, its role cannot be strictly thought in terms of a passive expression of
these signifiers. Rather, it has a much more active function: the symbol 'constitutes what it
expresses through the very process of its expression' (OPR: 99). In other words, it is not a
transparent medium, but is endowed with a proper structuring strength - an actual social
productivity that makes it possible for a number of unsatisfied demands to coalesce, revealing
the retroactive effect of naming (OPR: 108). What is it that makes for such a productivity? Its
force, Laclau argues, is given by affect, which entertains an intimate relationship with
signification: 'affect is required if signification is going to be possible' (OPR: 111).
Psychoanalytical categories are thus deemed by Laclau to go beyond their field of inception,
as they are part of a more general ontological reflection (OPR: 114). In this sense, Laclau
develops here a more sophisticated encounter with the positive dimension of the Lacanian
Real, the lack of which had been previously signalled by some of the scholars that were
formed under his supervision (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004: 209). This move is centred
around the notion that the subject is the bearer of a lost jouissance, that is a primordial and
irretrievable state of fullness associated with the mother/child dyad. This compels the subject
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to search for partial objects - which Lacan terms objects petit a.22 Laclau draws an interesting
equivalence here: the logic of the object petit a is the same as the hegemonic principle we
have seen so far. As he puts it: '[t]he partial object becomes itself a totality; it becomes the
structuring principle of the whole scene' (OPR: 113). The comparison is congruent with his
previous take that grants privilege to the signifier, as the fullness that is sought through a
partial object is purely mythical and will always evade us: the object, by being elevated to the
dignity of Thing, 'is simply the name that fullness receives within a certain historical horizon,
which as partial object of a hegemonic investment it is not an ersatz but the rallying point of
passionate attachments' (OPR: 116). In particular, as signalled above, the need to constitute a
new people 'arises only when that fullness is not achieved' - that is when dislocation shows
itself by way of a proliferation of demands - 'and partial objects within society (aims, figures,
symbols) are so cathected that they become the name of its absence' (OPR: 116-117).
Another move that Laclau conducts here is the clear differentiation that was anticipated
above between floating and empty signifiers. The floating signifier permits Laclau to account
for the fluidity of discourses and the possibility of shifts of the antagonistic frontier. Let us
briefly recapitulate what the notions consists in: a particular demand can receive the pressure
of rival projects, which try to attribute it a different meaning by way of an incorporation to
another chain of equivalences. The demand thus becomes indeterminate, and its meaning is
suspended, i.e. floating (OPR: 131). The difference with the empty signifier is that the latter
takes the frontier for granted and is concerned with the structuring of a popular identity,
while the floating signifier accounts for the displacement of the frontier. However, Laclau
22The partiality of the object is given precisely by its inability to delivering the mythical satisfaction that was
inherent to the mother/child dyad. Once the loss of this original Plenum has materialised, the subject can
enjoy satisfaction only through a partial object, or object of lack (Copjec, 2002: 59).
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argues that the distance is not that great as they both constitute two partial dimensions of
'any process of hegemonic construction of the 'people'' (OPR: 133).
Two more points are worth considering before turning to the empirical cases. In the first
place, much space is dedicated to the question of the leader in flesh and blood throughout his
initial discussion of Freud's contribution. Here, as we have seen in the first chapter, he
suggests with Freud that the leader can be a primus inter pares (OPR: 59). This would suggest
a democratic type of leadership, quite different from the despotic, narcissistic type of
leadership often imputed to populist rulers. Further to this, in the most substantive part of the
text, he argues that since the assemblage of disparate elements is necessarily maintained by a
singularity, an extreme form of the latter can be an individuality, that is the name of the
leader (OPR: 100). This definition is ambiguous for that would rule out actual persons, as
Arditi also notes (Arditi, 2010: 490) and would in principle fit only extreme cases such as
Peronism after Perón. However, immediately after, Laclau summons Hobbes and Freud, who
clearly refer to real individuals (OPR: 100). Again, in other interventions he openly allows for
the individuality to be represented by the leader, alive and kicking (Laclau, 2006: 119).
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this poses the problem of whether an individuality in flesh
and blood could be treated simply as a name, as a signifier that can be emptied at will.
As for the second point, in other interventions published in the 2000s, Laclau has put forward
his theory of populism as a medicine for the sorry state of the left nowadays. Populism
(together with hegemony) would then not just be categories of a general theory of politics,
but also the strategy for the left to follow, as epitomised by the title of his response Why
Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics (Laclau, 2006b) to Žižek's provocative
review of OPR (Žižek, 2006). Hints of this type can be found in On Populist Reason too
112
however, which echo some of the nuances found in Laclau's 1980s thought and testify his
return to a more active commitment with real politics:
A globalized capitalism creates myriad points of rupture and antagonisms — ecological crises, imbalance
between different sectors of the economy, massive unemployment, and so on — and only an
overdetermination of this antagonistic plurality can create global anti-capitalist subjects capable of
carrying out a struggle worth the name. And, as all historical experience shows, it is impossible to
determine a priori who the hegemonic actors in this struggle will be. It is by no means clear that they
will be the workers. All we know is that they will be the outsiders of the system, the underdogs — those
we have called the heterogeneous — who are decisive in the establishment of an antagonistic frontier
(OPR: 150).
But are Laclau's formulations ontologically and strategically cogent? And to what extent do
they shed light on the analysis of political and social phenomena? It is now time to tease out
some of the impasses through the empirical analyses of the following two chapters.
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Chapter 3: The Italian Communist Party between Togliatti and Berlinguer23
So far, I have reconstructed the development of the notions of populism and hegemony in the
corpus of Ernesto Laclau, as well as illustrated some of the antinomies that emerge from his
formulations. The empirical part of the thesis is meant to help us see these deficiencies more
clearly, identify others and provide some hints in order to overcome the theoretical impasses.
Let us start with the Italian case.
This chapter analyses the course of the PCI from 1944 until the early 1980s. However, it is not
to be intended as a precise recounting or reconstruction of all the historical events of the
post-war PCI. This empirical analysis is in primis meant to put into practice the theoretical
tools furnished by Laclau and understand how far they go in accounting for the political
phenomenon at stake. The latter task reveals that what is pursued here is not a simple
application of the Essex discourse theory: rather, starting from it, a prepositive
problematisation of the very instruments that it offers is put forward. It also needs to be
noted that precisely because the chapter is not concerned with strict historiographical
questions, the weight attributed to the different periods of the analysis is not even. In this
sense, particular emphasis is given to the first founding period from 1944 to 1947, when the
contours of the political practice that the PCI will by and large uphold for the following four
decades, are set out.
A temporal division of the chapter is proposed. The first section ‘Togliatti: partito nuovo and
progressive democracy’ deals with the remoulding of the party as set forth by Togliatti upon
his return to Italy in 1944. It thus introduces the main tenets of his political line, the peculiar
23A part of the work of this chapter draws from my MA dissertation (Mazzolini, 2014).
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traits that the party took up and the different interpretations that such a political course
engendered among academic and political commentators. Much attention is dedicated to the
equivalential enchainment that was established between heterogeneous demands and
signifiers and to the concrete ways in which this was achieved. Through an engagement with
primary sources such as party documents and speeches, which implies a careful look at some
of the most minute aspects of party life that constituted a peculiar political significance, this
section sheds light on the aesthetic, cultural and political dimensions that underpinned the
creation of a new people in the Italian post-war scenario around the PCI. Concomitantly,
owing to the peculiar mix of antagonism and constant search for compromise with other
political parties, a complex discussion on how the PCI is to be located along the
populism/institutionalism axis is put forward. The second section, ‘The 1950s and 1960s’,
presents some of the difficulties that the Cold War context posed to the Togliattian political
line between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, with the assimilation of a more markedly Stalinist
and antagonistic outlook that put under discussion the so called ‘Italian road to socialism’ and
made the relationship with the intellectuals much more complicated. It is worth stating that
from here onwards, the sources used are prevalently secondary, with the exception of the
interviews that I realised. The section then accounts for the later return of a more specifically
national line after Stalin's death. It also presents the political problematics of the 1960s,
before and after the death of Togliatti, with a look at how the PCI approached the students
and workers' protests of 1968-69 and at the first signs of the internal divisions that were to
emerge more clearly in the following decade. The third section, titled ‘The historic
compromise’, engages with the 1970s non-belligerence pact that the PCI Secretary General
Enrico Berlinguer stipulated with the Christian Democrats. This historic compromise indicated
that the PCI finally opted for the most moderate interpretation of the Gramscian and
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Togliattian legacy, which induced the party to assimilate the motives of its political adversaries
with the goal of overcoming the ostracism to which it had hitherto been subject at the hands
the rest of the political system. The final section ‘Populism and hegemony in the PCI’ advances
a theoretical reflection in view of the analysis conducted, with particular emphasis on the
particular status of the empty signifier of the PCI - communism itself - which was both
embraced and disavowed. It also explains how its peculiar organisational and political features
make it possible to call its practice counter-hegemonic but hardly populist, and goes on to
treat the question of the leader at some lenght. The section also briefly encompasses the so
called ‘second Berlinguer’ period between 1980 and 1984, i.e. the phase in which many of the
political choices taken in the previous decade were inverted.
Togliatti: partito nuovo and progressive democracy
The politics that characterised the new course of the party came to be known under the name
of partito nuovo (new party). Officially introduced in April 1944 just after the return to Italy
from exile of Palmiro Togliatti (Spriano, 1975: 386), this political line was upheld despite some
stops and 'obfuscations' (Natta, 1971: 75). Much has been written and said on whether this
line was a faithful translation of the Gramscian heritage, especially insofar as his Notebooks
are concerned. We shall not deal at length with this question here, which is more of a
philological preoccupation given the fragmentary nature of Gramsci's Notebooks.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting in passing that the position of Liguori on the matter seems
accurate: 'Togliatti largely conducted a politics of Gramscian inspiration within the limits set
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by his realism in the post-Yalta conference world' (Liguori, 2012: 59).24 Accordingly, the
distancing of Togliatti from Gramsci regarded three particular questions: the Gramscian war of
position did not refer to the anti-Fascist struggle but to a broader anti-capitalist struggle; the
party envisaged by Gramsci was not the mass party of Togliatti, but a party of cadres with a
Leninist configuration; and finally the full acceptance of pluralism and political democracy of
Togliatti clashed with the position of Gramsci, despite his openings towards the limits of force
(Liguori, 2012: 59). As we shall see, it is the first issue of the three, although presented in a
different guise, to have had a relevance in the internal debates a few decades later. More in
general, it is possible to concur with Alfredo Reichlin, a former prominent member of the PCI,
who states that the chief element that makes it possible to characterise Togliatti's politics as
Gramscian is the acknowledgment of the necessity to resolve, to “take upon oneself”, the
historical Italian knots, such as the Southern, the peasant and the Vatican questions (Interview
3).
Concretely, Giuseppe Vacca, a historian that was a member of the party's central committee
from the early 1970s until the party's dissolution in 1991, highlights that the politics
inaugurated by Togliatti in 1944 had its origins in the anti-Fascist struggle of the partisans,
which was composed by a vast range of political forces (Vacca, 1974: 263-264). The unity of
such forces to which the PCI contributed, as decreed by the so-called Salerno turning point
(from the name of the city where the first government of national unity was constituted with
the presence of Togliatti), was the prerequisite for the inauguration of a regime of
'progressive democracy' (Vacca, 1974: 263-266). It was the very historical contingencies that
made the struggle for a set of far-reaching socio-economic reforms to be bargained with the
24Laclau and Mouffe share the same view: '[i]t is therefore profoundly wrong to oppose Gramnsci (sic), as
some do, to Togliatti. The latter's objective […] was fundamentally Gramscian and fits perfectly into the
theoretical problematic of absolute historicism elaborated by Gramsci' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 19).
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other anti-Fascist allies as the best path to socialism, highlighting the role played by the 1948
Constitution that sanctioned a number of fundamental and progressive rights (Vacca, 1974:
278-282). The new strategy was to be broadly understood within the Gramscian framework of
analysis adopted by the party. Accordingly, 'capitalism never offers a situation of final clash
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, rather it is the task of the proletarian
«vanguard» to find allies among other classes and social strata such as peasants and middle
classes' (Sassoon, 1980: 9). Compromise was thus part and parcel of such an understanding.
This approach conceded that before a full conquest of state power, the communists had to
build their hegemony in the terrain of civil society through a war of position (Sassoon, 1980:
12-13, 32). These were the general coordinates of the distinctive re-elaboration of socialist
thought, often proudly termed as the ‘Italian Road to Socialism’.
More specifically, the PCI was part of a succession of unstable coalition governments - initially
extending even to the discredited monarchy - that transitioned the country out of the war and
paved the way for the establishment of a democratic regime. Overall, a cautious line
characterised the politics of the PCI as set out by its leadership. In the first public speech after
the end of the conflict delivered in Sesto San Giovanni, a Milanese suburb by then already
christened as the ‘Italian Stalingrad’ for its working-class base and the stoic fight put up
against Fascism, Togliatti pointed out: “The Communist Party does not advance class claims
but wants that the working class stretches out its hand to all those who are willing to
collaborate in the reconstruction of Italy” (Togliatti in Bocca, 1973: 385). The internal party
documents of those years confirm the same tendency. For instance, during a meeting of the
National Directorate held in late June 1945, Togliatti exhorted not to include “too much
socialism” in the programmes that the party was elaborating, otherwise the risk would have
been the breaking of the alliance with the other political parties (PCI, 1945b). When the
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government led by Ferruccio Parri was constituted – possibly the most left-wing leaning
cabinet formed between 1944 and 1947 as it had even three communist Ministries (including
Togliatti) – the leader of the PCI showed scepticism and the position of power was little
exploited in order to implement the so called 'progressive measures' that he envisaged
(Bocca, 1973: 438). Fearful of potential reactions in the centre and south of the country,
entirely liberated by the Western Allies and thus alien to the Resistance movement, but also
historically more conservative, Togliatti deemed it necessary to avoid scaring off the
'moderate' Italy and was rather more interested in the preparation for the general elections
(Bocca, 1973: 438-442). More specifically, the PCI did not want to lose the trust of the
Christian Democrats (DC): “We are available, as Communist Party, allied to the Socialist Party,
to forge a pact of common action with the party of the Christian Democracy […] for a common
programme of economic, political and social regeneration” (Togliatti in Spriano, 1975: 393).
This new social bloc had to be created while abiding by the rules of the liberal-democratic
game:
the acquisition of a leading role by a part of the working class […] determines […] a national social bloc
of a new type, recomposing exploited masses […] and this already indicates how a democratic revolution
naturally begins to intertwine with a socialist transformation. But at this stage of the process the
political form of its development cannot but be democratic (Vacca, 1974: 273).
Giorgio Amendola, one of the leading figures of the party later to be the chief character of the
so called right-wing within the PCI, took this even further in an internal meeting shortly after
the national liberation: “We need to highlight more the liberal function of the democracy of
new type in our action. The participation of private initiative in the reconstruction process is a
sign of liberality” (PCI, 1945b).
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It can easily be discerned that the main division of the political space that the party operated
during and in the first few years after WW2 was that between Fascism and anti-Fascism.
Within the latter, the PCI played the card of presenting itself as the most anti-Fascist political
subject of all (Spriano, 1975: 388). Along with the Fascists, the enemy was also identified with
the plutocratic groups that supported Mussolini (Spriano, 1975: 389). Nevertheless, while
outright Fascists needed to be isolated, the regular man that had adhered to Fascism in good
faith could be given an opportunity for redemption (PCI, n.d.: 75). This should not induce us to
think that tensions, differentiations and hostilities did not exist with other democratic parties
with whom the PCI shared governmental responsibilities, with the partial exception of the
Socialists to which the PCI was then organically allied. However, the main thrust of the PCI
politics as approved by the 5th Congress in January 1946 was directed at maintaining the
national unity of the anti-Fascist forces, especially by way of reciprocal collaboration within
the Trade Unions (Cecchi, 1977: 72).
The PCI occupied cabinet positions until May 1947, when the Christian Democrats decided to
oust it and their approach became growingly hostile towards the PCI. Initially, this did not
change the general politics of ‘national unity’ advanced by the party: despite now nominally
being an opposition party, Togliatti opted for curbing the hostilities, explaining the gesture in
terms of the fear of being marginalised in the Constituent Assembly, but also more broadly,
because it responded to the long-term strategy of not being isolated in the country at large
(Bocca, 1973: 484). At the 6th Congress held in January 1948, Togliatti defended the
Constitution as the “bond between all democrats” (Cecchi, 1977: 77). This meant establishing
a double frontier, a strong one against Fascism and a weaker one against other parties,
Socialist Party (PSI) excluded. As also recognised by Alessandro Natta, a leading member then
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to become the penultimate PCI Secretary General in the 1980s, in relation to those years:
'[t]he struggle actually involves and differentiates the very anti-Fascist front' (Natta, 1971: 77).
The line of progressive democracy installed by Togliatti has been indicted by many as
excessively accommodating, if not utterly lenient towards the other political parties. For some
authors, the partito nuovo course was merely inspired by the gradualist politics dictated by
the Soviet Union, aimed at preserving international equilibrium (Galli, 1958: 165; Colarizi,
1984: 353; Flores and Gallerano, 1992: 70; Lehner, 1991: 190).25 By the time he returned to
Italy in March 1944, Togliatti had lived for 18 years in Soviet Russia where he had become one
of the most visible men of the Comintern. He had actively contributed to the ‘frontist’ turn
taken at the 7th Congress of the Comintern celebrated in 1935 and further reinforced in the
following years (Sassoon, 1980: 4).26 According to this view, the abdication of any immediate
revolutionary attempt suited the interests of the Soviet Union, which was then part of the
Allied forces in the war against Hitler's Germany. 'The simple suspicion that the USSR fostered
[…] movements against the dominant capitalist classes could constitute an obstacle to the
tight collaboration of Moscow with London and Washington' (Galli, 1958: 218). Accordingly,
such an orientation also suited the leaders of the PCI, as it gave them the possibility to exploit
the myth of the Soviet Union, while being guaranteed economic stability and a prestigious
career. In this view, the politics of partito nuovo struck a balance between Soviet interests and
the need to accommodate the revolutionary propensities of the rank and file, whose
25Curiously, and despite repeated expressions of his clear appreciation for the PCI in the following years,
Laclau maintains a similar position in the first text in which he mentions the Italian Communist Party. With
reference to the Stalinist concept of internationalism that, along with other communist parties, the PCI
adopted, Laclau argues: '[t]his led to the subsequent attempts to hinder the transformation of resistance
struggles into socialist revolutions […] in a less crude form it formed the basis of the Italian Communist
Party's policy after the ‘svolta di Salerno’' (Laclau, 1973: 118).
26However, it is to be noted that the frontist strategy as applied by Togliatti in the Italian context carried
pluralist features and thus 'differed sharply from the monistic national front envisaged by the Comintern'
(Barth Urban, 1986: 168). See also Sassoon, 1981: 205.
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disenchantment was offset by a 'well organised propagandistic illusionism' (Galli, 1958: 261-
262). The author also emphasises the rather flexible attitude of the PCI towards the Christian
Democrats and, as a result, the overall disappointing results that the party obtained (Galli,
1958: 262-278). Similarly, Asor Rosa characterises the PCI as intentionally limiting the most
advanced political energies of the working class (Asor Rosa, 1988). Coming from the operaista
quarters, this critique takes issue with the tendency towards accommodation that was
supposedly inherent to the historicist project of the PCI. For Asor Rosa instead, the working
class already enshrines in itself the creativity that would allow, through unmediated struggle,
the overcoming of capitalism. However, such a vitality was contained by a surplus of
pragmatism that favoured the embracement of the democratic culture, which diluted the
genuine and most developed demands of the proletariat (Asor Rosa, 1988: 64).
To be sure, these authors undervalue the objective difficulties that the party was faced with in
those years. The Greek scenario, where the communists launched an unsuccessful bid for
power that ended in a bloody civil war, served as a warning towards a choice that Togliatti and
other PCI leaders negatively termed as ‘adventure’. Many within the party nurtured ambitions
of that sort. 'Some of them proclaimed themselves in favour of a revolutionary political line
that furthered the action undertaken during the Resistance' (Vittorina, 2006: 59). Togliatti, of
course, did not share this view. Unlike many other figures of the leading group, he did not
take part to the Resistance war and was stubbornly opposed to let its most enthusiastic thrust
take hold (Bocca, 1973: 378-380). In particular, Togliatti was particularly wary of the impetus
that could have led to an insurrectional mood, based on an excessively optimistic view of the
circumstances, critically cashed out, in the phrasing of the time, as 'petite-bourgeois illusion'
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(Pajetta, 1971: 95).27 As bluntly put by Togliatti “We do not set ourselves the objective of
conquering power, given the national and international conditions” (Togliatti in Spriano, 1975:
308).
From the point of view of the dyad populism/institutionalism, the situation is far from clear
cut. In a sense, a dichotomic division of society existed, but the ‘them’, the Fascist enemy that
had brought Italy to war and humiliation after almost two decades of dictatorship, had just
been outlawed and was nominally ostracised by the rest of the political spectrum and would
have remained so ever since, although dangers of a Fascist relapse existed back then and
continued to do so, according to the view of the PCI, for decades. Towards the ‘legal’ political
forces, the party maintained instead a politics of unity, of constant search for an agreement,
often having to swallow bitter pills as a result. On this point, Magri forcefully propounds that
in terms of economic policy, institutional reforms (including the missed opportunity of a more
forceful purge of former Fascist officials) and foreign policy, the party gave up many struggles
that could have been put forward and realistically won, without putting under discussion the
parliamentary road to socialism and a realist approach (Magri, 2011: 53-56). In this sense, it
needs to be reminded that the extremely cautious approach of Togliatti was not evenly shared
within the leadership. According to Pietro Secchia, the then Organisation Secretary, what the
PCI had achieved by 1948 (chiefly, the creation of a mass party that had to be reckoned with
by all other political agents and the approval of a fairly progressive Constitution) was still an
underachievement with respect to the immediate post-war propitious conditions (Secchia in
Macaluso, 2013: 83). Just as a way of example, this passage from his personal diary emerges
as particularly telling:
27Despite his wariness, Togliatti did not disown the partisans' movement: in fact, he decided to candidate
many young figures of the Resistance to the Constituent Assembly (Rodano in Bocca, 1973: 397).
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I manage to include in the list of the undersecretaries Moscatelli […] and Moranino. They are a bitter pill
for De Gasperi to swallow.28 Of course I need to insist, because faced with the resistance of De Gasperi,
Togliatti was inclined to give up. […] It is exactly because De Gasperi does not want them that we need
to have them there. In the end I succeeded (Secchia in Albeltaro, 2014: 126-127).
The bent for reformism and moderation that has been analysed so far may suggest the
prominence of the logic of difference and, as a corollary, of an institutional kind of politics
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 151). As we know however, populism and institutionalism are not
to be found uncontaminated, but a coexistence of the two dimensions is always there.
Moreover, the thesis of the PCI as unequivocally pending towards the institutionalist pole is
belied by a number of different considerations. It may have well been the case that the official
politics of the PCI embraced a cautious course, but that would amount to extrapolating the
same error as those that measure populism exclusively on the basis of programmatic
statements, as criticised in the literature review. After all, the institution of a political identity
as a mass phenomenon that had up to that point been quite marginal in the country points
toward a more nuanced perspective. Here, it is worth inquiring those organisational and
cultural factors that permitted the PCI to forge a novel popular identity in the country. It
should be reminded that, rather than conceptualising these aspects simply as form, the
approach of Laclau sees them as co-producers of political significance.
To begin with, the partito nuovo politics provided for openness towards a number of social
sectors that had been traditionally alien to the communist tradition. This found concrete
application in the abolition of the requirement to profess the Marxist ideology in order to join
the party. In a communication of the Secretariat to all the regional Federations, non-Marxists
were said to be accepted and even eligible for leading positions, insofar as they accepted the
programme of the PCI, and so long as their different ideological points of view were discussed
28Alcide De Gasperi was the DC's Prime Minister of the time.
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only internally (PCI, 1945c). As a result, mass militancy became a cornerstone of the PCI's
politics and remained so throughout its history. To give a proportion of the phenomenon,
suffice it to remind that in 1946, a 'Republic's recruitment' campaign was launched in order to
raise the membership of the party to 7-8% of the electorate in all those areas in which the
target had not been met yet (PCI, n.d.: 87). The non-homogeneous character of the PCI's
rooting made that target unrealistic in many areas, but the figure still delivers a sense of the
confidence that the party received from the mass recruitment it successfully promoted, with
heights such as those of Reggio Emilia (14.4%) and Siena (18.2%) (PCI, n.d.: 86). Despite the
mass-militancy, particular importance was dedicated to the formation of the cadres ('while
maintaining […] the character of a mass party, we need to acquire […] the qualities of a «party
of cadres»' (PCI, n.d.: 102)) and to the recruitment of the 'influential man'. This could be a
highly valued worker, somebody who enjoyed the trust of the local population or the wise old
man of a village (PCI, n.d.: 102). Equally, local leaders were encouraged to know and
appreciate their militants one by one and to find a right task for each of them within the party
(PCI, n.d.: 104). The PCI was also particularly concerned with the penetration of 'bad
elements' into its ranks. The new militants had to be honest and irreproachable, possibly the
best available men: 'honest workers do not like to sit next to the dishonest ones, to individuals
of bad reputation', hence the conclusion was that 'we are not here to recruit randomly just for
the sake of numbers' (PCI, n.d.: 88).
Much emphasis was in fact attributed to normality and common sense in order to appeal to
the average, mild and well-mannered person. Togliatti was against the excessively
revolutionary or slovenly manifestations and exhorted militants to care about their look
(Bocca, 1973: 401). The propaganda needed to follow the same directives: not only the work
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of the local branches had to be 'molecular' and 'disciplined', but it also needed to be
distinguished by 'civic virtues' (PCI, n.d.: 48-50):
we need to condemn the widespread tendency to disturb the public meetings organised by other
parties and their demonstrative abandonment, in mass and well planned-ahead, the laceration and
dirtying of adversaries' placards, the abuse […] of loudspeakers that deafen the population for whole
days, […] certain chants containing swearwords, […] the mass employment of motor transports and their
superfluous wandering while overloaded with comrades and red flags (PCI, n.d.: 46).
This passage neatly reveals the willingness to adopt behaviours and attitudes that could
arouse identification beyond the borders of those who had already pledged allegiance to
Marxist ideology. As Maria Lisa Cinciari Rodano, a leading member of the party, recalls:
I remember that when Togliatti returned to Italy, when I did not even know him yet, one of the first
things he did was to start going to football matches. […] He used to dress up, there was the attempt of
presenting ourselves as normal people, who were part of the normal life of the country, not as shabby
people (Interview 2).
With the partito nuovo politics, an entirely new anthropology of militancy was almost
surreptitiously introduced into the party, which had until that point been mostly characterised
by revolutionary Third-internationalism.
In effect, the elaboration of the programmes also indicated the priority to stay in touch with
the common man. In order to obtain the 'highest possible number of the votes', the party
encouraged the writing of more accessible programmes, not too lengthy, but not too vague
either: 'simple and easily absorbable programmes, presented in a charming way and
accompanied by incisive key words' (PCI, n.d.: 20-21). What did this all mean? The party
portrayed itself as a party of the people, of all the subalterns, not just of the working class or,
even worse, of its vanguard. This was also reflected in a change of the terminology employed.
To further enhance the remarks of Laclau on the process of naming, in the analysed
documents the term 'working class' is almost always forthwith accompanied by 'the people':
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the effect is that of representing the former – the base of the communist project – as not just
making its own corporative interests, but as serving the purposes of a wide array of social
forces and responding to demands of various sorts. Words such as class struggle, proletariat
(Bocca, 1973: 393) and bolshevism were ever less frequent instead, with the intention of
doing away with the extremist, sectarian connotation.
If creating a people - the ultimate meaning of populism - entails being faithful to a ‘politics of
the synecdoche’ by which a part aspires to represent the whole, the question of cultural and
political centrality becomes prominent. In other words, by taking up connotations of
widespread diffusion that can plausibly generate approval and identification among the
population, a political practice enhances its credentials to represent the whole. As we have
seen, the organisational opening of the party was aimed at facilitating this type of dynamics.
However, beyond the question of moderation, in moving away from the classist conception of
the party that characterised its pre-war mentality, the PCI also pursued a politics that
attempted to create a people by expanding the limits of its traditional reach in terms of
political articulation. In Togliatti's view, the working class was conceived as the epicentre of a
broader movement that was meant to deal with the most pressing problems of the nation and
thus embody the national will. By doing so, it extended its appeal to new, diverse elements,
both of concrete and more abstract import. The PCI of course maintained the working class
and its demands as its core constituency, a prime example being that 47.2% of the Central
Committee members following the 5th Congress were workers (Sebastiani in Vittorina, 2006:
61).29 But as put by Togliatti in his famous speech to the Neapolitan cadres of the party upon
his arrival in 1944: “we must be […] a mass party, which obtains its decisive forces from the
29However, precisely as a result of this line, such a figure started to decline consistently over the following
decades, reaching 23.5% following the 10th Congress in 1962 (Sebastiani in Vittorina, 2006: 99).
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working class […] pulling together the best elements of the peasant classes” (Togliatti, 1985:
25).
In his first text dealing with the PCI titled Togliatti and Politics, Laclau identifies precisely this:
the Italian communist leader attempted to go beyond class struggle by postulating the
expansion of a field of democratic struggles, irreducible to the former (Laclau, 1980b). The
articulation of such struggles brings about the constitution of a popular pole through a chain
of equivalences, which is not 'a political confluence between pre-constituted social agencies',
but rather a new type of unity emerging from a number of heterogeneous elements (Laclau,
1980b: 252, 254). Laclau conceptualises these elements as symbols, such as those that make
up a national identity, that are associated with the hegemonic bloc of the dominant class, but
which can nevertheless be disarticulated from that configuration. On the Italian case, he
refers to the articulation between national, popular and democratic symbols emerging from
the war of liberation and the Italian unification process on one side, and communism on the
other (Laclau, 1980b: 254-256). Despite the antagonistic element being blunted, a process of
equivalential articulation undoubtedly took place. At this point, it seems paramount to
analyse which sectors were articulated and how.
Among the most significant social sectors that the PCI tried to connect with beyond the
industrial proletariat of the North, the peasant masses stood out. In a work-document of the
party's Secretariat written in February 1947, it is worthy to note the vice Secretary General
Luigi Longo summarising some of the most important gains achieved in this respect and
mentioning the important activity undertaken with the agricultural proletariat, the effective
work realised among the métayers in Central Italy and the important role played by the party
in leading the struggles of the landless peasants in Sicily, Calabria, Sardinia and Lazio (PCI,
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1947). The party was particularly concerned with achieving the unity of the peasant masses
irrespective of their position in the productive process by trying to converge the interests of
diverse agricultural layers ranging from medium farmers to the poorest labourers.30 Under the
banner of agrarian reform, the PCI led a particularly harsh set of struggles between 1948 and
1950 in the Italian countryside, with good results in Central Italy and mixed ones in the South
(Andreucci, 2014: 227).
At the same time, the party was keen to build a sense of unity between the claims of the
workers and those of the peasants. It is worth quoting this insightful passage by Pietro Grifone
contained in a party-document, no matters how propagandistic:
The city workers have been ever more frequently led to solidarise with peasants' struggles and
viceversa. Never before has the city been so politically close to the countryside and viceversa. Industrial
workers went to the countryside to bring their solidarity to peasants (Milan) through the offer of
utensils and tractors; peasants have offered to the poor of the city the ‘gratuities’ that are no longer
given to the lords and have hosted children of workers and white-collars in their houses (PCI, 1948: 3).
As for the relationship with the Catholics, we have here one of the most important
cornerstones of Togliatti's politics. Reminiscent of Gramsci's insights on the Catholic question
(Gramsci, 1994: 310), Togliatti was equally conscious of the deep roots of Catholicism in Italy
(Bocca, 1973: 442). In this regard, the party was prevalently concerned with stifling the
anticlerical tendencies of the base and manifesting its good intentions towards believers and
their religiosity (PCI, n.d.: 46) notwithstanding the open hostility displayed by the Vatican
(Vittoria, 2006: 63): a blatant proof of this attitude was the party's favourable vote for the
ratification of the Lateran treaties in the Constituent Assembly.31 Nevertheless, the analysis of
30It is worth emphasising that this aim was often achieved by putting pressure on the most combative groups
in order to moderate their claims.
31The Lateran Treaties, signed by Mussolini's Italy and the Vatican in 1929, regulate the relationship between
the two countries, providing for a number of financial and extraterritorial privileges to the Church.
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the relevant speeches of the PCI's leaders and the internal party documents reveals that a
relation of exteriority was maintained with the Catholics: despite calling for unity against
Fascism, they were not tout court subsumed under the communist umbrella. In other words,
the Catholic masses were still conceived as something other than the communist ones and
there was no outright attempt to create a metaphorical relationship between catholicism and
communism; at best, Catholic thought could be an input in the refinement of the peculiar
communist path undertaken in Italy32. In this sense, Togliatti considered the grip of the
Catholic Church on its followers too strong for a more frontal challenge and was thus more
oriented to exploiting some of the contradictions within the Catholic world to the party's
advantage (Bocca, 1973: 443). Nevertheless, the party conquered some important credentials
once the small Party of the Christian Left was dissolved and joined the PCI in late 1945
(Vittorina, 2006: 61).33
Other important social categories that were articulated in the discourse of the PCI were
women, young people and, to a lesser degree, war-survivors and the elderly. Very specific
demands arising from these sectors were incorporated into the electoral programmes and
speeches of the party leaders, while the PCI also tried to interpret and replicate their ways of
life. In a discussion of the National Directorate on how to improve the political work among
women, Eugenio Reale suggested to adopt the format of the popular female magazine Mary
Claire for the party-controlled magazine Noi Donne (Us women), whereas Giancarlo Pajetta
suggested that the mass women organisation should be more concerned with issues around
children and Togliatti noted that the forms of propaganda addressed at women were not
feminine enough (PCI, 1945a). As for young people, in a communication to the provincial
32On this, see the speech of Togliatti delivered in Bergamo in 1963 (Togliatti, 2010: 905).
33Franco Rodano, the leader of that group, would become one of the most prominent collaborators of
Togliatti and Berlinguer in pursuing a dialogue with the Church.
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federations of the party issued in October 1946, Togliatti recommended analysing all of the
problems affecting the Italian youth of the time: unemployment, malnutrition, illnesses, lack
of participation in the democratic life, disillusionment with institutions, and so on. All the
problems of the young are problems of the nation, he wrote. Moreover, he went into further
details, specifying which measures to adopt (even in mutualistic fashion) in order to alleviate
the conditions of poverty hitting the youth: state-sponsored canteens, shoes and winter
clothes collection, cheaper transport fares, unemployment subsidies, etc. (PCI, 1946). It is
possible to note here the micro-level engagement of the party, which surpassed the typically
propagandistic attitude of the pre-war period, exclusively directed at working-class issues.
Other social demands unlinked to specific classes were mobilised, as in the case of the appeal
to reconstruction (intended not only in material and economic, but also political, cultural and
moral terms). Particular attention was dedicated to the most immediate needs of the
population and other pressing socio-economic claims. In April 1947 for example, the National
Secretariat issued a communication to the regional Secretariats, informing them that the main
economic objective of the party was the increase of the means of subsistence (foodstuff,
clothes, shoes, houses, etc.) for the working masses to be achieved through the regulation of
foreign trade, fight against speculation, price reduction and differential rationing (PCI, 1947b).
In terms of political, cultural and moral reconstruction, Togliatti attributed utmost importance
to the role of the intellectuals and the middle urban classes.34 The relationship between the
34Nevertheless, the rank and file were not always entirely happy about this. As noted in a 1946 internal party
document: '[i]n several of our organisations, a hostile or diffident approach towards the middle urban
classes, and especially towards the intellectuals, is still firm and this needs to disappear as soon as possible'
(PCI, n.d.: 45). It is not difficult to grasp the contradictory character of this ambivalence: the capacity to
reach out to new social sectors was initially faced with the open boycott of some sectors of the party, which
were little keen to give up their workerist mentality. However, this type of approach started to fade over
the course of the 1950s only to vanquish entirely in the 1960s and 1970s.
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PCI and the Italian intellectuals deserves special attention, as it played a key role in the
penetration of the party into Italian society. To begin with, as Alfredo Reichlin reminds, “it was
especially Gramsci's thought to entice the intellectual world, the publication of the letters and
the Notebooks of Gramsci was a great cultural and intellectual event, it changed the mind of
many people” (Interview 3). The intellectuals were also instrumental in the forging of a new
common sense, an entirely new communist folklore. In the leading cultural review that he
established in 1944, Rinascita, Togliatti wrote:
The renewal of all the fields of our intellectual and cultural activity […] obliges us to embrace fields of
inquiry […] that we never explored in the past. Secondly, it obliges to gather […] new, diverse forces, not
regularly organised in our movement, but which are resolute as we are to break away with a past, first
of decay, then of collapse, and to explore the ways of a radical renewal both our political and cultural
life (Togliatti, 1944: 2).
Intellectuals were conceptualised as a 'multiplying coefficient of numbers: they form cadres,
activists, militants; they occupy strategic positions such as cafe tables, university rooms, mass-
media; they create and manage languages' (Cafagna, 1991: 73). This sector was also important
in order for the PCI to understand and study the country in which it was acting, especially
thanks to the contribution of reportages published in the widely read party newspaper L'Unità
and the ‘neorealist’ images of those film-makers keen to cast light on the conditions of the
South of Italy (Andreucci, 2014: 222). Emphatically, Luciana Castellina, a leading intellectual of
the PCI, claims that “culture had such a weight that the debate took place among
philosophers, but these philosophers were all leading members of the party, people totally
involved in politics” (Interview 1).
However, two types of language, two levels, coexisted in Togliatti: one was directed at those
who could understand the high culture, and one more accessible, a 'popular culture' for those
who could barely express themselves in Italian (Bocca, 1973: 410). To these aims contributed
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the editing of very different journals, reviews, newspapers, but also the affiliation of ‘organic
intellectuals’ into the party and the formation of the cadres in the party schools. The creation
of a communist culture in the post-war Italian scenario, both at an elitist and a popular level,
was such that 'all the cultural and artistic tendencies that emerged in Italy from 1945 […]
found echo in the PCI, both in a positive and a negative sense, as support or
excommunication' (Ajello in Macaluso, 2013: 26).
The recruitment of intellectuals responded to another related aim of the party. The PCI leader
wanted to 'make our own all the progressive traditions of the nation: from Garibaldi to
Pisacane, from Gramsci to Gobetti' (Spriano: 1975: 40), that is, it aspired to retroactively
construct a filiation between the communist cause and other Italian intellectual families,
especially those within the broad historicist tradition of the Italian Hegelian Left of De Sanctis,
Spaventa and Labriola, which had been the ideology of the democratic and popular
movement of Risorgimento (the Italian unification process) and of which Italian communism
aspired to be its development (Agosti, 1996: 331). The myth of Risorgimento occupied a quite
significant role in the rhetoric of the PCI:
Garibaldinism becomes a symbol that transcends the historical, spatial and chronological reality of
Garibaldi and his undertakings, a flag under which all the Italian combatants for freedom unite,
whatever the people they are fighting for, whatever the generation to which they belong (Anonymous,
1945: 49).
The reference to the struggle conducted by the communist partisans in the civil war is
obvious. As put by the journalist Vittorio Gorresio in summing up the strategy of the PCI:
In this strenuous attempt to hoard all the values of the Italian tradition there is the obscure wish or the
unconscious need to insert into it, by overcoming all the obstacles that the communists find on their
way: this is why they keep insisting on the question of the profound Italianity of communism, of its
homogeneity with the spirit of the nation and of the race (Gorresio in Andreucci, 2014: 279-280).
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In fact, the party was also keen to stress the national character of its activity, as made evident
by the rather frequent reference to the fatherland. This patriotic rhetoric, along with constant
talk of sovereignty, could be easily employed in a period in which the Fascists were depicted
as siding with the ‘foreign aggressor’, as Hitler's Germany was often termed during the
conflict. Nevertheless, the stress on the Italian character had two further connotations: the
first entailed that the route to socialism had to be a national one, which meant that it would
have to be adapted to the Italian context.35 The second alluded to the task that Gramsci had
conceived for the Italian working class: the true unification of the two 'Italies', i.e. the
backward, agrarian South and the more developed, industrial North, which had until that
point remained economically, culturally and socially divided (Gramsci, 1994: 313-337).
The openness towards new sectors, demands and signifiers other than a single-minded focus
on the working class and its battles was pursued through the acquisition of new aspects by
the communist horizon, which served as the empty signifier of the PCI discourse: in this way,
communism underwent a change in its identity as a result of the relation established with
other elements (HSS: 105). The communist cause was thus slowly being identified as
embodying common traits of the population, and the latter could see in the communists not a
bunch of child-eaters (as the Christian Democrats' propaganda maliciously had them), but
rather a movement of regular men, with a clear programme. It was thus an idea - re-
elaborated in the very specific terms falling under the name of the ‘Italian Road to Socialism’ -
to occupy a centrality in the discourse of the party, and not the leader. This does not mean
35The claim to the 'Italian Road to socialism' was often justified by recourse to the classics of Marx and Lenin,
that is by reference to the need to historicise all the major strategic problems and make them dependent
upon the particular situation (Sassoon, 1980: 219-220). Nevertheless, this by no means could be taken as a
complete freedom of manoeuvre from Moscow, which tried to tightly control the actions of the PCI.
Moreover, the partito nuovo politics had the blessing of Stalin himself. It is necessary to highlight however
that Togliatti gradually paved the way for a more autonomous party. It was then Berlinguer to emancipate
the party more decidedly from the sway of the Soviet Union.
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that Togliatti did not occupy a place of utmost importance: in fact, he had the final word on
most decisions, being invested with the authority deriving from having worked at the
Comintern for almost two decades. However, this did not prevent the possibility for open
discussion within the party. Even though the authority of Togliatti was not disputed,
disagreements often arose within the leading bodies with the very Secretary General (Agosti,
1996: 297), and criticism was encouraged at all levels. As Secchia said at an internal meeting:
The local leaders of the party have a mentality such that before opening their mouth they expect
something from above to happen, they need to get used to behave more independently; then we should
get used that our party newspapers publish articles of comrades that do not think in the same way as
we do. For example, on the problem of our participation to the government, if there were a comrade
who does not agree, I would publish his article (PCI, 1945d).
Even more tellingly, as revealed to me by Aldo Tortorella, a prominent figure of the post-war
PCI, in relation to Togliatti's return to Italy: "we the youngest knew he was called Ercoli [his
nickname], but did not even know his real name" (Interview 4). It can thus be deduced that
the structuration of the popular camp did not strictly rest on Togliatti's figure as a sort of
initiator, or founder that created a new identity ex nihilo, even though his contribution in
shaping the particular line that has been hitherto described was certainly decisive. Rather, it
was a more profound attachment to the perspective of building a new society inspired by
communist ideals - in good part spurred by the contribution of the Resistance movement and
the role played by the Soviet Union in WW2 - that played the articulating role.
The 1950s and 1960s
The onset of the Cold War created a new context for the Italian communists. On one side, the
confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union translated in Italy into a growing hostility
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of the Christian Democrats towards the PCI, leading to the ousting of the party from cabinet
positions in May 1947. On the other side, the communists, who had hoped to maintain their
presence in what used to be termed the ‘governmental area’ as a key component of their
hegemonic approach, kept the tones down until roughly 1948. However, a temporary change
of the course of the PCI also occurred, one which was later to be reverted, but not without
repercussions. The ‘Zdanovian’ turn that was dictated to the international communist
movement with the creation of the Cominform in 1948 at the Szklarska Poreba conference, at
which the supposedly shy attitude of the PCI was harshly criticised by the Bulgarian and
Yugoslav delegations, contradicted many of the tenets of the Togliattian politics, even though
this did not imply embarking upon any 'adventure' (Magri, 2011: 85).
Following the shift, the partito nuovo line underwent a number of alterations, even though
talk of unity never disappeared entirely.36 In the first place, the ideological question was once
again foregrounded, as neatly exemplified by the reintroduction of the requirement to be a
Marxist in order to join the party. The emphasis on the figure of the cadre at the expense of
the mass element was also rescued and the question of discipline became of utmost
importance. This development coincided with the increasing ascendancy of Secchia, who had
a more workerist mentality and enjoyed a good relationship with Stalin himself. Secondly, the
PCI did not spare harsh tones against the Christian Democrats. The confrontation between the
PCI and the DC became particularly radical in those years. The DC was defined as ‘clerico-
fascist’, and one of the most famous electoral posters of the time had three Christian
Democrats rushing with a bib around their neck while carrying a fork, a spoon and a knife, in
the attempt to highlight their voracious and corrupt appetite for public resources. In the
36See for example Longo and Togliatti's interventions at the 7th Congress in 1951 (Cecchi, 1977: 77, 104).
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1950s, the interior minister Mario Scelba employed a particularly tough hand against
demonstrations organised by the communists. Only as a result of the 1948-1950 clashes, 62
people had died, 3,126 were wounded, 92,169 arrested and 13,906 condemned for a total of
8,441 years of jail (Andreucci, 2014: 324). The PCI did not hesitate to denounce the Fascist
tendencies lurking within the DC.
In a book dedicated to the symbolism of the PCI, David Kertzer (1996) offers an insightful
perspective into the founding myths of the party and the ways in which they became
institutionalised. Many of these characteristics distinguished the PCI throughout the whole
period under analysis, but they reached their apex in the early 1950s. In particular, it is the
Manichean attitudes that characterised the symbolic management operated by the party that
became very pronounced. Significantly, the myth of the Soviet Union and the hagiolatry of
Stalin and other leaders gave a religious touch to the discourse of the PCI (Kertzer, 1996: 46).
Andreucci also stresses that a strong cult of personality for Togliatti was developed and
fostered in line with the Soviet tradition, furnishing various telling examples, especially in the
form of highly poetic interventions praising the PCI's leader published on the party press
(Andreucci, 2014: 240-244).
The Russian Revolution occupied in the discourse of the party the 'embodiment of all that was
good, struggling in a mighty battle against evil, namely, the forces of capitalism and
imperialism epitomized by the United States' (Kertzer, 1996: 18). In particular, the author
focuses on how party-sponsored rituals spread a particular view of history by which historical
processes were identified with their ritualisation (Kertzer, 1996: 18). The party yearbook,
symbolic linkages to the past in PCI gatherings, public commemoration of events: these were
some of the various attempts in order to sanctify a determined understanding of history and
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the world by way of rituals. Other symbolic manipulations which Kertzer brings to light have
to do with the predilection for military metaphors, the continuity of communist symbols, the
endowment of certain spaces with sacrality, the selection or transformation of history and the
conspiratorial linking of dissent with betrayal (Kertzer, 1996: 24-36). At the same time, the
Resistenza provided the possibility for the party to cast itself as the saviour of the nation,
while painting the Allied forces as enemies of the Italian people and the United States in
particular as reactionary imperialists aiming at world domination (Kertzer, 1996: 49-50, 56-
57). Oppositely, the Soviet Union was portrayed as the protector of the world's workers and
the guarantor of global peace.
This new climate of self-sufficiency and entrenchment impacted upon the relationship with
the intellectuals, which had its ups and downs. Following the war, the party undoubtedly
exerted a great attraction among young scholars, writers, painters and film-makers. The PCI
was eager to welcome them in its ranks, but often attempted to impose its own criteria and
make them entirely organic to the party project. The famous exchange on the politics-culture
relationship between Togliatti and Elio Vittorini, a prominent writer who had fought the
Resistance and joined the PCI, is quite explicative of such an approach. Vittorini had founded a
literary and cultural magazine, called Il Politecnico, which gave space to a number of different
leftist voices. Togliatti branded his enterprise as 'an abstract search for the new, the different
and the astonishing' (Togliatti, 1974: 122). In response, Vittorini vindicated that the truly
revolutionary writer is not the Pied Piper that merely supports the requirements of politics,
but the one committed to the search of the truth (Vittorini, 1947: 2). The PCI intellectual
Rossana Rossanda later recognised the unwillingness of the party to accept the openness of
certain intellectuals towards new democratic philosophical and literary currents emerging in
Europe and America (Agosti, 1996: 331). In fact, their journals were accused of 'antologism',
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the tendency to review all possible theoretical developments, whereas Togliatti hoped they
would opt for a more national cultural engagement, capable of establishing a fruitful dialogue
with other Italian philosophical schools. This attitude created, even according to Vacca, a
fracture with the most modern and urban sectors of the Italian intellectuality (Agosti, 1996:
331).
Equally, through his own editorials published on Rinascita, Togliatti, under the pseudonym
Roderigo di Castiglia, did not hesitate to launch heavy and often offensive attacks on those
disagreeing with the party. The Stalinist outlook that the PCI still displayed was thus often
inimical to the demand for free discussion that intellectuals advanced. The difficulty of the
relationship between party and intellectuals dramatically came to the fore once again amid
the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, when the party unreservedly sided with the Russians.
The reduction of the events of Budapest to a simple conspiracy of reactionary instigators
provoked a tide of indignation that resulted in a distancing of many talented intellectuals.
How do we make sense of these developments from the point of view of populism and
hegemony? In a sense, the antagonistic element was foregrounded, but this move did not
entail an enhanced capacity to articulate. As put by Magri:
the hard years had turned the Party in on itself and fostered ideological rigidity, with the paradoxical
result that it sought a way out in political manoeuvring at the top and in parliament, more than through
an expansion of its social and cultural presence in society (Magri, 2011: 122).
By placing once again particular emphasis on ideological alignment, on the centrality of the
working class and the privileged relationship with the Soviet Union, as opposed to a more
independent search for an ‘Italian Road to Socialism’, the PCI made a step back in the
construction of a people. While Stalin's regime, the epitome of communism, enjoyed a
positive reputation among rank-and-file communists and the left more generally, the bulk of
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the population did not necessarily look at that experience in favourable terms, and the
hammering anti-communist propaganda of the DC, conducted under the good auspices of the
Americans, certainly did not help. In this sense, it needs to be noted that in 1950s Italy,
communism as such could not be considered as the empty signifier in the sense of a salvific
horizon that orders all other meanings, but was exclusively the empty signifier of the PCI's
discourse. A return to a narrower and more limited understanding of that perspective could
not be taken, in Laclau's terms, neither as populist, despite its more decided antagonistic
thrust, nor as hegemonic.
Following the death of Stalin in 1956, Togliatti adopted an evasive approach towards the
Secret Speech delivered at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) by Nikita Khrushchev and, in a subsequent interview with Nuovi Argomenti released
once the contents of the speech were already of public domain, he recognised some of the
'errors' of Stalin, while still minimising them in a framework that praised the Soviet process as
a whole (Togliatti, 1974: 267). Nevertheless, by taking his cues from Khrushchev's acceptance
of different national roads to socialism, in the same text Togliatti formulated the notion of
'polycentrism', indicating that the Soviet model was not mandatory and that there could not
be a single guide (Togliatti, 1974: 268). The 8th Congress of the PCI that took place a few
months later indeed sanctioned the return to the politics that Togliatti had set forth after the
war. 'For the Italian Road to Socialism' titled L'Unità newspaper where the full inaugural
speech of Togliatti was transcribed. In it, Togliatti delineated a series of structural reforms
that prefigured an advancement of the party towards the conquest of new fortresses in
society (Togliatti, 1974: 290). More generally, the Congress brought a loosening of the tight
discipline that had characterised the preceding years, a generational renovation at the top
with the entrance of many young profiles that had fought during the Resistance and a more
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relaxed climate within the Party that fostered discussion, yet without putting democratic
centralism, and the system of co-optation of cadres in order to scale up the party ladder, in
question (Magri, 2011: 135, 183-184).
It is in the period between the 8th Congress and the death of Togliatti in 1964 that the party
started to display, if only in nuce, two diverging interpretations of the ‘Italian Road to
Socialism’. At first, these interpretations took the form of two different readings of the
economic context and Italian capitalism more in general. The conference organised by the
Gramsci Institute in 1962 was indicative of this initial divide. On one side, Amendola pointed
to the disequilibria and the structural backwardness of Italian capitalism that, while not
impeding an overall growth of the national economy, with GDP figures skyrocketing in the
years of the so called ‘economic miracle’, made for an unbalanced type of development.
Under this view, the Party had to urge the centre-left coalition that in those years was formed
between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to adopt measures against inequality,
thereby sticking to the fight for immediate aims that could potentially entail the political
involvement of the communists in Parliament (Magri, 2011: 174). It is not by chance that
Amendola pushed in that period for a reunification with the Socialist Party that was not to find
much support within the PCI (Magri, 2011: 179). On the other side, a reading of the Italian
context in terms of neocapitalism was put forward, whereby entirely new aspects deriving
from the process of industrialisation were foregrounded. The themes of consumerism,
technology, mass communication and labour alienation found ample treatment here. These
analyses led to a much harsher positioning towards the PSI and the centre-left experience,
and in the following years the reflections took up the name of an ‘alternative growth model’.
According to Magri, these views were later maliciously portrayed as a utopian attempt to
reinvigorate a too openly radical-democratic and anti-capitalist project, while in the mind of
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their proponents they still envisaged a series of structural reforms as part of a long-term
process (Magri, 2011: 177-178).
The clash between these two views, defended respectively by the right and left wings of the
party, became more intense after Togliatti's death in 1964 and ended up in the internal
ostracisation of the latter following the 11th Congress of the PCI in 1966. Pietro Ingrao, the
most representative figure of the left, voiced his dissent during the plenary regarding the
habit to hide the preliminary debates of the congresses, and in so doing he broke the taboo of
showing disunity among the leading officials in public. This resulted in the downplay of his
prominence and in the distancing of all the figures that were close to him from the key posts
of the PCI. The left of the party was thus defeated, with the victory of the centrist faction, in
alliance with the right (Liguori, 2014: 21).
These passages are important to bear in mind because they created a particular balance of
power within the PCI and shaped a particular configuration of the party before the protest
cycle of 1968-69. The massive students' and workers' mobilisations that erupted in those
years rested on a reactivation of the social conflict led by the trade unions in the early 1960s.
Contrary to the interpretation of Laclau (Laclau, 1981: 57), it was already at this time that the
PCI showed an ultimate inability to get in touch with such sectors, and not later. This is not the
place for an accurate assessment of such mobilisations; suffice it to highlight that they were
largely characterised, especially those led by the students, by an unconciliatory approach that
made spontaneism, permanent mobilisation and extra-parliamentary activity their
distinguishing features. The most radicalised elements openly contested the politics of the
PCI, which they considered as excessively top-down, moderate and institutionalist.
Nevertheless, the PCI did not understand the extent of the movement - the analysis of
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Boltansky and Chiapello on the later capacity of capitalism to absorb and re-orient in its own
terms the creative dimension of the '68 protests (Boltansky and Chiapello, 2005) speaks of the
far-reaching effects of those movements - and missed a historic opportunity not just to
enhance its electoral performances, but to influence a fundamental 'fortified position', that is
a key societal fortress, to put it in Gramscian terms (Magri, 2011: 233). To be sure though, the
then Secretary General Luigi Longo attempted to open a dialogue with the students'
movement by meeting its leaders. However, this was too little and, most importantly, his
attitude did not go unchallenged internally. As reminded by Macaluso in his latest book on the
PCI, the internal right-wing of the party held an entirely different view as it thought that it was
time for the PCI to access the 'governmental area' and deemed the convergence with the
movements as inopportune (Macaluso, 2013: 100). Even more vehemently, some leaders of
the PCI scolded the students as the bearers of a rebellious ideology, with irrationalist traits
(Magri, 2011: 232). The PCI fared better in its relationship with the workers' protests but
resigned to make its presence within the firms more pronounced, delegating the bulk of the
activity to the trade union (Magri, 2011: 231).
In terms of articulatory potential, it seems fair to summarise that while the PCI progressively
made headway into constituencies that were ‘democratically’ oriented but not necessarily
mobilised and certainly not ready nor prone for a radical and sudden break with the current
order - whatever that may have meant - it had a hard time coming to terms with those that
were interested in a more open contestation of the status quo. The PCI of the late 1950s and
1960s thus backtracked from the Cold War antagonism that recuperated a sterile pride for the
communist identity, but acquired a series of traits that, while not immediately affecting the
party in terms of electoral performances, which actually improved consistently in the 1960s,
founded the pillars for an institutional turn. More in particular, it became evident that the
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question of hegemony was ever more posed in terms of alliances with other political sectors
rather than with social sectors. In the words of Liguori, the Party:
had not been able to interpret the Sixty-Eight and its 'long wave', with all the political and cultural
unrest of which it was expression, and preferred the resumption of the dialogue with the traditional
parties, shaken as they were by the sinking of the centre-left (Liguori, 2014: 64).
The historic compromise
The strategy of the ‘Italian Road to Socialism’ can be rightfully described as 'a theoretical
amalgamation of subversive Marxist ideas [...] and a practical application of reformist notions'
and, in perspective, 'either aspect could be used by the future ruling party generations to
forward radical or reformist strategies alternatively' (Fouskas, 1998: 25-26). While leaving the
door open for considering the conservative effects brought about by the party's increasing
penetration into local institutions (Amyot, 1981: 21-22), Amyot finds that the PCI underwent
an ideological shift. However, this did not mean that the working class was ideologically
hegemonised by the bourgeoisie, but rather a 'distinctively working-class ideology has kept
the proletariat within the bounds of reformism […] This Popular Front Ideology, also known as
‘frontism’, is an expression of the post-war strategy of the PCI' (Amyot, 1981: 25). Its impact
was further compounded by the rules of democratic centralism, which prohibited factions and
established the tradition of unanimous voting in the deliberative organs, and by the Michelian
'iron law of oligarchy' (Amyot, 1981: 28-29). Amyot also recognises the complexity of the
Popular Front policy, which had a revolutionary potential that was not developed by the PCI.
In fact, the Soviet directives mitigated the departure from the Leninist model of revolution by
postulating a two-stage theory: a first democratic phase of anti-Fascist coalition government,
and a second one, that of the socialist revolution proper (Amyot, 1981: 36-37). Over time
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however, eurocommunism interpreted this strategy by emphasising the former aspect, while
relegating the latter to an unspecified future time in order to reassure potential allies of the
first phase: the petty bourgeoisie and the anti-monopolistic elements of the bourgeoisie
proper (Amyot, 1981: 39-40). According to Amyot: '[t]hese two variants of Eurocommunism
coexisted within the PCI; in the early 1960s Pietro Ingrao was to make the more radical
interpretation of the concept of structural reform a major element of his platform' (Amyot,
1981: 44). As we have seen however, the internal defeat of Ingrao paved the way for the
1970s political season of the historic compromise.
Luigi Longo, the most prestigious figure pertaining to the old guard, replaced Togliatti in 1964.
It was Longo himself to designate Enrico Berlinguer as his successor already in 1969, by
appointing him as Vice Secretary General. Berlinguer then became Secretary General of the
PCI in 1972 at the 13th Congress. As analysed by one of his biographers, Berlinguer was not a
talented orator or a particularly brilliant character (Gorresio, 1976: 12, 22-23). Yet, he became
a hugely popular and respected figure among the party followers: his sober, elegant and
honest outlook attracted many even well beyond the traditional communist electorate.
Differently from Togliatti however, Berlinguer, who was considered as a figure of compromise
belonging to the so-called centre of the party, constantly had to mediate his decisions by
taking into account the weight of the different components of the PCI.
In his report at the 13th congress, Berlinguer envisaged the constitution of a government that
was to mark a democratic turning point which, by doing away with the anti-communist
discrimination, would entail the collaboration of the three biggest political families: the
catholic, the socialist and the communist. In particular, Berlinguer saw the possibility of a
political shift of the catholic masses towards an understanding with the leftist forces
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(Berlinguer, 1985: 305-307). In this, he enjoyed the full support of the right-wing of the party
that was persuaded that there existed the willingness to collaborate among other political
forces (Napolitano, 1976: 96). In this sense, according to a different view, the PCI kept on
conceptualising the Christian Democrats as it did in the 1940s, that is without realising the fact
that it had transformed into the party of 'strong interests' and ran the state in an entirely
clientelist fashion. In particular, the PCI maintained an overly optimistic stance towards the
left-wing of the DC led by Aldo Moro, failing to assess that, despite being less anti-communist,
it was still strongly tied to the rest of its party (Liguori, 2014: 74).
The politics of rapprochement with the DC, which was only being theorised in the early 1970s,
found particular resonance in an issue of the party-owned magazine Il Contemporaneo of
1973. According to Giuseppe Chiarante, the leading article of the issue was that of Gerardo
Chiaromonte, which 'expressed not only the orientation of the magazine's leading board, but
of the majority of the right-wing that prevailed in the leading bodies of the party' (Chiarante,
1996: 176). In this article, Chiaromonte stated that not even the 51% of votes for the Socialists
and the Communists together would have been enough to guarantee a left-wing government
and that a democratic turning point hinged around the renovation of the Christian Democrats
(Chiaromonte, 1973). This was only the prologue of a more sustained effort to set out the
politics of the historic compromise, enunciated by Berlinguer in three long articles published
on Rinascita following the Chilean coup d'etat in 1973. As a whole, they constituted the most
explicit formulation of what the role of the PCI in that particular historical conjunction ought
to be. The reflection of Berlinguer invited a cautious assessment of the international situation,
in which the US had directly intervened in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. In this sense,
the communists had to play the card of consensus in order to avert any possibility of a
reactionary backlash. There prevailed, in this view, a distinctively Togliattian pessimism
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towards the always latent possibility of a Fascist comeback (see Berlinguer, 1971: 374-374;
Liguori, 2014: 64). What was feared was the possibility of an alliance between the Christian
Democrats and the extreme right, which could have given birth to a large 'clerico-fascist' front
(Gorresio, 1976: 89). As a result, the PCI had to fight for the democratisation of the state and
conquer new institutions by way of an agreement with the Christian Democrats (Liguori, 2014:
71). In parallel, Berlinguer developed the notion of eurocommunism, which was to unite, if
only for a brief period, the Italian, Spanish and French communist parties in the distancing
from the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union by emphasising the role played by individual
freedoms, political pluralism and respect for the democratic process in the construction of
socialism.
The historic comprise found concrete implementation in 1976 in the so called ‘national
solidarity’ strategy, straight after the most successful electoral performance of the PCI ever to
be achieved at general elections, at which it gained 34.4% of the votes for the lower house of
parliament. However, it was not quite a compromise, because the DC had conducted an
electoral campaign explicitly rejecting the possibility of a communist involvement.
Nevertheless, given that parliamentary mathematics did not permit to compose a majority
without the communists, the DC formed a minority government led by Giulio Andreotti,
possibly one of the most distant figures among the Christian Democrats from the communists,
and the PCI, along with the socialists, did not enter the government, but agreed to abstain in
order to let the government legislate. For the PCI, the abstention was aimed at overcoming
the conventio ad excludendum, that is the tacit agreement that had up to that point
maintained the communists away from national power since 1947. In so doing however, the
PCI lost entirely the character of an alternative force. In fact, policy-wise little was achieved in
those years. The defenders of that strategy, which lasted until 1979, claim that, despite not
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being well managed, the national solidarity supported democratic institutions in a critical
juncture, characterised by a harsh economic crisis and both black and red terrorism, while also
implementing a number of important measures (Magri, 2011: 277). However, the view
according to which the left was offered nothing more than a symbolic role, and that the
majority of the policies implemented in those years ran counter to the interests that the PCI
had historically defended, seems much more apt to describe the situation (Magri, 2011: 272).
While it may be possible that the concrete instantiation of the historic compromise was
ultimately different from how Berlinguer had envisaged it (Tortorella, 2004: 19), the particular
reading of the economic situation put forward by the right wing of the party was to strongly
influence Berlinguer and the behaviour of the PCI as a whole in those years (Chiarante, 2003:
30). In particular, in the words of Rossanda, there was a surplus of Gramscianism that led to a
blurring of class analysis (Rossanda, 2003: 13). The view according to which hegemony
consists first and foremost in the renouncement of the corporative interests of the working
class (see for example Napolitano, 1976: 97) took up a particular twist. Talk of sacrifices
became indeed pervasive. As put by Amendola: "Sacrifices are required by the state of things"
(Amendola, in Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986: 11). Berlinguer was equally blunt: "I don't see
which government would have, without the participation of the PCI, enough political and
moral authority to request these efforts" (Berlinguer in Gorresio, 1976: 101).
The line of reasoning behind the supposed need for sacrifices is well conveyed by Larry and
Roberta Garner. In sum, a would-be hegemonic force must take up the destiny of the nation
as a whole, and not simply that of its original constituency (Garner and Garner, 1981: 258). In
so doing, it has to look at the short-term and provide solutions to the pressing problems of the
day: a strategy that made the PCI susceptible of being accused of reformism and to which it
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responded with the two related concepts of 'structural reform' and 'elements of socialism'
(Garner and Garner, 1981: 261-262). So far, so good: this strategy seems to fit perfectly along
the Gramscian/Togliattian project. However, the successful wage struggles conducted at the
beginning of the 1960s along with the trade union dramatically increased the costs of
production, leading to a crisis in the mid-1970s. As a result, faithful to the hegemonic
approach adopted, the PCI had to restrain the fight for further increases in order to avoid a
furthering of the crisis of Italian capitalism, which would have not only meant a deterioration
of conditions for the very working class, but would have constituted a threat to the unity of
the historic bloc hitherto constructed. In particular, a setback in regard to the relationship
with the petit-bourgeois base was seen as particularly dangerous (Garner and Garner, 1981:
265-266). This is also why Berlinguer was more interested in making of the PCI a reliable and
tranquil political force, particularly to the benefit of the middle classes (Liguori, 2014: 38). In a
nutshell, if the overall efficiency of the economy was to be maintained, moderation and the
backing off from certain structural reforms were of paramount importance (Garner and
Garner, 1981: 269).
This stance is profoundly unconvincing. In an insightful volume that brings to a conclusion a
long comparative research programme between Italian communism and other European
social-democratic paths, Leonardo Paggi and Massimo D'Angelillo come to very different
conclusions (Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986). To begin with, they analyse that talk of austerity and
sacrifices found no echo in the European social-democratic language of those years, and that
the certainty that working class interests could enter into conflict with the interests of the
generality, insofar as these were the culprit of a diminished competitiveness of the national
economy, is rather to be interpreted as a sign of the 'cultural meeting' between liberalism and
the working class (Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986: x-xii). More specifically, the authors highlight
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the strident clash between the political influence achieved by the post-war PCI on one side,
and the incapacity to impact upon the orientation of the economic policies on the other (Paggi
and D'Angelillo, 1986: 63). This point is corroborated by other authors, who date the lack of a
refined economic knowledge and the subordination of the Italian left-wing economic culture
to liberalism back to Togliatti's times (Bocca, 1973: 464-466; Agosti, 1996: 306-307). These
factors impeded a more sustained engagement with economic issues and thus negatively
impinged upon the capacity of the party to have a broader influence on economic policy-
making (see Magri, 2011: 53-55).
There is a further issue however. The hyper-identity that derived from the PCI's affiliation to
the Warsaw pact played a role of internal integration on one side, but on the other opened up
a question of democratic legitimacy, as exemplified by the conventio ad excludendum. As a
result, while the social-democratic trade-off in other European countries meant bargaining
salary increases in exchange for the moderation of social conflict, in Italy the trade-off brought
for the PCI simply a more extended recognition (Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986: 102). In this
sense, the transformist strategy of the Christian Democrats attempted to pursue a
modernising path against the working class, by sabotaging the identity of the PCI from within
and integrating it into the system in a subordinated position (Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986: 67).
In the end, the judgement of the two authors on the hegemonic approach adopted by the PCI
is harsh but plausible:
Once translated into the political perspective of national unity, this theory of hegemony paradoxically
ends up legitimising a political proposition which tends to interpret the governmental participation not
so much in terms of alternative and rupture with the transformist model, but rather as a theoretical
justification of its molecular modification from within, and thus also as an acceptance of some of its
basic compatibilities (Paggi and D'Angelillo, 1986: 104-105).
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Populism and hegemony in the PCI
In an overall assessment of the PCI, Laclau stated that the party found obstacles in becoming a
'fully fledged populist movement' because:
'Communism' in its Italian guise could not move beyond a certain point in the direction of constituting
itself as the empty signifier unifying a historical singularity; the ideological issue denied the PCI access to
a plurality of sectors whose incorporation was nevertheless vital to the success of the Togliattian project
(OPR: 185).
In this sense, the fullness of the symbolism that was so important for the party members was
at the same time a sort of cap that impeded to take the populist reach even further. In other
words, the too heavily charged ideological baggage of the PCI was not empty enough in order
to make room for a wider equivalential chain and hegemonise - in the way Laclau employs the
term - the whole discursive terrain. The short circuit between a heavy symbolism that had
particular purchase within the party, but a much more modest one without, is thus a central
issue that throws light on the potential contradictions between the inside (the militant world)
and the outside (the electorate at large) of an emancipatory political practice.
To be sure though, Togliatti and Berlinguer were aware of the necessity to pursue a certain
emptiness and to some extent went in that direction. Although the building of a socialist
society and the Soviet model (with the latter starting to fade as a point of reference from the
late 1960s onwards) remained at the very heart of the party's rhetoric, the ‘victory’ of
communism was not in the short-term agenda - it needed to be thought as a long-term
horizon, as something only looming ahead in a distant future. The realisation of the
communist dream, this promise of harmony and fullness, was thus concomitantly embraced
and disavowed. As put by Castellina: “With Catholic workers? No, we did not mention the
Soviet Union with them. But it was still a symbolic reference to maintain alterity” (Interview
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1). Soviet communism was a worldly heaven, yet a certain distance had to be maintained from
it; communism was a historical necessity, yet socialism, in the ‘Italian Road to Socialism’, was
in actual fact excluded from the final goals, as a destination never to be reached (Cafagna,
1991: 62-63). In this sense, the question of the passage from capitalism to socialism remained
permanently elusive, and the 'whole pattern of “transitional thinking”, moreover, only begged
the question: transition to what? and when?' (Barth Urban, 1986: 245). This move lightened
the ‘ideological issue’ without removing it entirely. However, precisely because the party went
some strides towards the emancipation of 'theory from too close a relationship to politics
(and viceversa)' (Sassoon, 1981: 42) in the search of a discourse that could broaden its appeal,
'the crucial link between "principles" and the "concrete"' (Sassoon, 1981: 235) became scant,
as well mirrored in the deficiencies of the party's economic thinking mentioned above. At this
point, there lacked a detailed analysis on how exactly the normative could find concrete
implementation in reality.
Although ambiguity is a distinguishing characteristic of a truly popular identity insofar as a
historical singularity becomes the site of inscription of a variety of demands that find a
precarious equilibrium (OPR: 108-109), the ambiguity here is of a different kind, as the PCI
displayed a profound ambivalence at the very heart of its nodal point, in a peculiar mix of
pride and dilution. The party encouraged the fantasy of communism to exist and thrive,
provoking a strong emotional attachment among its followers, but at the same time such a
horizon was indefinitely postponed.37 Communism was heightened to the dignity of the Thing,
37This is particularly well conveyed by the words of Tortorella: “there was no duplicity in Togliatti. He was
sincerely convinced that here [in Italy] the Soviet way was not to be followed at all, and that there [in the
Soviet Union] everything that had happened was an appalling tragedy. I knew Togliatti well. Nothing of
what had been done there was to be replicated. But if you listen to his conversation with Bobbio in 1954,
what is the point? There was a logical error, even a boy like me could understand it. According to Togliatti,
we must start from a firm point: socialism is no longer a question of a discussion among intellectuals. It is a
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it represented the desired object, the 'dream of a state without disturbances, out of reach of
human depravity' (Žižek, 2012: 685), but only partially, as it was held as a distant and almost
unrealisable destination and the progress to it was to be achieved only by virtue of cultivating
unity with its own political adversaries. The price for being communists was thus the constant
need to legitimise such a position by way of providing reassurances to the enemy and to the
people at large, which took the form of a substantial abdication to think of itself as a true
alternative. It is not by chance that the PCI has often been characterised as ultimately
schizophrenic in its overall behaviour.
In this sense, there is another related reason for claiming that the PCI fell short of
transforming itself into a fully-fledged populist practice. As we have seen, besides the sharp
political frontier established with Fascism, the antagonistic edge with respect to the rest of
the political spectrum was particularly blunted in the 1944-47 and 1976-79 periods, but even
in the remaining years considered here - with the exception of the ‘Zdanovist phase’ at the
beginning of the Cold War when the tones became much harsher - the party always depicted
the DC as its own nemesis while concomitantly harbouring the desire to re-establish a
governmental relationship with it. Its Manichaeism was thus constantly belied by a strategy
that made collaboration its cornerstone.
This did not mean that an articulatory process did not take place. Paradoxically, the capacity
to join heterogeneous elements took place more easily when the antagonism was softened, in
particular because the exacerbation of antagonism in the early 1950s was dictated by a more
ideological embracing of Marxism-Leninism that made it difficult for the PCI to broaden its
appeal. A ‘people’ was somehow constructed, as the PCI managed to create a metaphorical
historical reality. He thought that even though this state was born amid a lot of deaths, appalling tragedies,
etc., it is a historical reality and a new society had begun. Of this he was sincerely convinced” (Interview 4).
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relationship between constituencies, social sectors, demands and symbols that did not
naturally tend to converge.
The peculiar trait that emerges from the analysis of the PCI is that it possibly nurtured more a
counter-hegemonic approach than a populist one. This assertion begs an explanation. Without
becoming a majority in the country, the PCI managed to create a ‘people’ despite its political
frontiers not being as sharp. Even more crucially, through a work of penetration of the party
into the thousands of rivulets of civil society, it exerted a strong political and cultural
influence, one inspired by ideals at odds with those of the status quo. In fact, the PCI was not
the sectarian movement that some of his detractors have described, as in the case of
Andreucci's latest book (Andreucci, 2014). The PCI was precisely what he negates it to have
been: a national-popular party that incorporated democracy and socialism, stemming the
most revolutionary impetuses and that overall represented a distinctive case in the
'firmament' of international communism (Andreucci, 2014: 286). Electoral results, mass-
militancy, its deep presence in the country and its planned mix of radicalism and moderation
are only among the most vivid proofs of such a characterisation. The party schools, for
example, were not a simple method of indoctrination that sanctified a chain of command and
a process of homologation (Andreucci, 2014: 235-6), but - along with all the party recreational
spaces - they played a pedagogical function through which a particular world-view was
cultivated and where the political alphabetisation, both of the masses and of the future
leaders, was pursued. Moreover, the party schools played a pivotal role in the rooting of the
PCI and in the fusion of Marxism with Italian history, which entailed a retroactive construction
of myth by linking disparate historical events and customs into a single narrative (Andreucci,
2014: 285).
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A similar line of reasoning has to be applied to the particularly remarkable influence on Italian
culture. Dozens of philosophers, writers, artists and thinkers joined the ranks of the party and
contributed to make the PCI one of the chief organisers of cultural activities in the country.
The number of magazines, conferences and exhibitions that it engineered are tangible proof
of its profound involvement in this field. This was also made possible, if somewhat
paradoxically, by the battle for freedom of culture waged against the clerical and obscurantist
politics of the Christian Democrats throughout the 1950s. The later distancing from Stalinism
operated by Berlinguer was also conducive in creating a greater appeal for this sector. In the
1970s, the PCI managed to extend its influence to intellectual sectors that had up to that point
been quite far from the reach of the party. University professors, architects, urban planners
and judges were among the categories over which the party started to have a great deal of
sway.
By the same token, democratic centralism and the cascade of structures, from the smallest
territorial cell at the neighbourhood level leading up to the Secretariat, made for a
hierarchical arrangement, but ample room was left for voluntarism and activism (Andreucci,
2014: 344). The PCI gave them constant impetus as a way to be in touch with a variety of
social sectors. Movements such as the trade union CGIL, the women’s movement UDI, the
youth-related Fronte della Gioventù were associations in which militants pertaining to
different political parties (but also non-militants) participated. The unity of such organisations
was deemed to be of utmost importance, because it permitted the PCI to extend its appeal to
a wider audience, ‘controlled’ by other parties. In addition, specific magazines were published,
behind which stood the party, creating the capacity to ramify and penetrate into the most
diverse environments (Andreucci, 2014: 344-345). All these activities - not to mention the
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thousands of political assemblies, rallies, conferences, electoral campaigns at all levels and so
on - required an army of party officials, which constituted the scaffolding of the PCI.
This pervasiveness of the party in the country at large was the result of the application of a
war of position strategy. Nevertheless, the way in which the war of position was understood
shifted considerably. Laclau was aware of the Gramscian debates of the 1960s and 1970s
(Laclau, 1981: 56), yet he failed to connect the overly political version of Gramsci that became
dominant in the party to the growing incapacity of the PCI to connect with those new
struggles that in the 1980s Laclau deems as indispensable for any emancipatory project. At
most, what we find in his writings is the acknowledgement of the limits of the Togliattian
synthesis in the 1960s, while remaining largely elusive on what could have been done in order
to overcome the difficulties encountered by the PCI, other than vaguely stating that the
theoretical elements to face up the new situation were to be found in Gramsci (Laclau, 1980b:
258; Laclau and Mouffe, 1981: 21). In actual fact however, Gramsci never intended that
alliances had to be established at the level of what he termed political society, but rather at a
purely social level. The working class was to become the epicentre of a practice that put
together other classes and constituted a new historic bloc without the mediation of other
parties. The way in which this was assimilated by the PCI was different from the very outset.
Alliances at a social level were deemed to go through an understanding with other political
forces. With the creation of a post-war state that was permeable to the inputs coming from
the left - and thus differing from the liberal state of the past that was exclusively in the elites'
hands - and the establishment of a political system in which parties had much more weight
than in the Anglo-Saxon model, political society had become the terrain for the ideological
struggle for hegemony (Vatalaro, 2011: 91). This did not impede the communists from
ramifying their presence and having a real bearing on Italian society.
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As we have seen however, the importance of political society at the expense of civil society
became markedly visible in the 1970s. The PCI underwent a considerably deep cultural and
organisational shift that was to usher in its final capitulation. The so called ‘second Berlinguer’
period of the early 1980s up to his death in 1984, in which he distanced himself from the
perspective of the historic compromise and tried to reconstruct a relationship with the
working class and the social movements, did not succeed. This was partly because a great part
of the leadership did not follow him on that course (Liguori, 2014: 139), partly because the
party at that point relied more on electors than on militants and the quality of participation
had deteriorated, with the bulk of the membership unable to conduct a regular work among
the masses, and partly because the larger societal environment played a homogenising role
(Magri: 2011: 343-345). The fall of the Soviet Union was to do the rest, resulting in the
dissolution of the PCI in 1991 and the transformation into a liberal-democratic party, rather
than a social-democratic one, and with this death any type of emancipatory thrust. As a
conclusion on populism and hegemony then, it seems that populism and hegemony occupy
distinct conceptual terrains and a counter-hegemonic approach runs the risk of absorption if it
does not maintain a clear frontier with the remaining political actors.
A final consideration on the role of the leader is needed. The role of Togliatti in the
structuration of the popular camp is undeniable. Furthermore, the figure of Togliatti
exemplifies the sense in which the notion of charisma is implicitly employed in Laclau. In fact,
charisma does not lie so much in personal qualities, in the ability to deliver aesthetically
attractive speeches, or in personal magnetism, but rather in the capacity to make sayable the
transcript that a particular regime maintains hidden and foreclosed, making it an essentially
reciprocal category: in other words, 'charisma means that one "has charisma" only to the
extent that others confer it upon one' (Scott, 1990: 221), or, to put it in terms familiar with
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our theoretical scheme, insofar as certain grievances are brought to the fore (Stavrakakis,
2015: 279). Almost every account on Togliatti agrees that he was not particularly pleasant or
charismatic in the traditional sense; his professorial attitude and convoluted language do not
seem to match the classical image of a populist leader, even though - it is worth emphasising -
it is not that which is taken as a sign of populism here.38 Equally, Berlinguer was no rabble-
rouser either, despite the already mentioned non-indulgent and frank approach that gained
him and the party the respect of many. Yet, their political prominence was able to intercept a
series of unmet demands and inscribe them within the perspective of change propounded by
the PCI. A proof of this, let alone the structural difficulties that the PCI faced in the 1980s, is
the oft debated question of the lack of credible leaderships following Berlinguer's death that
could have avoided the dissolution of the PCI and the political ‘normalisation’ of its heirs in
the 1990s.
Nevertheless, we have an important qualitative difference in the communist leaders under
scrutiny here with respect to other populist leaders. What comes out as particularly important
for our purposes is that the type of leadership embodied by Italian communist leaders
differed from the one of Rafael Correa presented in the next chapter. What are its
peculiarities? In a sense the very fact of being the leader of the PCI had a bureaucratic
component that made for a certain top-down approach; the choice of Togliatti who had been
away from Italy for a long time, as well as the transitions from Togliatti to Longo and then to
Berlinguer were somewhat ‘precooked’ internally. Yet the centrality of such figures was
partially blunted by the fact of their being accompanied by a greater importance attributed to
38As put by Castellina in reference to Togliatti: “What is hard to believe is how this man, who used to wear a
blue double-breasted coat, spoke like a liceo [high school] professor, that is in a very erudite way, very
cultured, because he knew and followed everything, was such a popular leader. And Berlinguer was very
much the same” (Interview 1).
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the realm of ideas. Leaders here are not totally empty, simple points of anchorage of
heterogeneous aspirations that are drawn together by the negation of the current order, but
they are the embodiment of a more concrete and delineated project. In a sense, it is possible
to partially concur with Žižek in his attempt to distance communist movements from populism
(Žižek, 2006: 557). In the case of the PCI, the salience of the ideological issue at the expense of
the leader seems to have been able to preserve the centrality of the ideas and the capacity to
play a truly pedagogical function in the country, with the cult of the leader serving as a sort of
supplementary role. This is not to say that emancipatory movements cannot be generated by
a leader, but that the continued prominence of a leader will tend to signal the incapacity to
move beyond a situation of more cursory infatuation. It is to such a scenario that we now turn
with the analysis of the Citizens' Revolution in Ecuador.
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Chapter 4: Correa's Citizens' Revolution39
In this chapter, the focus shifts to a rather different geographical and temporal context.
Indeed, the attention is directed at making sense of the Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution from
2006 to 2018 by analysing its emergence and the successive transformations that occurred
throughout its trajectory. More precisely, the chapter intends to give an account of the birth
of a political discourse capable of forging a novel popular identity that interpellated a wide
range of social sectors, investigate its subsequent evolutions, its specificities and its material
impacts in terms of tangible social, political, economic and cultural transformations. As a
result of the empirical analysis, I will be in a position to provide a number of insights on the
explanatory and strategic potential and limitation of the notions of populism and hegemony
as set out by Laclau. As we know, his theory of populism has exercised a preponderant
influence in the analysis of the Latin American populist phenomena, with special reference to
the context that the academic literature has termed ‘pink tide’ or ‘turn to the left’, to which
Ecuadorian Citizens' Revolution clearly pertains. It will emerge that if to some extent Laclau's
categories help us to clarify what happened in Ecuador and put in evidence the political merits
of the populist approach, this is not without difficulties from both an analytical plane, as well
as a strategic and normative point of view.
As with the PCI case, I propose a temporal division of the chapter with four stages of
periodisation of the Citizens' Revolution. The first section ‘The construction of a people’ deals
with the founding moment, and in particular with the initial anti-neoliberal gamble launched
by Rafael Correa before the 2006 presidential elections that gave life to a new political
39A part of this chapter draws from an earlier work on Ecuador (Mazzolini, 2016).
160
subject, and with his first steps as Ecuadorian President. It is the turbulent moment of the
take-off of the project, when the old political class attempts to prevent the ascendancy of
Correa as the new political star of the country, that the defining political and ideological
features of the project acquire increasing clarity. During this period, a range of heterogeneous
demands existing in Ecuadorian society are forged together so as to create a new collective
will, a novel bloc composed of diverse social actors that find in the figure of Correa a unifying
element. In the section, some references will also be made to the socio-political context that
preceded and, in some ways, created the terrain for the advent of the Citizens' Revolution.
The second section, ‘Populism in transition’, begins during the 2008 Constituent Assembly,
and more specifically with the resignation of its President Alberto Acosta, a leading figure
within the newly formed popular bloc, that took place in June. As his distancing from the
Citizens' Revolution testifies, this period is distinguished by the appearance of some minor
conflicts within the popular camp, which suggest a cooling of the relations between the
government and organised social sectors. Yet almost paradoxically, it is the moment of
consolidation of the project, in which the grip of the Citizens' Revolution in Ecuadorian society
seems to be at its strongest. The period extends up to Correa's second re-election in 2013.
The third stage, which coincides with the entire third mandate of Rafael Correa until May
2017, is named ‘Towards a progressive degeneration of populism’ and is characterised by the
emergence of a number of problematic aspects. The slowly declining appeal of Correa's
charisma goes hand in hand with a pronounced shift away from popular sectors, the
exacerbation of antagonistic confrontations with an increasing number of political enemies
and the deepening of top-down and caudillistic drifts which, in an embryonic form, already
made their exordium in the previous stage. It is also marked by an economic crisis that spurs a
number of changes in terms of normative orientation, thus contradicting some of the political
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and economic tenets that Correa had previously stood for. The fourth stage, which falls here
under the title ‘A non-hegemonic end of a populism’, functions as a sort of epilogue: the initial
steps, as president, of Lenin Moreno, the successor designated by the Citizens' Revolution,
have gone in the direction of ousting Correa from the political scene and doing away with
much of the symbolism and the confrontational thrust that had theretofore distinguished the
Citizens' Revolution. The period considered here finishes with the seven-part referendum and
popular consultation organised by Moreno in February 2018, which sanctions the definitive
parting from the political inheritance of his predecessor. In the fifth and final section,
‘Theoretical outcomes’, a series of theoretical considerations on the Ecuadorian context and
Laclau's work as a result of the analysis are advanced.
The construction of a people
In the wake of the deepening of the structural adjustment policies during the government of
Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996), a phase of particular instability began in the Ecuador. Despite
falling far from a rigorous implementation of the Washington Consensus policies that saw
their apex in Chile and Argentina, the ‘qualitative leap’ of the neoliberal agenda created the
conditions for an exponential increase of social protest that resulted in a condition of
permanent political instability. Inflation, lack of growth, corruption, re-primarisation of the
economy, unemployment, authoritarianism, migratory exodus: these were only the most
visible factors that led thousands of citizens to tip over repeatedly onto the streets,
contributing to the fall of three elected Presidents (Abdalá Bucaram in 1997, Jamil Mahuad in
2000 and Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005), and a proliferation of social demands systematically
neglected by existing institutional channels. Not even the Constituent Assembly held in 1998
managed to put things in order and inject some of the much sought-after governability to the
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Ecuadorian political system. Rather, it could be said that the Constitution of 1998 integrated
various demands through a modest talk of rights and contributed to creating a climate that
favoured participation at a local level. However, it failed to reform the state consistently and
to give real access to those rights, as the core of the new Magna Carta hinged around a
strengthened role for the market to the detriment of the state. In this way, demands kept
expressing themselves through extra-institutional forms, with the indigenous organisation
playing an increasingly central role (Ortiz Crespo, 2008: 14-15). Such a prominence occurred
amid the loss of political weight of the trade unions and resulted in the capacity of the
indigenous movement to enact protests that embodied the general interest, thus attracting a
plurality of popular demands (León Trujillo, 2010: 16)
Nevertheless, despite accumulating, these claims did not lead automatically to the
consolidation of an alternative proposal capable of launching an organised and effective
assault to the supremacy of the national political actors who, with different nuances,
defended the status quo. The demands, many of which had their distant origin in different
relations of oppression dating back even to the colonial era, were exacerbated by policies that
hit the most vulnerable sectors of society and by a profound crisis of the political system. If we
follow the categorisation employed by Laclau, we can say that in the stage prior to the advent
of the Citizens' Revolution, these demands had already ceased to be ‘democratic’ in order to
become ‘popular’. This means that they were no longer isolated demands, because among
them there was no doubt a vague solidarity in recognising in the political and economic
powers their common adversary. However, they had not yet transformed themselves into a
stable system of signification (OPR: 74). In this sense, the creation of the Coordinadora de
Movimientos Sociales (Social Movements Coordination Body) in 1995 testifies the
convergence of some of the demands expressed by Ecuadorian civil society. Another example
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is the 2005 Forajido (outlaw) movement that developed in Quito in opposition to the
President Lucio Gutiérrez. Even though temporally limited and prevalently composed by the
middle class, the movement managed to coalesce heterogeneous frustrations under the anti-
parties motto ¡Qué se vayan todos! (Let them all go!).
This traumatic situation of crisis and uncertainty that existed in Ecuador in the 1990s and
2000s - a lack of social fullness which was expressed precisely by means of demands (OPR:
114-115) - weakened the old political discourses which until then had conferred identity,
opening up a window that made it possible for subjects to re-construct new structures and re-
identify with new discursive objects. It was a time - the emblem of which was the 5-days long
bank holiday of 1999 when all financial activities were suspended amid a ruinous banking
crisis and following which the economy was dollarised - that, as we have seen, Laclau
conceptualises under the name of dislocation, i.e. an experience that makes visible the
contingency of social relations and identities, opening a new range of possibilities. But which
were the demands that more forcefully began to spread among the Ecuadorian population?
We need to keep in mind that not all of them were necessarily represented by a particular
socio-political actor and that those expressing them not always belonged to an organised
militant sector: in fact, some demands emerged simply as generic questionings of existing
relationships of subordination, thereby becoming potential antagonistic sites (HSS: 153-154).
While some of these claims overlapped in so far as subjects could well be bearers of more
than one of them, from an analytical point of view we can discriminate them. Among them,
we can distinguish claims for the recognition of ancestral peoples, for the cancellation of the
external debt, for a more transparent politics in opposition to a political class growingly
perceived as corrupt and self-absorbed, against the destruction of the Andean and Amazonian
ecosystems, against the abysmal levels of poverty and inequality, against the continuous
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interference of the United States in national political matters, for the recognition of care work
and the denunciation of the sexual division of labour, and against labour outsourcing and
flexibility.
However, it should be remembered that the appearance of such demands does not guarantee
a social transformation in a progressive direction. The contingency imposed by the dislocation
can be hidden thanks to its reabsorption by the dominant bloc, through a differential
satisfaction of demands or, similarly, by means of a new discourse which transformistically
carries out what Antonio Gramsci called passive revolution, i.e. a change so that nothing will
change. What is required is a condensation of a range of demands to the extent that they
become enchained one to the other. As Laclau clarifies:
All struggle is the struggle of concrete social actors for particular objectives, and nothing guarantees that
these objectives will not clash with each other. Now I would agree that no overall historical
transformation is possible unless the particularism of the struggles is superseded and a wider "collective
will" is constituted. But this requires the implementation of what in our work we have called the logic of
equivalence, which involves acts of political articulation (Laclau, 2001: 8).
How is a new collective will forged in Ecuador? Let us have a look at how the project came
about specifically. Correa, a heterodox economist with no particularly strong ties to the
militant Left, was nominated as Minister for the Economy by Alfredo Palacio, the President
who had succeeded Lucio Gutiérrez once the latter was removed from power amid the
popular unrest that shook the city of Quito in April 2005. Correa gained much visibility by
expressing stark critiques against neoliberal economic policies and by altering the allocation of
the reserve fund arising from the oil revenues exceeding the budgeted price: while up to that
point 70% of that fund was addressed to covering the foreign debt with only 10% spent on
health and education programs, Correa reduced the former to 50% and increased the latter to
30%, while also enhancing the amount allocated to other productive rubrics (El Universo
165
2005; Correa, 2005: 72). It was already clear that by the time he resigned as Minister following
some bitter disagreements with Palacio, he had already acquired a consistent political capital
and was the most popular member of the cabinet (El Universo, 2005b). From there, it was a
short step to transforming his vocal rants into an electoral campaign.
A hasty process of electoral preparation followed, which, as we shall see below, was not
exempt from repercussions in the medium-long run in the politics of the Citizens' Revolution.
From an organisational point of view, the creation of Correa's movement was supported by
the academic prestige of many of its original proponents (Rafael Correa himself, Alberto
Acosta, Fander Falconí, Fernando Bustamante) and by the logistic and organisational networks
provided by some political groups that came together in the movement.40 But it was certainly
the work of the political articulation of demands that made the difference. The creation of a
‘people’ was made possible precisely by the political gamble of Correa, who enchained
equivalentially these demands, i.e. he made their contiguity, their proximity as demands,
transform into a fully-fledged analogy (OPR: 109). In other words, originally heterogeneous
demands gained homogeneity and joined in one discourse by which each demand necessarily
implied the other. This did not happen immediately however, as Correa - one of thirteen
contenders in the 2006 elections - ended second in the first round and won only in the run-off
against the banana tycoon Álvaro Noboa, in a vote that was possibly more against Noboa than
pro Correa. It is also paramount to highlight that by the time Correa launched his electoral bid,
popular mobilisations had already ebbed and the main character of the previous protests, the
indigenous movement through its national organization CONAIE, had lost much of his political
40Among these it is worth mentioning Jubileo 2000, Iniciativa Ciudadana, Acción Democrática Nacional,
Movimiento Alianza Bolivariana Alfarista, Ciudadanos Nuevo País and Alternativa Democrática. The Partido
Socialista Frente Amplio also supported Rafael Correa from the outset, even though it never joined Alianza
País.
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capital by allying with former President Lucio Gutiérrez, whose promises to do away with
neoliberalism proved to be vacuous. It would thus be more correct to affirm that it was
through the consolidation of Correa in power that the chain of equivalences fully established
itself, thanks to a massive deployment of the state and the design of efficient public policies,
as we shall analyse more at length below.
As well synthesised by Conaghan, two overarching themes stood out in the 2006 campaign: on
one side, Correa insisted on the moral bankruptcy of the political class, which was deemed as
responsible for the degradation of state institutions; on the other his fiery attacks went
against the disintegration of the fatherland (patria) following the implementation of elite-
engineered economic policies that furthered the interests of the few at the expense of the
many (Conaghan, 2011: 265). The reference to the fatherland permitted Correa to construct a
powerful narrative once in power. Accompanied by the promise of a radical rupture with a
past made of entreguismo (the attitude of granting concessions to powerful interests,
especially foreign ones), Correa adopted dramatic tones and a quasi-religious language in
shaping his patriotic discourse (Burbano de Lara, 2015: 24). Patria became an all-pervading
term, as well epitomised by the name of Correa's movement Patria altiva i soberana (Proud
and sovereign fatherland), whose initials together formed the acronym PAIS (which in Spanish
means country). As Correa put it in the inaugural speech of the Constituent Assembly election
day:
We require the national spirit, the most honest and deep one, linked to the endearing deeds of the
fatherland, to be present in this hour, which is the reaffirmation of the change of epoch, of the light at
the end of the tunnel, of the hope for the poor of the fatherland (Correa, 2007).
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Even more performative was the felicitous appropriation of the Himno a la Patria (Hymn to
the Fatherland, not the official national anthem), a lively motif that started to be played any
time Correa made his entrance at a public event. The first verse goes like this:
Patria, tierra sagrada,
de honor y de hidalguía
que fecundó la sangre
y engrandeció el dolor
como me enorgullece llamarte mía
mía como mi madre con infinito amor
Fatherland, sacred land,
of honour and nobility
that fertilised the blood
and magnified the pain
how I am proud to call you mine
mine like my mother with infinite love
The invocation of the fatherland was thus aimed at legitimising various metaphorical
enchainments. Invoking the fatherland and its dignity was subservient to appealing to a
variety of situations: fatherland meant showing interest for the downtrodden and forgotten
sectors of society, it meant claiming for more social justice, it meant recuperating the
sovereignty that the country had ceded to foreign interests, it meant displaying proximity
towards the millions of Ecuadorians who had migrated abroad after the banking crisis a few
years before. But most especially it meant creating a filiation with the most glorious political
traditions of the country, just as we have seen in the case of the PCI (Burbano de Lara, 2015:
26-30). Eloy Alfaro, the leader of the so called Liberal Revolution of the 1890s-1910s and
former president who was brutally assassinated and burnt by a conservative-led mob, was
elevated as the ultimate source of political and symbolic inspiration. In his honour, the
Constituent Assembly was set up in Montecristi, the city where he was born. As put by Correa
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in a ceremony that marked the beginning of the Constituent Assembly during which the ashes
of Alfaro were collocated in a newly-built mausoleum: "By following the footsteps and traces
of Alfaro's sovereignty, independence and patriotism, they are irrefutable evidence of the
permanence and validity of his ideology" (Correa, 2007b). A second historic reference was
that of Manuela Sáenz, the Ecuadorian loving and political partner of Simón Bolívar, also
known as El Libertador for his successful military undertakings in the struggle for South
American liberation from Spanish colonial rule. In this sense, Bolivarianism - already deployed
in the discourses of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia - was constitutive of
a teleological rhetoric that made of the Citizens' Revolution the second and definitive
independence (Burbano de Lara, 2015: 24).
What about in terms of the actual ideology of the Citizens' Revolution? As hinted, the
discourse adopted by Correa was markedly anti-neoliberal and adverse to free-market
policies. In the inaugural address of his first Presidency, he bluntly stated:
The neoliberal, inhuman and cruel globalisation, which wants to convert us into markets and not into
nations, which wants to make us simple consumers and not citizens of the world, is very similar in
conceptual terms to the savage capitalism of the Industrial Revolution (Correa, 2007c).
Correa defined the époque that preceded his election as the "sad and long neoliberal night",
an expression that became famous as he insisted in repeating it in his presidential speeches.
In the first few years, Correa adhered to the ill-defined horizon of the socialism of the XXI
century, which at the time found much echo in Latin America. His socialism went hand in hand
with his catholic credo, which he always displayed very openly, in an important metaphorical
operation which, differently from the PCI, tried to conflate the two in a country that is deeply
religious. "The politics of the Citizens' Revolution is a politics of solidarity, of true Christian
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consecration in its love for the neighbour and adoption of the brotherly doctrine of the
socialism of the XXI century" (Correa, 2007d).
In order to respond to the falling levels of solidarity and the mounting individualism fostered
by neoliberal policies, Correa put the state at the centre of his politics (Burbano de Lara, 2015:
33). The reconstruction of an efficient and dynamic state apparatus ranked high among his
priorities, especially in the light of the ‘corporativisation’ of the state, colonised according to
Correa's view by private interests - especially in the oil sector (see Santos, 2008) - and other
unions (Ospina Peralta, 2010: 3). Such an emphasis has led some commentators to speak
about the curious emergence of a sort of technocratic populism, at odds with the much more
precarious state management of other populist experiences (such as Venezuela) (de la Torre,
2013; de la Torre, 2013b).41 This, however, has been described as an elitism of a new sort,
whereby '[c]itizens are being turned into passive and grateful recipients of the leader's
benevolent and technocratically engineered redistributive policies' (de la Torre, 2013b: 45).
According to de la Torre, the National Secretary of Planning and Development (SENPLADES
from its Spanish acronym) played a major role in this process of state reactivation and he is
apt to observe that '[u]nlike neoliberal experts who believed in econometric models, they
[SENPLADES' technocrats] are interdisciplinary and eclectic, citing postcolonial theorists,
radical democrats, unorthodox economists, and political ecologists' (de la Torre, 2014: 460).42
The theorisation of Laclau on populism helps us here in capturing how this new collective
identity came about. The project of Correa was based on a forceful simplification of the
41As we know from the literature review, such a surprise before a populist practice that proves to be
‘technically’ prepared is only possible to the extent that populism is conceptualised in terms of simplicity
and ‘policy sloppiness’. Once again, this proves the untenability of any non-minimal definition of populism.
42This observation perfectly fits with my own experience as a consultant of the above mentioned institution.
However, what is missed is that by the time de la Torre wrote these lines, the influence of SENPLADES
within the government had already greatly diminished, a signal of the progressive shift to the centre of
Correa on which more will said in the following sections.
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political space – a 'permanent antagonism' as Philip and Panizza put it (2011: 90) - which
consists in the discursive creation of a radical frontier between two camps: on the one hand
the ‘people’, i.e. the bearers of the articulated demands, and on the other the ‘elites’,
identified by the discourse of the Citizens' Revolution in the big banks, the traditional political
class, the mainstream media, the agro-exporting sectors and foreign actors such as the IMF,
the World Bank as well as the the US and Colombian governments. It is worth recalling that
among the demands there is no positivity that joins them. Rather, it is the political frontier
erected against the same adversary that is constituent by serving as the minimum common
denominator. In addition, the performative role played by naming deserves a mention. From
the beginning, Correa devised particularly suggestive phrases to refer to the two camps. The
‘people’ were those with “lucid minds, clean hands and passionate hearts”, while pejorative
expressions such as a “partycracy” and “pelucones” (bigwigs) were effectively employed to
refer to the adversary.43 It is also necessary to note that the unity of the popular subject was
not only given by the amalgamation of pre-politicised individuals and organised sectors. This is
possible only if, as noted above, the concept of demand does not necessarily match with a
specific organised group. In this sense, Correa deployed different rhetorics; similar to the PCI,
we can identify a sophisticated one aimed at a more cultivated and somehow militant public,
and another ‘plebeian’ one and spiced up by phrases and gestures of popular character and
thus capable of interpellating the common citizen generally indifferent to politics. This
movement is not trivial, since it allowed the Citizens' Revolution to go beyond the small circle
of the radical left.
43In actual fact, the term pelucón was originally introduced by former president Abdalá Bucaram into the
Ecuadorian political lexicon.
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At this point, following the Laclauian scheme, it is essential to wonder what the nodal point of
the equivalential system of the Citizens' Revolution was. In another text on the matter, I
identified the empty signifier of the Citizens' Revolution in the Buen Vivir (Good Living, also
known as Sumak Kawsay in the Kichwa indigenous language) (Mazzolini 2012). What is the
Buen Vivir? The Buen Vivir imaginary derives from the indigenous repertoire and refers, in its
particularist meaning, to the demand for recognition of ancestral peoples together with the
vindication of a paradigm shift regarding the relationship between man and nature. Despite
there existing a range of various definitions, some of which are stricter than others in
conceding the possibility of admitting elements belonging to western modernity - for example
the notion of economic growth is by some fully opposed while others allow for its usefulness
(see Viola Recasens, 2011) - Buen Vivir is known for repudiating the conception of wealth
understood in mercantilist or monetary terms. We are faced with an epistemological inversion
of those philosophies whose raison d'être lies in accumulation or consumption, be them
dictated by the reasons of capital or socialism. As a result, orthodox economic notions are
treated as colonial and Eurocentric, giving to Buen Vivir the touch of a claim to an altogether
different form of civilization (Lander, 2009: 37).
The notion of Buen Vivir appears as central from the very outset in the Citizens' Revolution.
The government plan adopted in 2006 presents it as:
a shared goal: a good living in harmony with nature. It is an inclusive proposal. This means that we think
of popular sectors, the dispossessed, the marginalised, not only as passive subjects, but as protagonists
in this process of change, so that from now on they can take over the present and above all their future
(Movimiento PAIS, 2006: 4).
Such an understanding betrays a particularly elastic conception: Buen Vivir was gradually
‘filled’ with the other demands mentioned above. This had already happened before Correa
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and the Citizens' Revolution took hold. During the popular demonstrations of the 1990s and
2000s, the role played by the indigenous movement made it possible for this signifier - which
played a minor role even in the indigenous tradition (Viola Recasens, 2011: 272) - to be
retrieved as an effective slogan amid the fusion of the indigenous and the mestizo-left
symbols. The phenomenon is not new, as made clear by Laclau already in the late 1970s:
In the Andean countries popular resistance was increasingly expressed through indigenist symbols,
which originally represented the resistance to the dissolution of peasant communities but which,
reinterpreted by urban sectors, lost any necessary rural connotation and came to be symbols of popular
resistance in general (PIM: 180).
As mentioned in the second chapter, according to Laclau - but also, as we shall see, according
to the empirical evidence - occupying the place of the empty signifier is a dangerous victory
for a demand: by becoming the surface of inscription of a series of demands, the emptying
that allows the equivalential moment can be particularly pronounced, 'blur[ring] its
connection with the actual content with which it was originally associated' and 'break[ing] its
links with the force which was its original promoter and beneficiary' (Laclau, 1994: 177; also in
E: 45).
Nevertheless, Buen Vivir has been an empty signifier able to symbolise the equivalential chain
at a relatively ‘high level’, as it never achieved a representative role for large audiences and
thus never constituted the homogenising cement able to keep together heterogeneous
groups. What, then, has been the empty signifier of the Citizens' Revolution? Surely, the
signifier able to amalgamate the various components of the popular field has been the leader
himself, i.e. Rafael Correa. As we have seen, Laclau outlines this possibility by recognising that
the effectiveness of a signifier in providing homogeneity to a heterogeneous reality derives
from the reduction to a minimum of its particular contents, being the most extreme
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expression of this dynamic when the role is played by the name of the leader (Laclau, 2005b:
40). Affect is part and parcel of this process. Indeed, any empirical analysis of the Citizens'
Revolution needs to recognise the pre-eminence of the leader and the affect he unleashed, an
affect which has effectively cemented and conferred a univocal meaning to the popular field.
The leader works at this stage as what Jason Glynos calls an enigma that promises meaning:
i.e. the ‘site’ in which a plurality of aspirations are struggling to inscribe themselves (Glynos,
2000: 99; Panizza 2005: 19). The ability to perform that role is certainly made plausible by the
rich phenomenology which Correa gave life to. As analysed by Carlos de la Torre, Correa made
himself known as a man of popular origins but at the same time able to excel in life, arising in
such a way as the best suited to be the anti-oligarchic ‘battering ram’ and as the incarnation
of the fatherland (de la Torre, 2008: 32; de la Torre, 2013: 31). His fired-up rhetoric, his
omnipresence in the media, his defiant and confrontational attitude, his well-articulated rants
on the disastrous situation in which the country lay before his political engagement are also
decisive elements that turned him into the indispensable hinging point of the Citizens'
Revolution: both his generator and his constant feeder.
Yet, notwithstanding his irrefutable centrality, it would be reductive to say that the whole
process has only been about his persona. As analysed in the second chapter, there is an
incongruence in Laclau's status of the empty signifier: it could be both a leader or a
particularly widespread demand, but while the latter pre-exists the formation of a popular
camp and can be ‘filled’ with the contents of a particular project, the former typically
constitutes the popular camp, while not being yet majoritarian in society and thus not
necessarily being perceived as a redeeming horizon. The 2006 electoral process tells us
precisely this: Correa was not the name of a widely perceived redemption. What was the
name of redemption, then? As stated above, the question of the fatherland played that kind
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of role. Yet different nuances existed and, thanks to the policies enacted over time, the
Citizens' Revolution managed to flirt with all of them. Fatherland meant an infrastructural
modernisation of the country, it meant a recuperation of stolen popular and national
sovereignty, it meant providing for the well-being of the most vulnerable, it meant taking
revenge against the national vendepatrias (those who sell out their fatherland, a reference
Correa dedicated to oligarchs and politicians alike). In the short-term, it meant living up to the
promise of the refoundation of the country, which took the form of the promise of a new
post-neoliberal Constitution, possibly the most central slogan of Correa's campaign. The
process of calling for this was tortuous as Correa had not presented any candidate to the
legislative in 2006, in the name of his repudiation of an institution that was highly discredited.
Correa's intention to set up a Constituent Assembly thus unleashed a bitter confrontation
between various state powers, which Correa managed to outmanoeuvre savvily. Finally, a
referendum gave a green light to the Constituent Assembly with almost 82% of the vote, and
in the subsequent election of the assembly-members Correa's movement secured a majority
of 80 out of 130. The plebiscitary politics of Correa had just begun (Philip and Panizza, 2011:
110). It is thus to the second period starting with the Constituent Assembly that we now turn.
Populism in transition
With the setting up of the Constituent Assembly and the first measures Correa adopted, the
promise to undo much of the neoliberal framework was under way. However, during the
Constituent phase, there occurred a number of transformations. Initially, a further expansion
of the equivalential chain began: its empirical concretion consisted in the pilgrimage of
thousands of groups, collectives or simple citizens to the small coastal town where the
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Constituent Assembly was installed so that their voices could be heard and somehow
crystallised into the new Magna Carta. This expansion, however, did not contemplate only
demands oriented to the left, but a much wider range:
The truth is that maintaining unity and cohesion within the governmental block in Montecristi required
an enormous effort from the staff of Alianza País. It was not, in any way, a homogeneous group of
legislators. There coexisted very different political fractions, ranging from the center-right to a variety of
expressions of the left, such as environmental positions, stances near the indigenous movement,
assemblymen next to certain trade unions, assembly members related to women's organizations, or
with the activism of NGOs, there were expressions of progressive churches (and others not so
progressive), traditional partisanship of old and new left parties, until citizens that were "newcomers" to
politics (Ramírez Gallegos, 2008).
We know from Laclau that some ideological ambiguity is an intrinsic characteristic of every
populist practice and, as populism is a logic that permeates to varying degrees every political
construction, of politics itself (OPR: 109, 118, 154). He also warns us that the empty signifier
exerts an irresistible attraction on any unmet demand but does not have any ability to
determine which demands can enter the equivalential chain (OPR: 108). While this seems
appropriate in relation to the initial stage, the empty signifier Correa actually took up a much
more active role, rather than being the passive recipient of societal demands. In fact, among
the myriad of proposals, Correa functioned as the final arbiter of what entered and what did
not into the new Constitution (de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016: 225). On a related account
however, Laclau is of better help. Although he does not provide many details about the
entailments for a populist practice to pass from the opposition to the incumbency, his theory
is not entirely static either, since it gives us important clues about the possibility of variations
with respect to the antagonistic frontier and the demands articulated thanks to the notion of
the floating signifier. The vagueness of populism is, as we have seen, performative, but a
source of tension too. As Correa started to impose a firmer line, there was an increasingly
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irreconcilable confrontation between environmentalist and redistributive drives. As a result,
there was the attempt of a new political project to dispute the environmental demand in
order to disentangle it from the equivalential chain instituted by the Citizens' Revolution.
The first clash began with the resignation of Alberto Acosta as President of the Constituent
Assembly and a further distancing between Correa and CONAIE, the largest indigenous
organisation in the country. Up to that point, the relationship between Correa and the
indigenous constituencies had been erratic. CONAIE refused to enter into a ticket with Correa
in 2006, only to endorse him in the second round. Nevertheless, Correa made much use of
their symbolic repertoire, as well testified by the indigenous ceremony held in the indigenous
village of Zumbahua along with leftist allies Venezuelan and Bolivian presidents Hugo Chávez
and Evo Morales. Dressed up in highland clothes, Correa received a sceptre from indigenous
leaders, symbolising their acceptance of his rule. On various occasions, Correa even exhibited
a modest knowledge of the Kichwa language. Nevertheless, relationships soon deteriorated,
with Correa expressing contempt for indigenous leaders disagreeing with him, and a
systematic co-optation of the most conciliatory leaders in a divide et impera strategy took
place. Following a period of selective support, the rupture became more radical, with the
indigenous constituencies organising nationwide or local protests on issues relating to open-
pit mining, water property, interculturalism and positive discrimination (León Trujillo, 2010:
17-20).
This confrontation finally ushered in the creation of a radical left alternative, made of the
urban environmentalists (predominantly of Quito), the indigenous party Pachakutik - the
political wing of CONAIE - and the Democratic Popular Movement (MPD in its Spanish
acronym), threatened by the educational policies of the government that undermined its
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historic feuds among teachers and university students. The demands that these subjects
intended to represent were therefore in a state that Laclau describes as floating, i.e.
suspended between two rival projects competing to ascribe them a meaning (OPR: 131-132).
However, this type of tension did not manage to seriously put the equivalential chain of the
Citizens' Revolution under discussion, since the project of the radical left attempted an
‘assault’ on demands that lacked a majoritarian projection. Rather, this readjustment enabled
Correa to widen the register of the enemies: no longer only the classical economic and
political oligarchies, but also those who opposed change because of their “infantilism” - as
Correa repeatedly described their behaviour - or because of the returns obtained through a
mere logic of opposition. This development calls for a betterment of Laclau's theory of
populism insofar as the treatment of demands is concerned. Demands are not all strictly
equal, in the sense that the salience and intensity of each of them strongly varies, as
suggested by Howarth (2008: 185). It would then be more plausible to say that a hierarchy of
them is always at place and that any empirical analysis through the lens of the populist logic
should should foreground this aspect.44
In the light of this, how do we make sense of these conflicts? The dilemma can be summarised
in the following way: in the equivalential chain of the Citizens' Revolution, demands with a
socio-economic component were the majority and demanded the populist practice - now in
power - to deal with them. Tied to a primary-exporting model, Ecuador could not afford to
generate wealth without exerting further pressure on the environment, as the desired
44Once again, we find in Laclau a certain awareness of some of the problems that his theory may present:
'[t]he assertion that there is an essential unevenness of the elements entering the hegemonic struggle is
something with which I can certainly concur' (OPR: 236), even though he may be simply referring to the fact
that the empty signifier enjoys a privileged status vis-à-vis the remaining elements of a chain of
equivalences. Be that as it may, the recognition that a much more complex hierarchy among the articulated
elements always exist would require a much more nuanced and specific treatment of its theoretical
entailments.
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economic diversification was seen as a long-term goal that required, among the other things,
conspicuous investments. The Citizens' Revolution, despite the pompous constitutional
rhetoric that grants rights to nature, went for partially sacrificing environmental issues -
especially in so far as mining is concerned - and then giving this move sense within a
framework of compromises with other demands. The situation just described testifies the
paradox signalled above: despite being a representative slogan of the Citizens' Revolution,
Buen Vivir began to lose the connection with its original meaning, leading the defenders of its
particularist meaning to speak about the turning of Buen Vivir into sheer marketing (Acosta in
Fernández, B. S., Pardo, L., and Salamanca, K., 2014: 104). The logic of the governmental
discourse - and by the same token of the priorities in terms of demands - is well described by
this passage of René Ramírez, a radical economist who occupied various cabinet posts in the
Correa administrations:
If an economy that seeks to be anti (or even post) capitalist does not improve the material conditions of
production and reproduction of the social life of the population and does not overcome poverty, not
only is it not politically viable but it is not ethically desirable either, no matters the «non-capitalist
accumulation» it entails (Ramírez Gallegos, R., 2012: 141).
As also evidenced by the 2009-2013 development plan elaborated by SENPLADES, of which
Ramírez was in charge at the time, leaving aside the primary exporting model was then
considered unviable and a first stage of policies oriented at satisfying basic necessities was
envisaged (SENPLADES, 2009: 57-58; Manosalvas, 2014: 108).
Coming back to the Constitution, it recognised an ample spectrum of rights, while
emphasising special attention for priority groups (young people, indigenous, women, children,
the elderly). It also provided for a variety of instruments enhancing popular participation by
allowing for civil society organisations to have a say in the shaping of public policies and
augmented the role of the state in the economy and society at large (Ortiz Crespo, 2008: 16).
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Before and after the Constitution, sound accomplishments in terms of social policies in health
care, education, infrastructure building and protection of the national industries reinforced
the idea of a project hinging around a renewed role for the state. Spending for social
programs climbed up from 4.8% of the GDP in 2006 to 9.3% in 2011, while in the same period
poverty went down from 37.6% to 28.6%, and the Gini coefficient from 54 to 47. School
enrolment rose consistently, especially in the pre-primary level. Thanks to a potent fiscal
stimulus, the number of fully employed people rose from 39.3% in 2007 to 50.2% in 2012,
while GDP figures remained positive even in 2009 when the majority of world economies
sank, and skyrocketed to 7.2% and 7.8% in 2008 and 2011 respectively (Ray and Kozameh,
2012: 1, 3, 13-15). A number of other bold moves attracted world-wide attention and made
crystal-clear that the reference to the fatherland was not a mere electoral smokescreen. In
the first place, Correa announced a default on $3.2 billion of the foreign public debt after a
process of auditing aimed at determining its legitimacy, legality, transparency, quality, efficacy
and efficiency. Later, 'Ecuador completed a buyback of 91 percent of the defaulted bonds, at
about 35 cents on the dollar. The government thus retired about a third of its foreign debt […]
reducing its foreign public debt to 17 percent of GDP' (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2009: 17).
Secondly, the oil politics changed course with a renegotiation of all contracts with
multinational companies on much better terms for Ecuador, increasing the state share from
13% to 87% of gross oil revenues, and thus conducing to a much greater fiscal revenue
(Ghosh, 2012). Thirdly, the nationalist foreign policies of Correa included the non-renewal of
the lease of the military base in Manta to the United States (Correa defiantly stated that he
would have renewed the lease had the US permitted to establish an Ecuadorian military base
in Miami) (Stewart, 2007), the expulsion from Ecuador of an US Ambassador, a World Bank
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envoy and another US diplomatic secretary, and the political asylum granted to Wikileaks
founder Julian Assange.
Yet, despite a revolutionary fervour that found ample resonance in the speeches of Correa
and his aides, a certain reflux was palpable. On the account of participation, the constitutional
text did not find a particularly convincing application and the state seemed to have entirely
engulfed society. As bluntly put by Santiago Ortiz, a fairly sympathetic observer of the Citizens'
Revolution and the ‘pink tide’ as whole: '[t]he government of Rafael Correa, differently from
other "lefts" in Latin America, did not give signs of comprehending the importance of
participation, nor of having a consistent politics on this field' (Ortiz Crespo, 2008: 17). In fact,
the distancing of those sectors that advocated a more radical interpretation of the
environmental and indigenous demands went along a cooling of relations between the
government and a range of civil society actors that had supported the process as a whole.
Some of them showed a growing discomfort towards the government and its policies, such as
public employees, affected by a law that homogenised the rules of the game across civil and
military bureaucracy (Ortiz Crespo, 2011: 27). Moreover, the process of listening and
processing of the demands arising from the organised sectors became increasingly a facade.
Examples include the critical position adopted by Fenocin (CLOC, 2010) and university
students (Ortiz Crespo, 2011: 28), and the separation from the government of the political
group Ruptura de los 25 (El Universo, 2011). The tendency continued over time, involving
organizations that had been very close to the government, such as the urban youth group
Diabluma (Diabluma 2013). In this sense, it is worth highlighting that this distancing was
regretfully acknowledged even by pro-government legislators (Hernández y Buendía, 2011:
135-136, 142). Speaking of the legislative, a frenetic pace imposed by the executive
encroached upon its autonomy, and the bills that the government wanted to rapidly approve
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in order to modernise the state took little account of the heterogeneity of Ecuadorian society
(Ortiz Crespo, 2011: 28). Critical voices within the governing bloc were also treated with
suspicion and internal debate soon waned amid the habit of Correa to rapidly alternate his
ministers. Similarly, the passive mode of militancy of the supporters of Alianza País is to be
emphasised. Indeed, the movement created by Correa had never great transcendence in what
concerns the organisation of the bases and the politicisation of society, and even when
activated, the dynamics usually responded to direct calls coming from the government - with
the notable exception of the spontaneous mobilisation against the failed police coup on 30
September 2010.
Laclau proposes a rather effective scheme to capture this movement: if we think of politics in
terms of two dimensions, one horizontal and the other vertical, where the former represents
the autonomy of demands and the latter their condensation in a hegemonic project seeking a
radical transformation of the state (Laclau, 2014: 9), we can say that between 2008 and 2013,
the Citizens' Revolution began to favour the latter while gradually setting aside the former.
This did not immediately affect the levels of support towards the executive led by Correa: the
economic bonanza favoured by high oil prices enabled the carrying out of far-reaching
programs of wealth redistribution, with particular emphasis, as we have seen, on the
education and health sectors, as well as on infrastructural modernisation. These achievements
ensured that the appeal to the people and the fatherland were still perfectly legitimate before
the eyes of the population at large. There was thus no significant trace of these tensions in the
presidential elections of February 2013, in which Correa was re-elected with 57% of the
popular vote in the first round, a result which has no precedents in the republican history of
the country.
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Towards a progressive degeneration of populism
Correa's 2013 re-election marks the third phase of the Citizens' Revolution. As put by Franklin
Ramírez little after the election in relation to the profound changes brought about by this new
stage of the Citizens' Revolution: 'in the modification of the political field are combined,
perhaps paradoxically, the highest point of popular support to the project of change with a
stagnation of the work of hegemonic construction on the part of the ruling force' (Ramírez
Gallegos, 2014: 100). The most obvious symbolic manifestation of this rupture occurred with
the change of vice-president running mate: while until then Correa had been accompanied by
Lenin Moreno, a man in a wheelchair who gained much popularity through the enactment of
public policies in favour of the disabled, for the new period Correa chose Jorge Glas. Glas
clearly displayed much less charisma than his predecessor and exhibited a very friendly
attitude towards the business world, having excelled as a skilful negotiator while he served as
Minister of the Strategic Sectors in the previous legislature.
In fact, some substantial transformations in the political practice ensued from this moment
onward, which can be broadly summarised as a turn to the centre. Correa adopted a mixture
of measures that made it ever more difficult to characterise his government in a clear manner
from a normative point of view. While some leftist proposals survived, such as the law to
avoid land speculation and the attempt to introduce a tax on the inheritance of big
patrimonies - then aborted amid street protests - (El Telégrafo, 2016), by and large most
analysts have agreed on a certain ‘normalisation’ of the project. More specifically, it seems
that a quite notable reconsideration on the thrust of the economic policies took place.
According to some, the economic orientation of the Citizens' Revolution was clear from the
beginning as the regime of Correa never questioned capitalism as such and this became
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evident with the consolidation of the largest economic groups of the country, which
benefitted from a number of concessions and saw their returns increase consistently during
the whole period that Correa was in power, and a with an import-fed consumerist boom
(Acosta and Cajas Guijarro, 2016: 9, 18-23). In this sense, they highlight that economic
diversification - purportedly, one of the chief aims of the Citizens' Revolution - has been an
utter failure, with industrial output stationary at roughly 12.5% of the GDP throughout the
2007-2015 period. Moreover, they point out that the percentage of primary export rose from
74 to 79 in the same period (Acosta and Cajas Guijarro, 2016: 24). While their critique is at
times ungenerous, it is possible to concur with the fact that the Citizens' Revolution did not
manage to substantially alter the economic system and come up with its own model. Their
observation that suggests the consolidation of an oligopolistic structure in the Ecuadorian
economy is also indisputable (Acosta and Cajas Guijarro, 2016: 24). Ospina suggests that the
reasons for the failure to change the productive structure and overcome the historic
economic lag lies in the power struggle that happened behind closed doors within the
government. In particular, he signals that three groups fought for the internal predominance:
the progressive technocratic group (which, it must be added, had no real rooting in society),
the group representing agro-exporting interests and that representing national and foreign
interests in connection to the extraction of natural resources (Ospina Peralta, 2013). While
Ospina concludes that the skirmishes between the first two were then superseded by the
clear hegemony of the last group, epitomised by the ascending power of Glas, the picture is
possibly more complex, with more than simply three groups involved in the struggle and a
much more nuanced internal power map. For example, the move towards the political centre
is also observable by looking at the growing weight of officials associated with the coastal
clientele networks (Ortiz Crespo, 2016) and the number of local leaders (caciques) whose
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adhesion to the political project was all but ideological. The many concessions made to the
financial sector in order to grant higher margins of utility also speak of the reluctance to touch
powerful financial interests (El Universo, 2015). What is certain is that in this period the
influence exerted by the sectors of the left within the executive waned, associated with their
increasingly lower propensity to contend to Correa his more controversial decisions. For the
purposes of this research, what is important to establish is that, faced with an economically
difficult situation consisting of declining oil prices and the appreciation of the dollar, the
heterodox model initially envisaged by Correa proved to be hardly sustainable, or to put it
otherwise, it would have required a clash with powerful interests that Correa was unwilling to
sustain and which would have needed a genuine mobilisation of popular forces that Correa
never cultivated. In order to deal with the crisis then, Correa resorted to measures such as the
signing of a trade agreement with the European Union (Andes, 2014) on terms very similar to
those of Peru and Colombia (Isch, 2014), a possibility that had been peremptorily excluded in
the past (El Comercio, 2012), and the return of the IMF into the country in order to obtain
new credits (El Mostrador, 2016). Paradoxically, the state returned to servicing foreign debt at
a higher rate than that Correa took issue with back in 2005 (Labarthe and Saint Upéry, 2017:
35). Finally, for Ibarra the new private-public alliances that opened the way for new
privatisations and a more docile relationship with national entrepreneurs 'implies the
retraction and the readjustment of state intervention, which entails a reconciliation with
arguments typical of the neoliberal perspective, so reviled by the government' (Ibarra, 2016).
How do we account for this rather drastic political shift that does away with many of the
emancipatory credentials previously exhibited by the Citizens' Revolution? As the project
clearly revolved around the centrality of Correa, the changing inclinations of the leader had a
preponderant influence upon the path of the political process as a whole. A rigorous analysis
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of the role of Correa can thus account for these transformations. We can say that until 2013
Correa had fitted fairly well with the Freudian description retaken by Laclau, by which a strong
leader is a primus inter pares (OPR: 59-60). However, the evidence indicates that the
democratic leadership that Correa embodied in the first stage was gradually replaced by a
despotic and apodictic leadership which found fertile ground in the political culture of
caudillismo. In this regard, it should be noted that this culture does not work unilaterally:
caudillismo is not exclusively attributable to the leader, but also to an environment that
accepts and legitimates it, even when the leader is no longer a primus inter pares. This may
seem at first sight contradictory, but it is not. Not only the accentuated presidential system,
reinforced by the 2008 Constitution, but also the automatic creation of an army of self-
interested loyalists, side-lined the processing of differences. It is not that dissent and the will
to discuss do not exist altogether, but rather that they are dealt with by ostracising those in
disagreement and replacing them with consenting people. This has its costs however. At a
theoretical level, as we have seen in the second chapter, Arditi resolves the impasse by
claiming that the leader cannot be simply considered as an empty signifier, because she/he is
also a person and this paves the way for a possible unhinging of the symbolic unification that
that he managed to construct around his individuality (Arditi, 2010: 490). His critique fits very
well with the Citizens' Revolution, where a bureaucratic direction that removes the possibility
of a significant debate within the popular field started to prevail. As Ortiz clarifies: 'the so-
called "political bureau" provided some shared direction with intellectuals, political leaders
and technocrats up to 2011-12, but then it dissolved as the strong leadership of Rafael Correa
gained impetus' (Ortiz Crespo, 2016).
In this context, the few episodes of internal dissent were dealt with quite brusquely. A couple
of examples may convey a clearer picture. In the middle of the parliamentary discussions on
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the new criminal code in October 2013, some assemblymen of the ruling party tried to
promote the decriminalisation of abortion in case of rape. The reaction of Correa, who was
deeply contrary to the measure, was swift: "If these betrayals and disloyalties follow […] I will
tender my resignation" (BBC Mundo, 2013). The proposed amendment of the text was
therefore abandoned, and the involved assembly members were suspended by the Ethics
Committee of the movement for a month, during which they were forbidden to attend the
National Assembly sessions and make public appearances (El Universo, 2013). It is worth
highlighting that, in an apparent case of self-censorship, several pro-government assembly
members historically associated with feminism declined to join this attempt to modify the text
proposed by the Executive.45 Another case has been the suspension for six months and the
subsequent membership disaffiliation from PAIS of Fernando Bustamante for having voted in
the National Assembly against the package of constitutional amendments promoted by the
government in 2015. Thanks to an overwhelming majority, Correa's party did not strictly
necessitate his vote for the approval of the amendments. These internal rebellions
intercepted much better the common sense that was developing in the country. Shortly after
the failed attempt to introduce abortion legislation, a collective gave life to a campaign that,
under the name of Yo soy 65 (I am 65), showed the results of a survey according to which 65%
of the Ecuadorian population would have been in favour of the decriminalisation of abortion
in case of rape (El Mercurio, 2014). In the same way, the boldness of Bustamante revealed the
wide dissatisfaction of the citizens with the way in which the issue of constitutional reform
had been dealt (Rosero, 2015). What resulted, and was particularly stunning, was the
difference with the management of another package of minor amendments in 2011: while on
45Once again, it is clear how the demands enchained in the equivalence are not truly equal among
themselves: those arising from the feminist camp found some space in the discourse of the Citizens'
Revolution and a number of them were directly addressed. Yet many were relegated in terms of importance
or, as we have just seen, openly repudiated despite much of the popular camp would have been in favour.
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that occasion a referendum - eventually won - was promoted, in 2015 Correa preferred to
take advantage of the 2/3 parliamentary majority to approve the amendments, even though
one of them contained an issue of greater importance, such as the possibility for indefinite re-
election of all public posts. According to the polls, the vast majority of the population would
have preferred to be consulted directly on the matter (Cedatos, 2015).46
This self-sufficiency was matched by an equally problematic relationship with society as a
whole. The Citizens' Revolution entered a phase of difficulty concerning those demands that
had been initially articulated. If somehow many of them - such as the reduction of inequality
and poverty - were still part of the symbolic heritage to which the executive clung, the fall of
oil prices and the rise of the dollar put the government in an awkward situation by presenting
dilemmas that the relative fiscal prosperity of the previous years had made less drastic. In the
case of other demands, the claim of diversity with the practices of the past became more
questionable instead. Although much more transparent than that of his predecessors, the
governance was opaque in various aspects. Already in 2012, Sosa highlighted the existence of
clientelistic practices and ongoing corruption (Sosa, 2012: 179). These phenomena, whose
veracity is not our concern here but whose perception had certainly become widespread by
2016-2017, had much weight in determining a distancing of many social sectors from the
political project. Another demand that was initially articulated was the struggle to depoliticise
state institutions. Here, the record became particularly negative, if we consider that all the
powers of the state – nominally independent - were occupied by figures close to Correa, as in
the case, just to mention a couple, of the Judicial Council - whose President Gustavo Jahlk was
Minister of the Interior and Personal Secretary of Rafael Correa - and the General State
46Although the pollster in question has traditionally been averse to the Government of Correa, the
overwhelming percentage suggests that this measurement did capture a rather diffuse feeling among the
Ecuadorian population. The following political events also justify this interpretation.
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Prosecutor's Office - chaired by Galo Chiriboga, former personal lawyer of Correa, former
Minister of Hydrocarbons and former Ambassador to Spain of the Citizens' Revolution. The
non-satisfaction of these demands made for the emergence of new potential sites of tension,
as in the case of the environmental demand in the past. As aptly put by two commentators:
the technocratic component of the state autonomised itself from social and territorial expectations and
demands by reproducing an antipolitical logic: that of managing and administering state capacities
without giving rise to particular and concrete ways in which organised groups shape and experience
social demands (Ortiz Crespo and Burbano de Lara, 2017).
A blunt example of this is the dropping of the Yasuní-ITT initiative and its aftermath. The
proposal set forth the suspension of extraction of one of the greatest oil reserves in a sector
of the Ecuadorian Amazon jungle, which is considered as harbouring one of the most
biodiverse environments in the world, on condition that the international community
compensated Ecuador for half of its foregone profits. Despite enormous efforts, the campaign
did not go far very far in collecting the required amount, and in August 2013 Correa chose to
opt for the so-called plan B, that is the scrapping of the initiative and the beginning of oil
extraction. Soon after, there started a collection of signatures led by environmentalist groups
in order to call for a referendum that stopped oil extraction in the area, regardless of the
international compensation. Despite claims of having reached the required number of
petitions, the referendum was halted by the National Electoral Committee (CNE) on grounds
that the majority of the signatures were invalid. However, the decision sparked a number of
doubts: on one side, de la Torre has highlighted that the CNE's head was a close ally of Correa
(de la Torre, 2013: 38), on the other a technical analysis conducted by some independent
Ecuadorian academics established that many more signatures should have been considered
valid, an amount sufficient to permit the celebration of the referendum (El Comercio, 2014).
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What this and the above mentioned episodes signal is the 'selective use of referenda and
hence the manipulation of participatory mechanisms' (Balderacchi, 2016: 170).
Moreover, the society that the Citizens' Revolution contributed to shape in previous years
began to generate new demands. Similar to what has happened in other countries of the ‘pink
tide’, the empowerment of formerly needy classes and the consolidation of a middle segment
led to the development of aspirations that place themselves outside of the national-popular
discourses. The improvement of living conditions went hand in hand with the dissemination of
habits, customs, and expectations that the discourse that was able to bring the Citizens'
Revolution to power failed to intercept. This of course has much to do with the lack of any
pedagogical approach to politics: the enactment of public policies did not proceed along a
politicisation of society, the cultivation of the party bases, the promotion of a rich intellectual
debate, the involvement in arts and culture. This is why the anti-neoliberal invectives and the
rants against the “corrupt media” no longer seduced the electorate as well as they did in
2007. In fact, some measures of the government met rather lively resistance of some sectors
that had paradoxically been direct beneficiaries of the policies of ‘Correismo’ since they
clashed with the diffuse desire to expand consumption. Particularly emblematic in this respect
was the first and only true popular protest that this government witnessed, i.e. the
mobilisation against the law of inheritance in 2015. Even though this tax would have not even
affected many sectors that rushed to the streets, the narrative that much of the public
opinion assimilated was that of a bloodthirsty executive seeking to illegitimately put its hands
into people's pockets. We should also note here the responsibility of an excessive leaderism in
determining a certain immobility in the political discourse of the Citizens' Revolution, that is,
the inability to innovate its terms and incorporate new demands in the chain of equivalences.
From a condition of possibility of political rupture in the country, the centrality of Correa
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became the condition of incrustation of the same political project. The scarce receptivity
towards the floating signifiers and the common senses that were emerging in the country
made the imaginary of the Citizens' Revolution static. The stifling of all discursive creativity
was the result of an exaggerated cult of personality and the growing emergence of
hierarchical and top-down processes. At the same time, the replacement of deliberation and
genuine political mobilisation in favour of an incessant political marketing were exacerbated
by an asphyxiated climate and a culture of self-sufficiency. In parallel, the presumption to
represent a necessary and indispensable flux of history spread, as if the Citizens' Revolution
unconditionally reflected popular interests. As Correa ardently put it during the May Day
demonstration in 2015: "on 21 April 2005 my life changed forever when I was nominated
Minister for the Economy. The rest is already history. I know well that I am no longer myself, I
am a whole people" (Correa, 2015).
By 2014-2015 the project was clearly on the wane. Two further tangible proofs show the
decreasing appeal of the discourse of the Citizens' Revolution. The first came with the telling
defeat at the 2014 local elections. Correa's movement lost the major cities of the country that
had previously been governed by a PAIS' mayor (Quito, Cuenca, Manta, Loja, Santo Domingo
de los Tsáchilas, Ambato, Portoviejo), while failing to conquer Guayaquil, Ecuador's biggest
city, which always remained in the hands of Jaime Nebot, a former presidential candidate and
member of the otherwise hugely discredited Partido Social Cristiano (Pallares, n/d). The
second proof was the opening of new fronts of dispute between the government and society.
In 2015, the government was no longer just quarrelling with indigenous constituencies and
environmentalist groups. Amid the fiscal crisis and the ensuing necessity to scrape together
new resources coupled with the unwillingness to confront more powerful actors, Correa took
issues with the armed forces, various state-sponsored universities, the oncological hospital in
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Quito SOLCA and a variety of state contractors. 'In the end, the distributive conflicts brought
about by the crisis, lead to cracks in the "consumer's pact" that united middle and popular
sectors with business sectors, in the previous ten years of bonanza' (Ortiz Crespo, 2016). This
difficulty went along with an accentuation of the antagonistic tones of Correa, which led to a
steep decline of his popularity, as evidenced by a May 2016 poll that indicated that 65% of the
population no longer believed in him (El Universo, 2016). As we know from Laclau,
polarisation and the erection of frontiers can be performative and politically productive.
However, as we already know from the PCI case, polarisation is not all that counts. It is indeed
possible to claim that a bad management of polarisation took place, i.e. the inability to
maintain the antagonism within a reasonable and acceptable course. As polarisation turned
into a continuous contumely against political adversaries, while utterly lacking a pedagogical
side, its deployment took up problematic traits. If there is no adaptive dimension, if the
foundations to generate a different civilisational form are not laid, and especially if the
political frontier is not elastic, there emerges the possibility that another dividing line
displaces the existing one, as paradoxically as that could be between conciliators and non-
conciliators. We shall see that this is precisely what happened later. Moreover, if polarisation
is not progressively transcended to give life to some sort of normalisation, there is a risk that
such an exacerbated division becomes the source of social discomfort, irreparably wearing out
the discourse that continues to make use of it.
In this sense, the attitude towards political adversaries deployed by Correa has shown an
allergy to pluralism and a plebiscitarian view of politics, which has led to a frequent trampling
of the rule of law, while a strict adherence to it has been imposed on political opponents.47
47Among the most notable cases it is worth recalling the revocation of the visa to the foreign activists
Manuela Picq and Oliver Utne (see Mazzolini, 2014b; Mazzolini, 2015).
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While some liberal commentators already depicted Correa as being totally incomprehensive
and intolerant towards political adversaries from the early days of his mandate (Burbano de
Lara, 2007: 16), it is beyond doubt that such an attitude reached its apex in his last mandate.
In this period, Correa did not spare deep criticism, media attacks and judicial prosecutions for
his adversaries, even in occasions that entailed only sheer mockery, such as in the cases of the
cartoons of the Guayaquil-based newspaper El Universo satirist Bonil (El Comercio, n/d), the
sarcasm of the English comedian John Oliver in two of his programs ‘Last Week Tonight John
Oliver’ (Viana, 2015) and the memes spread on social networks by a user known as 'Crudo
Ecuador' (El Comercio, 2015). The intolerance shown towards satire and irreverence betrayed
a susceptibility even to ironic criticism, in a politics of literality that does not admit the gap
between fictional and hilarious representation on one side, and outright lying on the other.
A non-hegemonic end of a populism
In the constitutional amendment regarding the indefinite re-election, Correa provided for the
introduction of a transitory regulation, by which the new arrangement would apply only after
the next elections. That meant excluding himself from the 2017 electoral race, in order to
reassure the population that this was not an ad hoc reform tailored to perpetuate him in
power. The idea behind this, most analysts speculated, was that of taking a period off, and
then presenting himself again at the next elections in 2021. The search for the successor thus
ensued. Correa pushed for Jorge Glas, his closest ally in the cabinet in a sort of Putin-
Medvedev-Putin succession. However, it is not a coincidence that, after a series of polls, the
candidacy of Correa's former vice-President Lenin Moreno, seen as a conciliatory option,
resulted as the only one capable of guaranteeing the victory of the Citizens' Revolution in the
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upcoming elections. Despite having been away from the country for a few years and having
already manifested some scepticism towards the route undertaken by Correa in the last
period, Moreno was the only figure with charisma and capable of reaching out to parts of the
electorate that were not loyal to Correa (Ortiz Crespo, 2016b: 90). This is a very revealing
aspect for a project that considered itself hegemonic and thought to have permanently
changed the mentality of the country. After ten years in power, no other national leaders with
chances to win the presidential election had emerged.
In the electoral campaign, once he had officially become the candidate of the Citizens'
Revolution, Moreno gave signs of some distancing from the rhetoric of Correa, while not
breaking entirely with him. This tactic did not manage to guarantee him victory in the first
round, and he only narrowly made it in the April 2017 run-off. However, as soon he became
President, it became clear that he was pursuing an entirely different political project. From
the very start, he made dialogue with social sectors previously ignored by Correa his political
cornerstone. These included indigenous and environmentalist groups, but also chambers of
commerce and, importantly, the United States. In what represented a stark foreign policy U-
turn, at the first press conference after his presidential inauguration, he said: "Our
relationship [with the United States] will be fluid […] We must refresh and increase that
confidence that in one way or another could, to some extent, have been lost. We must
strengthen our good relationship with this people that is our friend" (Moreno in Andes, 2017).
Soon, he made very blunt statements that took a distance from the practices of his
predecessor and former political godfather. He harshly criticised the economic management
of Correa, saying that he had left behind a difficult situation (Ecuador Inmediato, 2017). As for
the possibilities engendered by the national dialogue process he launched, and in relation to
the oft-mocked subservient attitude displayed by Correa's followers, he said: "That's
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wonderful, little by little, people will give up their sheep behaviour and start breathing once
again this new freedom, which is how I feel comfortable, I feel comfortable when people get a
chance to criticise" (Moreno in Labarthe and Saint Upéry, 2017: 31). Yet, as evidenced above,
the presidential system and the political culture of the country, in spite of claims to having
established a new hegemony, made it possible that even those who theretofore had
wholeheartedly backed Correa started to depict the former period as pure ignominy (Ramírez
Gallegos, 2018).
However, the real rupture came with two further moves. As suggested before, the lack of
satisfaction of certain demands that the Citizens' Revolution had initially intercepted became
a dominant factor. Along with the necessity of scaling down of the previous tone, which
Moreno swiftly embodied by launching the process of national dialogue, we can say that the
issue of corruption became prominent in society. It would even be possible to claim that the
two questions represented in this period an absent fullness, that is the empty signifiers which,
potentially ‘fillable’ with any normative content, constituted the type of order sought after by
society at large. The perception that the management of the res publica had been opaque
during the Citizens' Revolution was, at this point, indeed quite widespread. From the very
start, Moreno made it clear that it he would not stop any judicial inquiry against members of
the governing party. And that is precisely what he did by permitting the inquiry, arrest,
conviction and final destitution of Jorge Glas, who still occupied the position of Vice-President,
having been imposed as Moreno's running mate by Correa. At this point, the party became
split between ‘Correistas’ and ‘Leninistas’ and Correa and Moreno started to exchange bitter
and irreconcilable messages with each other.48 The last straw came with the referendum and
48Just to give a picture of the polarisation between the two former allies, suffice it to recall the reciprocal
accusations that they launched at each other at the beginning of October 2017. Correa accused Moreno of
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popular consultation called by Moreno, following the process of dialogue. Among the various
issues proposed, many of which were simply designed to bring people to vote Yes to all the
questions, stood out the abolition of the constitutional amendment about the indefinite re-
election of public posts, with retroactive effect; an ad hominem measure, to be sure. The final
result of the referendum, held in February 2018, was 64-36 in favour of its elimination. The
Citizens' Revolution, for what it had been known, had been fatally killed.
Theoretical outcomes
How do we characterise the Ecuadorian populism in light of the above? We have seen that
Laclau argues that political practices are never entirely populist or institutionalist, since they
exhibit a mixture between the logic of equivalence and that of difference (Laclau, 2005b: 45-
46). While populism coincides with an intensification of the logic of equivalence, i.e. the
establishment of an enchainment between demands with the consequent simplification of the
political space, institutionalism entails the predominance of the logic of the difference, by
which demands are handled in an administrative way, under the perspective of divide et
impera (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 145). According to this line of reasoning, it would be
neither the presence nor the number of public policies that can make us infer the more or less
institutional character of a practice in power then, but the discursive context in which those
policies are framed. We can conclude that in our case the entanglement between populism
and institutionalism - and therefore between the two logics - is peculiar. To an extent, this
being a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”, further adding that “Moreno cheated me for ten years. He is a person
that was with the opposition” (Telesur, 2017). The day after Moreno responded by declaring that Correa
had left the “table served”, because the last minute heavy borrowing and consequent indebtedness of
Correa’s government served the purpose of magnifying his figure while leaving a difficult situation to
Moreno, so that the latter would prove to be a failure and facilitate the political comeback of the former (El
Universo, 2017).
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vindicates the 'technocratic populism' thesis of de la Torre, even though he erroneously treats
the case as an exception because he assimilates populism with political chaos. In response to
de la Torre, Cadahia rightly questions the attitude of determining a priori the lenses through
which we are to look at a political phenomenon, and in particular what we are to find in a
populist experience (Cadahia, 2016: 69). But let us see in detail how this entanglement
between the two logics works. Of institutionalism, the Citizens' Revolution assimilated a
certain ability to absorb demands in a transformist manner in a context of distancing from
social antagonisms, which goes hand in hand with the adoption of a top-down approach. It is
also important to recognise that, in an era of economic crisis, which coincides roughly with
our third period, the scarcity of resources tends to break up the unity between heterogeneous
sectors and leads to a case-by-case solution of the conflicts and demands that may arise. The
conflict between redistributive and environmentalist drives only partially fits in this case, since
it occurred during a period of relative prosperity and was mainly due to the historical
bottlenecks of Ecuadorian economic development and to an anti-equivalential political
anthropology of the bearers of the indigenous and environmental demands. Of populism, on
the other hand, the Citizens' Revolution retained the proposition of an antagonistic frontier
between the people and the elites, although this divide displayed a decreasing capacity for
articulation, and the excessive centrality of the leader, even though it should be conceded
that there are populist practices in which the role of the leadership is much less central. Laclau
recognises the latter possibility but has emphasised the need for a strong leadership time and
again, especially in the Latin American context, where the oligarchy has historically made the
legislative one of its main trenches (Laclau, 2010; Laclau in Arellano, 2012).49
49Speculatively, it could be argued that Laclau's aversion for parliamentarianism does not have a mere
historical derivation but also a theoretical one - which reinforces the scepticism he displays in his early
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The left-populism of Correa has thus maintained some points of tension with the agonist
model and radical-democratic model propounded by Mouffe. Though more will be said on this
in the next chapter, suffice it for now to highlight that this had not gone unnoticed. The
politics of Correa, indeed,
has been a politics closer to Laclau than to Mouffe, antagonist and not agonist, of enemies rather than
of adversaries, of confrontation more than consensus [...] the possibility of transforming the enemy into
an adversary, of moving from antagonism to agonism, requires a normative consensus around political
pluralism, associated with a deepening of the institutions of representative democracy, where a
common loyalty to the principles of freedom and equality for all crystallises. But the citizens' revolution
has shown as its ideological mark a detachment from representative democracy, from liberal values, and
from the normative principles of pluralism and separation of powers. A majoritarian democracy has
prevailed, based on the idea of a monopoly on popular representation (Burbano de Lara, 2016: 18).
Does this justify the claim of de la Torre who, in a paper about Correa, goes as far as stating
that 'Laclau's theory therefore opened the door for justifications of authoritarian fantasies of
power as a possession' (de la Torres, 2016: 130)? This is far from being an acceptable
conclusion. While it is possible to concur with him in that '[t]he challenge is how to combine
the emancipatory promises of constituent power without disregarding all the institutions and
norms of constituted power in a liberal democracy' (de la Torre, 2016: 135), it should be
remembered that this is part and parcel of the project envisioned by Laclau and Mouffe in
HSS, and that at no point does Laclau propose the endorsement of a competitive authoritarian
regime, which is how de la Torre defines the administration of Correa (de la Torre, 2016: 135).
In this sense, the simple invocation of the Lefortian emptiness at the space of power put
forward by de la Torre (de la Torre, 2016: 133) is inattentive towards the process of the
writings toward the bent for parliaments of the Argentine liberal elites of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (Laclau, 1969; Laclau, 1970). Even though it has been Mouffe that has dealt more closely with the
thought of Carl Schmitt, it is possible to claim that the conclusion of the latter by which the pre-eminence of
the legislative over the executive is to be ascribed to liberalism was fully taken onboard by Laclau (see
Mouffe, 1993: 118-120).
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construction of that constituent power and the far-reaching democratising effects of the
Citizens' Revolution. For Laclau:
the construction of a chain of equivalences out of a dispersion of fragmented demands, and their
unification around popular positions operating as empty signifiers, is not totalitarian but the very
condition for the construction of a collective will which, in many cases, can be profoundly democratic
(OPR: 166).
Yet it is possible to claim that there is a further aspect in which both the theory and the
practice of populism show their limits. Much has been said about a new hegemony produced
by Latin American progressive populism, which would have dislodged neoliberal hegemony
(Errejón and Guijarro, 2016). While it is not possible to deny a net shift in public policy, many
of the factors highlighted in the phenomenological description of the Citizens' Revolution
seem to indicate that a more nuanced view is necessary. Populism in of itself can produce new
electoral hegemonies, but these can be fleeting and ephemeral, but most especially do not
necessarily involve a transformation of the social formation that is nominally antagonised,
since they do not address the adaptive-educational dimension which tailors the civilisation
and morality of the broader popular masses to a political project (Gramsci, 1975: 1565-1566).
As we have seen, it took the collapse of the consumer's pact predicated upon high oil prices to
provoke the progressive falling apart of the equivalential chain previously built. Certainly,
dislocatory experiences are bound to undo any hegemony in any social formation, and
economic crises are often the spark of wide social discontent. But in this case, we are faced
with a populist experience that did not manage to consolidate its own model. This is true at a
variety of levels. In the economic realm, after the radicalism of the first few years, much of the
post-neoliberal repertoire was pulled back. The diversification of the economic apparatus
remained a vague and distant project. All in all, the heterodox model initially envisioned
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proved to be scarcely sustainable over time and its application presented remarkable pitfalls.
In the cultural realm, the ascendance of Correa was not matched by literary or artistic
movements worth the name. Politically, it seems that the project never posed itself the
question of cultivating an organic movement that accompanied the government at a social
level. The movement always remained an electoral machine, capable at best of brokering the
support of local leaders, while remaining virtually non-existent in many areas of the country.
What makes it especially difficult to speak of a new hegemony is also the fact that
consumerism was skyrocketing to the detriment of the consolidation of a more critical type of
consciousness. While elevating consumption for many segments of Ecuadorian society was
certainly right and proper from an emancipatory point of view, the Citizens' Revolution has
fostered a model that rendered consumption not as a means but as an end in itself. As put by
Rohn Dávila in relation to Correa's Ecuador:
One of the most important transformations of today's society is that, in essence, it is consumerist. [...]
This creates individuals thinking of a present to consume; they do not think about the future and,
therefore, neither about a historical project of a national state. [...] The government focuses its
discourse on stability and that is the only to make it possible for society to fulfil its dream: consume. [...]
The person only thinks that tomorrow he can go to the mall and buy what he wants (Rohn Dávila in El
Comercio, 2012b)
The high and protracted dependence on the role of the leader is also risky. As well highlighted
by Ortiz in relation to the police coup which took place in 2010, if Correa had been killed that
day, the whole process of the Citizens' Revolution would have fallen apart (Ortiz Crespo, 2011:
29). This remained true even seven years later, when the process unleashed by Correa did not
manage to find a replacement that followed a similar political line. Correa had to resort to a
figure of whom he was deeply suspicious and who, in the end, showed loyalty to a project of
his own. A pedagogical work that allowed the transition from the centrality of the leader to
the centrality of genuine political contents thus never took place. But this also confirms that a
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different relationship between representatives and represented remained the same,
perpetuating a fundamentally hierarchical scheme. As a result, beyond positioning a discourse
of social and economic rights that will undoubtedly continue to be an important patrimony of
popular identity to be referred from the left, the Citizens' Revolution failed to lay the
foundations for a lasting hegemony.
201
Chapter 5: Populism and hegemony unravelled50
In the light of the empirical research conducted so far, it is now time for a theoretical re-
elaboration of Laclau's notions of populism and hegemony. The two cases have already
prepared the terrain by indicating the voids, both ontological and normative, in Laclau's
theory and suggested, if only very vaguely for now, what kind of reformulations are needed.
Such reformulations, it is important to recall, are advanced by maintaining the double status
occupied by these categories, insofar as they constitute useful tools for the analysis of political
phenomena and for thinking about potential emancipatory courses.
Two broad critical avenues have thus emerged, which will be dealt with one at a time over the
course of this chapter. The first section ‘Lessons from the cases’ makes reference to them by
summarising the puzzles that arose during the empirical cases and anticipating their
theoretical treatment. The first area of concern, namely the excessive proximity between
populism and hegemony and the necessity to sunder the two notions more clearly, is dealt
with in the three following sections of the chapter through a peculiar route: that of
reformulating the notions of space and time. The second section ‘Taking space seriously’ is
thus concerned with a revisitation of the conception of space, while the third section ‘Taking
time seriously’ addresses a review of the notion of time. It will emerge that populism and
hegemony tend to overlap in Laclau also thanks to the singular conception of time and space
that he proposes throughout his corpus. Here, a plural conception of space and time is upheld
instead. The fourth section ‘What is hegemony then?’ is aimed at providing a better definition
of hegemony under this new configuration, with special attention dedicated to the distinction
50Some of the concepts that are elaborated in this chapter are tentatively developed in Mazzolini and
Borriello, 2017.
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hegemony/counter-hegemony, the role of subjectivation and the non-normative status of
hegemony.
The second critical avenue has to do with the issue of left-wing populism and is dealt with in
the fifth and sixth sections of this chapter. The fifth one ‘Unmediated leaderism and the
question of the empty signifier’ is concerned with the excessive privilege granted to the role
of the leader and with the relationship between leader and led. Particular reference will be
made here to the question of the empty signifier with a slight correction to the terms which
Laclau presents. The sixth section ‘For an agonistic, radical-democratic and ethical left-wing
populism’ provides evidence as to the contradictions between an unmediated left-wing
populism with the project of radical democracy that Laclau set forward with Chantal Mouffe
and the agonistic model proposed by the latter. As it is known, the works of Laclau and
Mouffe have often been seen as complementary, although with diverging emphases. What is
argued here is that the left-wing populism that we should stand for needs to be contaminated
more by the insights provided by Mouffe. In this discussion, the ethical dimension proposed
by the likes of William Connolly, Simon Critchley, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan is also
brought in and made compatible with a populist approach.
Finally, in line with the problematisation approach espoused here, it is worth emphasising that
the chapter revisits some of the theoretical influences that had an incidence in the forging of
Laclau's thought. In particular the chapter makes ample use of the insights of Antonio
Gramsci.51 This is done by way of both mobilising those aspects of his theory that were
51As for the sources that have been used for this exercise, it is worth stressing that this Gramscian re-insertion
has been conducted both by way of a direct engagement with the oeuvre of Gramsci and by reference to
some of its existing interpretations. Some of the debates that have taken place in and around the
International Gramsci Society, especially thanks to Italian scholars, are of particular use for the aims of this
research. Though technically not related to the latter association, the work of Michele Filippini stands out as
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overlooked altogether by Laclau and recuperating those that were somehow left behind over
the course of his theoretical development. In a sense, this could be said to be a Gramscian
reinterpretation of Laclau that, without losing the distinct post-structuralist ontology that
Laclau has built, attempts to make of it a better analytical and strategic tool for emancipatory
purposes.
Lessons from the cases
The empirical cases presented have a number of features in common. Let us enumerate some
of them: they were both practices located to the left of the political spectrum with a clear
emancipatory thrust, they both counted with a broad popular appeal as they managed to
coalesce a number of heterogeneous social sectors and demands, they were both led by
leaders that elicited vast respect and consensus, and they were both accused of harbouring
undemocratic pretensions. Of course, there are also some stark differences between them:
their geographical setting, their temporal length, the historical time in which they took place,
and the fact that one was openly communist and in one way or another linked to the Soviet
Union, while the other was of a more moderate leaning. Even more crucially, one of them
never occupied any governmental role at a national level, let alone a brief period of coalition
government with other political forces in a post-war scenario, while the other was in power
for a decade.
particularly relevant here. Within the Essex school of discourse analysis, very few people seem to have
specialised on Gramsci. Anna Marie Smith is a notable exception and her insights are extremely pertinent,
especially because they share a spirit which is very similar to that adopted here. Despite not being formally
a member the Essex school, the work of Stuart Hall is also very compatible with that of Laclau and he has
also realised much work on Gramsci. His contribution is also highly regarded in this chapter.
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Intuitively, some of these details may let us infer that the more moderate practice with
institutional responsibility was more hegemonic and less populist than the communist one
that was always excluded from power. After all, the Manichean approach that is typically
imputed to communism seems prima facie to be more associable with a populist propensity,
while it is easier to think of a practice that held power for a decade as more hegemonic than
one that did not. Yet, as we have seen, this was not so. Or rather, this was not entirely so. The
PCI did display some populist tendencies but mediated them by way of an attitude of
institutional responsibility and a constant search for compromise with other forces. It
construed a ‘people’, while softening polarisation. Despite not reaching power, it influenced
policy-making, the national cultural debate and the socialisation of vast segments of the
country. Over time however, the lack of a clear political frontier contributed to the
assimilation of the reasons of its historic adversaries, and whose final consequences are most
visible today. As put by Laclau: '[f]rontiers are the sine qua non of the emergence of the
‘people’: without them, the whole dialectic of partiality/universality would simply collapse'
(OPR: 231). On the contrary, the Citizens' Revolution was in power and yet its leader
maintained a flamboyant populist rhetoric during the whole period in power. Even more
tellingly, while much was done in terms of a policy-shift, the Citizens' Revolution never
impacted too significantly on other ambits of social relations and displayed a decreasing
propensity to uphold its early radical tones, in a move which resembles the attitude of the PCI,
although with a different timing. Moreover, the decline in popularity of its leader and his
replacement by an alleged ally gave way to a quick and unexpected political U-turn, which
may have been much more difficult if the predominance of Correa had been more than just
electoral.
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Theoretically, what emerges is a tension in Laclau. At a limit, populism means two things: the
articulation of heterogenous elements so as to form a new people and the dichotomisation of
society. The former is predicated on the latter. Nevertheless, these two moments may not
necessarily go together. An excessive dichotomisation may not create a people, as its
articulatory role may well be nihil. The Ecuadorian case shows this very clearly: at some point,
the maintenance of a stark dichotomic approach of the ‘either with or against me’ type
functioned as a political boomerang for the Citizens' Revolution. This is also true for the
‘Zdanovian’ period of the PCI. By and large however, the party led by Togliatti and Berlinguer
articulated pieces of society by mediating between a populist and institutional approach.
Equally, hegemony also conveys a sense of construction of the social, but of a different kind.
While populism entails a fleeting articulation of heterogenous elements, the creation of a
mere representational coalition, hegemony speaks of a sedimentation of meaning, of a
particular set of social relations, of a certain way in which society ought to be organised. But
do the two things go necessarily together? In purely quantitative terms, it may be said that
the PCI was not as successful as the Citizens' Revolution in terms of uniting different pieces of
society. In this sense, the latter enjoyed the electoral support of a larger chunk of society. Yet,
it is possible to argue that the PCI was able to impact more strongly in society at large and
over a longer period of time, thanks to an indirect influence on policy-making but also due to
the capacity to impart and guarantee the assimilation of a truly alternative political ABC
among ample social strata.
At this point, it is paramount to go back to the relationship between populism and hegemony
in Laclau. As we saw in the first chapter, and as the empirical cases clearly show, a certain
overlapping exists between the two in Laclau. In a paper in which he draws a connection
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between the theory of hegemony and policy studies, Howarth sets out two fundamental
aspects of hegemony. On one side, hegemony can:
be seen as a political practice that involves the linking together of disparate demands to forge projects
or 'discourse coalitions' that can contest a particular form of rule, practice or policy. These practices
presuppose the existence of antagonisms and the presence of 'floating signifiers' that can be articulated
by rival political projects (Howarth, 2009: 318).
This amounts precisely to the notion of populism as provided by Laclau in OPR. As for the
second aspect, Howarth asserts that any coalition needs installation and reproduction, as a
way in which subjects accept and conform to a particular regime. Here, Howarth stresses in
particular the necessity of any order to be reproduced without direct challenge, by way of a
'differential incorporation or even co-optation of claims and demands' (Howarth, 2009: 321).
Howarth goes on to equate the logic of difference through which this dynamic is captured by
post-structuralist discourse theory, with the Foucauldian notion of governmentality. If only
roughly then, hegemony also corresponds to what Laclau calls the institutionalist discourse,
which, by neutralising demands, is the opposite ideal pole of the continuum drawn together
with populism on the other side (Laclau, 2005b: 45).
Arditi is even more blunt in devising a certain conflation of populism with hegemony.
Specifically, he claims that:
The specific difference that populism introduces vis-à-vis hegemony is the division of society into two
camps to produce a relation of equivalence among demands and construct a frontier or antagonistic
relation between them. This is why populism can be said to be a species of the genus hegemony, the
species that calls into question the existing order with the purpose of constructing another. This genus
has at least one other species, institutionalist discourse, whose essence is to maintain the status quo
(Arditi, 2010: 492-493).
Nevertheless, Arditi is quite critical of this operation, as he finds that Laclau first equated
hegemony with politics as such in HSS and then did the same with populism, in 'an ad-hoc
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rewriting of the narrative of hegemony to adjust it to the subject matter of OPR' (Arditi, 2010:
493). In effect, if 'hegemony is populism is politics', as Arditi provocatively puts, the status of
each category loses theoretical efficacy and runs the risk of explaining very little, converting
the triad in a mere tautology. More specifically, it is not unwarranted to wonder to what
extent it is reasonable and productive to employ the linguistic and psychoanalytical tools
enshrined in the latest notion of populism to analyse the depths of society and, by the same
token, how far a populist project can in it and for itself naturalise its own self-proclaimed
values and conceal its own tensions (Howarth, 2004: 266, 269).
In the Ecuadorian case, a populist subject managed to obtain power through a discursive
assemblage that coalesced - and contingently fixed the meaning of - a number of existing
floating signifiers against a determined political regime, and then consolidated itself by
channelling a number of these demands and, for a while, neutralising potential ones. This
situation is not enough to infer its intrinsic capability of instilling a new modus vivendi among
the people that is consonant with its own self-proclaimed political ethos. This way of
approaching politics risks overshadowing a whole array of political phenomena ranging from
opportunism and transformism to clientelism. In other words, a political practice may well
manage to put together a number of frustrated aspirations in society by arousing political
passions among the people, while fundamentally foundering to take a leading position in the
economy, in civil society, in intellectual and moral life, in culture. In this sense, the
antagonistic articulation of existing demands does not necessarily exclude the possibility of
coming to terms with the moral and ideological coordinates pertaining to different milieus.
More particularly, what lies at the heart of the dissatisfaction with the excessive proximity
between populism and hegemony in Laclau is that not all political projects that launch
successful bids for power via the populist route manage to alter the conformism that lies at
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the basis of the social formation that they allegedly attempt to outdo. To put it in a different
way, the modification of overt political identities does not necessarily go hand in hand with
the abandonment of the deep-seated dispositions which are consonant with the political
regime that is nominally swept away.
Laclau is not entirely unaware of this. As he puts it in OPR: 'Even if Bush marginally loses the
election, the successor will find his movements limited by the straightjacket of a hegemonic
formation whose parameters remain substantially unchanged' (OPR: 138). Although the
conditions are very different, is this not to an extent what happened in the Ecuadorian case?
Equally, at some point hegemony is also recognised by Laclau as being more all-encompassing
than simply meaning an electoral predominance. More fundamentally, hegemony involves
turning the identity of the political adversary upside down. With Mouffe, Laclau states that:
Instead of a recasting of the socialist project, what we have witnessed in the last decade has been the
triumph of neo-liberalism, whose hegemony has become so pervasive that it has had a profound effect
on the very identity of the Left (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: xiv).
The question of identity resurfaces. It is not by chance that the PCI's heirs are often said to
have lost an identity that they once had. Yet we find in the very corpus of Laclau the elements
that can help us to overcome some of his own contradictions. Let us take these last two claims
seriously and attempt to provide a way out of the impasse.
Taking space seriously
A privileged avenue in order to clarify the relationship between populism and hegemony is
that of reformulating the notions of temporality and spatiality. It may seem a minor matter,
but profound implications follow from the way in which the two are developed. We have
already seen in chapter two that Laclau conceptualises the two in an antinomian scheme. To
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sum up his take on the matter very briefly, suffice it to recall that 'any repetition that is
governed by a structural law of successions is space' (NR: 41), thus becoming synonymous
with stasis, the absence of politics, or an attempt at closure; a closure that necessarily fails
thanks to the intervention of time, which, by means of dislocation, re-injects dynamism and
interrupts the predefined causality, giving new lymph to politics and thus being equated with
freedom.
In a critical review of his formulation of space and time, Doreen Massey - while sharing
Laclau's general philosophical system - openly condemns this duality of the type A/non-A that
establishes a priority that rewards temporality at the expense of spatiality and defines the
latter on the basis of a definition of the former, or rather as a lack of the former (Massey,
1992: 71-72). By arguing that the social is also spatially constructed, Massey is committed to
restoring a positive and dynamic description for space, thus becoming a potential source of
dislocation. For Massey, the space encapsulates different social relationships whose
interaction reveals unexpected potentialities that are certainly not ascribable to the concept
of causality. This criticism, however, stems more from the concerns of Massey, a political
geographer herself, than from the negative repercussions that these notions have on the rest
of the Laclauian theoretical edifice. Massey sees the use of space and temporality by Laclau as
merely metaphorical, although Laclau openly denies this possibility: 'note that when we refer
to space, we do not do so in a metaphorical sense, out of analogy with physical space' (NR:
41). It is precisely this claim that makes these categories sterile in Laclauian thought and that
requires a much more incisive intervention than the rehabilitation of space and the
postulation of the necessary imbrication between the two dimensions (Massey, 1992: 77).
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In this sense, it is here proposed the intrinsic plurality of both space and time. How do we
intend this plurality for space? In a recent commemorative article following the death of
Laclau, Massey insists again on the matter, by proposing a concept of spatiality in plural terms
that redeems the importance of multipolarity. 'Contemporary geographic differences occur in
a unique temporality. Speaking of multiple modernities can then serve to spatialise
modernity, to open a differentiated geography of alternatives, and - potentially - to politicise
it' (Massey, 2015: 11). Massey's concrete interest is here addressed to Latin America where,
with reference to the populist experiences of the ‘pink tide’, a new and genuine alternative
identity to neoliberalism is (was?) being created. However, space has a purely demonstrative
value: multipolarity, different political experiences in distinct places show us that things can
be otherwise, providing examples that break the cage of the pensée unique. But this plurality
is thought only in terms of entities that are in turn conceptualised in a homogeneous way.
There is, in fact, another way to conceive spatial plurality, not only in terms of nations as such,
but also as a diversity of social sites. Stuart Hall helps us to frame the question in a better way.
According to the scholar of Jamaican origin:
'Hegemony' implies: the struggle to contest and dis-organize an existing political formation; the taking of
the 'leading position' (on however minority a basis) over a number of different spheres of society at
once - economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the conduct of a wide and
differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a strategic measure of popular consent; and, thus, the
securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to conform society into a new historic project (Hall, 1988:
7).
As already hinted in the first chapter, what Hall highlights is that hegemony goes much
beyond the struggle to conquer nominal political power. In this view, a social formation is
made of different sites that, while living in close relation and being mutually influenced, are
not overlapping and can even show different dynamics. In this sense, it is worth remembering
that, while Gramsci initially employs the term 'politics' to refer to the art of government,
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which takes place in a determined space within the social formation, that is the institutions of
'political society' (Thomas, 2013: 203), he progressively uses the term in a much more
enlarged sense to allude to a wider array of conflictive practices, in parallel with the
development of the notion of 'integral state'. The latter is intended as a dialectical unity
between political and civil society, whereby neither of the two has a privileged status; rather
both 'constitute the specificity of the Gramscian theory of hegemony' (Thomas, 2013: 204).
Spatiality in this case is not purely metaphorical but real: to each of these sites of civil society
corresponds concrete places, which Gramsci terms 'trenches' and 'fortresses' and which
altogether constitute a spatially diffuse apparatus through which a particular hegemony is
constantly reproduced (Gramsci, 1971: 235-238; Gramsci, 1995: 272). Neither the state,
strictly intended as political society, can be intended as a granitic block; rather, it seems more
plausible to conceptualise it as a more dynamic, permeable and many-sided entity, which
functions on equal footing with civil society as a kampfplatz between different political
projects.52 As put by Aronowitz in interpreting Gramsci's reflections on political organisation:
'under the best of circumstances where the party has sufficient resources, especially cadres, it
contests bourgeois hegemony on all fronts, not merely in the sphere of electoral politics'
(Aronowitz, 2009: 10).
The comprehension of this aspect is also to be found in Norberto Bobbio's famous
intervention at the Gramsci conference held in Cagliari in 1967 and translated into English in
the aforementioned collective volume edited by Chantal Mouffe (Bobbio, 1979: 39-40).
Interestingly, Bobbio further argues that it matters little whether hegemony precedes the
52Very valuable in this regard are the insights of Bob Jessop, who further elaborated the concept of the state
as a social relation taking his cues from Gramsci and Nico Poulantzas. In a nutshell, according to Jessop,
state structures 'offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside that state to act for different
political purposes' (Jessop, 1990: 367).
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conquest of power. In other words, what is essential in the concept of hegemony is not about
'more or less, before or after', but its extension, which implies 'both the moment of political
leadership and the moment of cultural leadership', with emphasis on its ample diffusion in
civil society (Bobbio, 1979: 40). As it will be clarified in the section devoted to a redefinition of
hegemony, under particular conditions the moment of political leadership strictu senso may
even be lacking in formal terms, although politics at large would still be guided by a particular
hegemonic set of principles. In this context, hegemony therefore means elevating a peculiarity
to the role of the universal, but such elevation needs to be replicated on several fronts.
As it clearly emerged from the empirical analysis, the post-war PCI fully grasped this aspect
and did not confine its action to the electoral sphere but promoted a politics of ‘penetration’
both in civil society and in the political arena in the attempt to disseminate its world-views in
a variety of environments and contexts. Oppositely, the case of the Citizens' Revolution
speaks of a practice whose chief preoccupation was that of winning elections, while
abdicating to undertake any meaningful political work in the rest of civil society. The
incapacity of the Citizens' Revolution in this regard cannot just be explained in terms of the
snap ascent to political power immediately after the creation of Correa's political force (thus
making it objectively difficult to organise a party while having already the responsibility to
govern a country), but also and most crucially in terms of the reluctance to devise a cultural
plan - intended in the broad, Gramscian way - aimed at creating its correlative foundations in
the realm of civil society. This explains why the qualification of counter-hegemonic can be
attributed to the PCI, but hardly so to the Citizens' Revolution. Over time, however, the PCI
started to privilege the political ambit, with the negative consequences that have been
analysed from the point of view of emancipatory strategy.
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The same inattention to civil society is, mutatis mutandis, also to be found in Laclau's late
writings. His notion of space is singular because he tends to reduce a social formation to its
political society (thereby restricting his notion of politics mostly to the art of government), but
also because even there he does not heed its inherent plurality. In other words, Laclau
overlooks civil society and conceives politics mostly as the fight among projects that challenge
each other in the political arena. Civil society is only seen as the place from which demands
emerge and are somewhat instrumentally made use of, and whose chronology is limited to
times of crisis, not as the place in which consensus is created through a constant and long
pedagogical work. Moreover, the analysis of the political arena is particularly impoverished, as
who manages to ‘play the catachresical game’ better than others determines an objectivity
that pervades political institutions and spills over civil society - and whose trace of
contingency is only to be found in power (NR: 60).
It could be tentatively argued that the possibility of conceiving space (and hence also
hegemony) in these terms is made difficult by a certain conceptualisation of discourse, such
that it is transformed into a monolith, or confused with the discursive as such. In a passage
where the differences with Hall are made explicit, Howarth and Stavrakakis highlight that:
Where Hall differs from our approach is in his retention of the ontological separation between different
types of social practice, whether understood as ideological, sociological, economic or political. Discourse
theorists, by contrast, affirm the discursive character of all social practices and objects, and reject the
idea that ideological practices simply constitute one area or ‘region’ of social relations. Thus, for
instance, the distinctions between political, economic and ideological practices are pragmatic and
analytical, and strictly internal to the category of discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4).
Here the question is not about reintegrating discourse as a subordinate level to a privileged
ambit nor to deny the meritorious incorporation of Wittgenstein's intuition, by which the
discursive/extra-discursive distinction is overcome, but to emphasise the intrinsic multiformity
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of the social, by applying the concept of articulation also to this context. In other words, the
projection of a discourse, a project, or a practice - terms that Laclau uses as synonyms (Laclau,
1998: 9) - may only be limited to a domain, i.e. its ‘projectuality’ may exhaust itself within a
well-defined site or, alternatively, it may have the capacity and, most importantly, the
intention, to extend its influence to the entire social plane. Pluralising the inner space of the
social can cast light on the actual hegemonic reach of a project and assist the elaboration of
emancipatory strategies of greater incisiveness. Once again, the tools to obviate this are to be
found in Laclau himself. As he puts it in a 1988 interview: 'any form of unity, articulation and
hierarchization that may exist between various regions and levels will be the result of a
contingent and pragmatic construction' (Laclau, 1988: 18; also in NR: 186), meaning that
different levels exist within the discursive and that any possible connection between them is
to be studied on a case by case basis.
Taking time seriously
The temporal dimension adds a further layer of complexity that helps to understand the
difference between populism and hegemony. A recent debate on the matter among
Gramscian scholars provides a number of insights that can be fruitfully put to use (Thomas,
2013; Frosini, 2013; Filippini, 2016). Thomas' intervention is aimed at rediscovering Althusser's
conception of temporality set forth in Reading Capital. Concomitantly however, Thomas
rejects the Althusserian critical reading of Gramsci's take on time, suggesting that the two
ultimately defend the same position (Thomas, 2013: 193). In particular, Thomas initially
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foregrounds Althusser's critique of the Hegelian conception of the present, which,
accordingly, had contaminated Marxism. As put by Althusser himself:
This means that the structure of the historical existence of the Hegelian social totality allows what I
propose to call an ‘essential section’ (coupe d'essence), i.e., an intellectual operation in which a vertical
break is made at any moment in historical time, a break in the present such that all the elements of the
whole revealed by this section are in an immediate relationship with one another, a relationship that
immediately expresses their internal essence (Althusser in Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 94).
What Althusser criticises of this conception is its inherent teleology, which translates into 'a
substantially aestheticised conception of history, as a succession of 'essential sections' of
contemporaneity which are identical between themselves insofar as they all are mere
manifestations of an essence always identical with itself' (Thomas, 2013: 195). We are before
an eternalisation of the present which impedes thinking about change and which reduces the
possibility to conceive of transformative political practices (Thomas, 2013: 196). While this
conception is very far from Laclau's - who has always been at the forefront of the battle
against Hegelianism and any reduction of politics to a clash between various subjects that
claim for themselves a privileged knowledge of the object of the present (Thomas, 2013: 197)
- we can still draw a hint from Althusser's criticism and put it to use in order to understand a
limitation in Laclau's conception. Laclau's temporality is indeed devoid of essence but is also
singular. This emerges not only from his take on temporality as such, but also from the way in
which his discursive approach is modelled. If we operated a vertical break at any moment in
historical time following Laclau's theory of populism, the relationship between all the
elements of the whole would not be the expression of any internal essence that permeates
history through and through, for their being together would be totally contingent, but would
still be in an immediate relationship between each other, i.e. they would be all synchronic and
somehow coordinated. In other words, the theory of populism presupposes an entirely
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smooth plane whereby the successful intervention of a populist practice always and
necessarily displaces the previous social formation and installs a new one entirely coherent
with itself. As opposed to the Hegelian linear continuum by which the present moment is
contained in the previous one while already containing in itself the next one, that of Laclau is
a dis-continuum, marked by abrupt changes that make each present entirely unrelated to the
previous and the next formations: in other words, a time series of discrete events.53 Unlike
Gramsci then, Laclau's theoretical tools tell us about a series of properties in a static whole;
they are not abstractions that - as in the case of the Italian thinker - hold for a series of
interrelated phenomena over a period of time, making Laclau's political theory a synchronic
one (Morera, 1990: 83-84). According to Thomas:
For Gramsci, the present is necessarily non-identical with itself, composed by numerous 'times' which
neither coincide nor are regulated by a common measure […] the present for Gramsci is precisely an
ensemble of these practices taken in their different temporality, each of them in fight with the others in
order to assert its own specific temporality in relation to others, and without reference to […] a single
time baseline on which ‘advancement’ or ‘regression’ could be measured (Thomas, 2013: 202).
It is precisely the lack of recognition that each present contains different times which does not
seem to be fully acknowledged by Laclau and which leads him to postulate an erroneous
proximity between populism and hegemony. The intervention of Frosini (2013) takes issue
directly with the Argentine in this regard. The Italian Gramscian scholar recalls the distinction
operated by Laclau in NR. Here, as recalled above, temporality is conceived as dislocation, as
event, as the impossibility of suturing the social, whereas space is precisely the closed
organisation of signifieds (NR: 41-42). It follows, according to Frosini, that the plurality of
times can only be conceived in terms of a spatialised diachrony of orders (Frosini, 2013: 226).
This is clear in the way in which Laclau thinks of the instability of the system: in fact, this 'is
53As put by Laclau himself: '[h]istory is rather a discontinuous succession of hegemonic formations' (OPR:
226).
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not due to the contingency of its constitution, but to its crisis […] of which the reactivation of
the contingent nature of that systematic unification is a result' (Frosini, 2013: 226).54 The
consequence of this Bergsonian/Heideggerian conception of time, as Frosini has it, is that 'the
singularity of the situation falls entirely under the category of objectivity, whereby it becomes
impossible to think in a concrete manner, in which political innovation erupts in the system of
the signifieds' (Frosini, 2013: 227). Thus, the temporal uniqueness leads to 'a very poor
concrete analysis, in which the distinctions between different cases and situations are
reduced to superficial details' (Frosini, 2013: 227). This is because, as Frosini continues, by
pitting contingency against necessity, the original meaning of the former, cum-tangere, that is
the non-essential unity of at least two occurrences, is lost. In this way, the coming together of
historicity - that is the contamination of a plurality that operates within every system - and
decision is dynamited (Frosini, 2013: 227). In fact, by privileging the latter at the expense of
the former from NR onwards, the arbitrariness of decision becomes the only game in town, a
risk signalled also by Norval (2004: 148-149) and Howarth (2004: 264), who accepts that the
problem was half-acknowledged by Laclau in Emancipation(s) through a reference to the
54In a similar vein, Arditi notes the essential role attributed by Laclau to crisis: 'like Carl Schmitt, Laclau takes
for granted the goodness of order and the necessity of restoring-transforming it whenever it has been
unsettled, yet unlike Schmitt he also welcomes crises, as these are conditions of possibility for the felicity of
populist interventions. [...] The upshot is that equivalential logics cannot flourishx, and populism cannot rise
above what he calls "petty demagoguery" unless there is some kind of de-institutionalization that unsettles
the old order. [...] It is difficult to hold on to the argument that politics-as-populism has a constitutive force -
that it has the capacity to subvert and reconstruct the given - and at the same time claim that populist
interventions are dependent on the prior crisis in the existing order, for then the political would be
subservient to those junctures, and, therefore, its status would be derivate rather than constitutive'. (Arditi,
2010: 493-494). This aspect has important repercussions from the perspective that is privileged in this work:
strategy. Populism becomes a useful strategic tool only insofar as there is a crisis, but it cannot do anything
to unsettle the current order. Until dislocation manifests itself by way of a traumatic event then, the
struggle of different temporalities to impose themselves - be them dispersed or coalesced in a chain of
equivalences - and the very notion of organisation of alternative political practices that trace new political
horizons for society, are thus neglected and relegated in terms of importance.
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availability and credibility of discourses; a problem, however, that comes dramatically to the
fore again in OPR.55
How to conceive temporality then? Filippini provides the most convincing interpretation of
Gramsci's position, one which can be of particular use for the purposes pursued here as he
distinguishes between two forms of temporality. As he aptly puts it:
These two forms of temporality – plural temporality that is always struggling to prevail, and singular
temporality represented by the hegemonic force at the time – are constantly at play at one and the
same time in Gramsci's analysis. In the case of plural temporality, the outcome of the struggle is
different each time, from one case to the next; within singular temporality, the upheaval occurs at the
beginning of every new age, when the “temporal line” changes and points in another direction (Filippini,
2016: 106).
The singular temporality, also called hegemonic time, is thus that of the dominant bloc, which
does not necessarily and/or perfectly overlap with those who hold nominal power. The case
of Correa perfectly fits this situation: despite the President of Ecuador being the bearer of a
different temporality, the hegemonic temporality remained by and large neoliberal. This type
of temporality thus determines the uneven background in which the struggle among different
projects takes place. In this way, we can distinguish between duration and epoch: '[t]he
former is the stage for the imminent struggle between social forces within a system of
hegemonic power. The latter is the unequal background in which this struggle is played out'
(Filippini, 2016: 107). Significantly, duration does not entail substantial transformations in the
overall social organisation, whereas epoch implies the establishment of a new civilisation and
55To be fair to Laclau though, it must be added that this emphasis is at times mitigated even in NR: 'if the
agent is not entirely internal to the structure, this is because the structure itself is undecidable and cannot
be entirely repetitive, since the decisions based upon, but not determined by it, transform and subvert it
constantly. This means that the agents themselves transform their own identity in so far as they actualize
certain structural potentialities and reject others' (NR: 30). A few years later, Laclau calls the moment of the
decision the moment of madness and compares the taking of a decision to the impersonification of God
(Laclau, 1996b: 55, 57). Once again though, he mitigates his take: 'what counts as a valid decision will have
the limits of a structure which, in its actuality, is only partially destructured. The madness of the decision is,
if you want, as all madness, a regulated one' (Laclau, 1996b: 60-61).
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the destruction of old automatisms (Filippini, 2016: 107). This does not mean that duration -
or plural temporality - is always and necessarily characterised by petty fights, as these can
occasionally rise and put under discussion the singular temporality of an epoch.
This is best captured if we consider the parallel distinction that Gramsci draws between the
occasional and the permanent. As he puts it: '[t]he occasional gives rise to political criticism,
the permanent gives rise to sociohistorical criticism; the occasional helps one assess political
groups and personalities, the permanent helps one assess large social groupings' (Gramsci,
1996: 177). Gramsci thus postulates the existence of organic tendencies and conjunctures: the
former tend to be long-term processes and are associated with the strategic, the latter are
short-term phenomena, and linked to the tactical and the day-to-day (Gramsci, 1971: 177-
178; Morera, 1990: 90). However, despite recognising their different lengths and reaches,
neither of them is deemed to be definitive. It is when the battle that is launched in the
occasional establishes a new modus vivendi in a variety of areas that the transition to a new
permanent is carried out: at this point, it can be said that space and time find their ultimate
point of connection. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of a crisis per se that permits
the transition - although, as we shall see in a moment, the degree of the crisis should be
better heeded -, but rather the strength of the alternative political project that manages to
obtain a far-reaching triumph (Filippini, 2016: 96). To come up with a recent and immediate
example, one should not have difficulties at admitting that neoliberal capitalism operates at a
temporal level which is simply not comparable with that of an elected government, or
succession of like-minded governments. Again, the chapter on the Ecuadorian Citizen's
Revolution is particularly telling in this respect: despite one of Correa's favourite slogans being
that his government constituted “not an epoch of change, but a change of epoch”, the
empirical analysis reveals that, while several policy changes were in fact major progressive
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reforms, such transformations have failed to be as far-reaching and durable as often
proclaimed and to involve all areas of the social formation.
The oppositional couples that Gramsci proposes are thus entirely overlapping: singular/plural,
epochal/durational, permanent/occasional are different ways to express that each present is
pierced by temporalities that strive to impose themselves as political and social projects, but
this always happens against the context of one particular temporality (or project) that defines
the contours of the struggle. In this sense, while populism pertains to the register of the
plural, the durational and the occasional, hegemony belongs to that of the singular, the
epochal and the permanent. The point to assimilate here is that Gramsci's historicism
postulates that proper theoretical concepts cannot simply attempt to capture any given
moment while disregarding the totality of social phenomena (Morera, 2010: 83). While
populism, concerned as it is with the immediate contestation of a regime or practice, seems
to be preoccupied with the synchronic, the notion of hegemony emerges as intrinsically and
necessarily diachronic. The collision between Laclau and Gramsci could not be clearer on this:
while Laclau sees in populism a strategic device for the left that draws its wherewithal from a
synchronic analysis of the social environment (demands), Gramsci proposes that the
'theoretical concepts must emerge out of the complex abstraction of evidence ranging over a
suitably long period of time' (Morera, 1990: 84).
There is also a specular angle from which it is possible to treat the question of temporality,
which has to do with the excessive rapidity through which a social formation is deemed to be
transformable. The resilience of neoliberal social and institutional relations in the face of an
explicit challenge such as the one posed by the Citizens' Revolution - or by the general
discredit of neoliberal economic policies for that matter - speaks of a certain sluggishness in
221
the way in which deep dispositions undergo change, which seems to contradict the more
volatile account offered by Laclau. This is why the search for a better definition of populism
and hegemony, other than rescuing Gramsci, should also attempt to mediate the reading that
Laclau makes of Jacques Lacan. In this regard, it is worth starting by recalling this formulation
of the Lacanian-informed account of Stavrakakis as it does well to synthesise the
disproportionate depth attributed to the moment of the political that, to be sure, is the
moment of de-sedimentation which opens a window for a populist intervention (and which is
therefore prior to it): '[it] amounts to the cut of dislocation threatening all symbolisations of
the social, to the ultimate subversion of any sedimentation of political reality' (Stavrakakis,
1999: 75). Is the moment of the political always capable of putting under discussion all the
existing symbolisations of the social? Is it not possible to measure the extent of a dislocation
and by the same token its potential? Are all previous symbolisations equally at risk of
evaporating? This aspect is reinforced by placing stress on the primacy of the signifier which
goes hand in hand with the relegation of the signified. Here, 'the signified disappears because
it is no longer associated with the concept [...] The signified disappears as such, that is to say
as the epicentre of signification' (Stavrakakis, 1999: 26). These formulations, as we have seen,
furnish the premise on which the latest iteration of populism by Laclau is sustained.
This move, however, amounts to postulating that everything is lost every time the moment of
the political intervenes and new articulations are established by way of a populist
intervention. Anna Marie Smith had problematised this trend in Laclauian thinking already in
the 1990s (Smith, 1998), further developing some of the doubts expressed by Stuart Hall in
the 1980s. Hall claims that historical formations, though malleable in principle, 'do establish
lines of tendency and boundaries which give to the fields of politics and ideology the 'open
structure' of a formation and not simply the slide into an infinite and neverending plurality'
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(Hall, 1988: 10). Picking up on this, for Smith what is particularly problematic is that Laclau
increasingly moves towards the adoption of a formal model that pays exclusive heed to the
function of identification (and, it should be added, to its related opposite, de-identification) at
the expense of its contents. In other words, the Laclauian-Lacanian position stresses the
question of the subject of lack, who is constantly seeking an impossible completion and
therefore taken to continuously identify in new (political) objects, but by doing so it removes
from the scenario any attention to historical traces and normalised traditions that, from a
Gramscian perspectives, impinge upon the chances of a particular discourse to resonate and
hence become hegemonic (Smith, 1998: 76). While recognising its merits in terms of signalling
the impossibility of identity, Aletta Norval equally envisages the risks of an unmediated
adoption of this psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity, as it induces to do away with the
historically specific networks of power relations in which social agents come into being
(Norval, 1996: 64).
At this point, Smith pushes the argument further by depicting much more openly a contrast
between the earlier synthesis between Gramsci and post-structuralism achieved by Laclau and
Mouffe, and the later embracement of the Lacanian insights. The question, she argues,
revolves around the 'structurality' of the openness of any structure: while the former stance
holds that past articulations are weakened but never totally lost, as every signifier 'bears the
traces of past articulations', the latter maintains that the Real sweeps away every structure,
thus creating a sort of clean slate upon which entirely new articulations can be constructed
(Smith, 1998: 78-79). To put it differently, the post-structuralist cum Gramsci position accepts
the fallibility of any system, but also asserts that the conditions amid which such a failure
takes place will partially structure, though in ways impossible to determine a priori, the
conditions for the next failure, as opposed to the Lacanian-informed view of Laclau, whereby
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scant consideration is paid to the possibility of particular signifieds being dragged over. Here,
it may be possible to argue that Laclau misreads the Derridean category of undecidability by
treating it as sheer indeterminacy:
undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities […] These possibilities are
themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations […] I say ‘undecidability’ rather than
‘indeterminacy’ because I am interested in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that
allows, precisely, determinations in given situations to be stabilized through a decision of writing (in the
broad sense I give to this word, which also includes political action and speech) (Derrida, 1988: 148).
Derrida suggests that we have neither full freedom of choice, nor full determination, hence 'it
is not the case that simply anything is possible' (Norval, 2004: 148). Similarly, the Laclauian
bent for the 'clean slate' becomes particularly visible, according to Smith, in the loss of
emphasis that Laclau attributes to the Derridean concept of 'iteration', a non-essentialist
repetition principle that speaks of the 'non-determining traces of past articulations' (Smith,
1998: 80), and in the concomitant importance placed on the question of emptiness:
From a Lacanian perspective, those investments are made not because the signifiers have specific
meanings that resonate organically within a given context, but because the "empty signifiers" promise
to deliver jouissance, the primal unity and completion that was foreclosed at the entry into language.
[...] Laclau's Lacanian shift is in this respect a departure not only from post-structuralist theory, but also
from the Gramscian tradition, for Gramsci insists that a political discourse will only resonate with "the
people" insofar as it organically resonates in some way with popular traditions (Smith, 1998: 81)
The thrust of Smith's intervention is thus entirely consonant with the attempt to (re)mobilise
Gramsci (Smith, 1998: 82, 169), although this time in terms of a rediscovery of forgotten (but
once fully present) insights rather than the discovery of insights that were never quite
assimilated in Laclau's reading of Gramsci (which is what I have tried to do so far). In this
sense, it could be said that Smith similarly adopts a problematisation approach that re-
activates possibilities that have been progressively excluded by Gramsci. For example, Smith
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contrasts a number of old Laclauian passages in which particular care is given to the sphere of
content. This one is particularly revealing:
This does mean, of course, that any discourse putting itself forward as the embodiment of fullness will
be accepted. The acceptance of a discourse depends on its credibility, and this will not be granted if its
proposals clash with the basic principles informing the organization of a group (NR: 66)
Impossibility of fullness is fully active here, but historicity is not neglected as the complex
conditions underlying the doing and undoing of social orders are too big a factor to be
eliminated. This aspect, as it has been made clear so far, is important in order to comprehend
not only that meaningful political interventions need, to some extent, to speak the language
of common sense, but also that social formations exhibit traces that are slow to clear, and
that they limit, although not mechanically, the range of available options. Here, the
importance of the war of position is lost, yet in the early Laclau we find the acknowledgement
that there is no single revolutionary rupture, but a series of ruptures that can finally culminate
in a new hegemony (Laclau, 1981: 54). In this sense, a dislocation that provokes a genuine
questioning of the existing order will not necessarily, and most importantly not immediately,
result in another social order made of entirely new articulations. This is not only because of
the always possible differential reabsorption of the order in difficulty, but also because the
acceptance of a new prevailing discourse may not necessarily be able to undo, all of a sudden,
the previous formation altogether, precisely as a result of the sluggishness and difficulty in
avoiding the dragging on of past articulations.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should do away with Lacan altogether, not least
because the Laclauian interpretation of Lacan is in itself questionable and may be
philologically objected (for a different take that stays away from the 'clean slate' position of
Laclau, see Žižek, 1989: 95-144). As Smith herself specifies 'I am attempting to give greater
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emphasis to Gramscian contextualization without losing the psychoanalytic insights in Laclau's
recent work' (Smith, 1998: 169). Moreover, as we shall see towards the end of the chapter,
Lacan remains an indispensable ally in theorising an ethical type of hegemony that does away
with the pretension of establishing an impossible harmony (Stavrakakis, 1999: 137).
What is hegemony then?
What is hegemony, then? And even more crucially, how does a populist intervention displace
a social formation and transitions from the occasional to the permanent? So far it has been
established that talk of hegemony becomes legitimate only insofar as a particular set of social
relations becomes predominant in a variety of sites and transcends the sphere of petty fights
in order to establish itself as a more all-encompassing horizon with a strong impact on the
epochal common sense.
Before I proceed to further elucidating the reach of the category, it is paramount to dispel the
confusion that may have arisen in relation to the overstretching of the term and in particular
to the double use hegemony/counter-hegemony. Counter-hegemony is clearly not an
established hegemony and yet contains something inherent to the term. Counter-hegemony,
in other words, does not delineate a matter-of-factly predominance of a composite social
group and its world-view, but indicates the road to follow for those wishing to reach it. It is a
political practice that is hegemonic in potentia, meaning that it displays the spatial and
temporal attributes hitherto described. But there is another element that should be heeded. If
populism is a synonym of ambiguity, of a search for a fit between disparate aims and
ultimately of emptiness, (counter-)hegemony cannot but be substantial, i.e. it must be the
bearer of an alternative sociality to the predominant one and must be imbued with a certain
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fullness. Otherwise, the hegemony of a particular group would mean nothing, simply
signalling the hegemony of a symbol which has no real bearing on social relations. In focusing
on how the party ought to act in order to build its own hegemony, Gramsci holds that:
It requires an extremely minute, molecular process of exhaustive analysis in every detail, the
documentation for which is made up of an endless quantity of books, pamphlets, review and newspaper
articles, conversations and oral debates repeated countless times, and which in their gigantic
aggregation represent this long labour which gives birth to a collective will with a certain degree of
homogeneity - with the degree necessary and sufficient to achieve an action which is coordinated and
simultaneous in the time and the geographical space in which the historical event takes place (Gramsci,
1971: 194).
The importance that Gramsci grants to the questions of time and space resurfaces again, but
it is another element that I wish to foreground here. Gramsci stresses the necessity for an
emancipatory force to construct a well-founded, informed and sound political intervention.
The level of the analysis, the understanding of the conjuncture, the clarity on the type of
alternative sociality that it intends to implant, as well as their adequate dissemination, are
indispensable prerequisites. For Gramsci, the party is the bearer of an ideological fullness that
needs to be adjusted to the context through a labour that gradually changes the moral and
social coordinates of society. It is in this context that Gramsci's assertion that '[e]very
relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship' (Gramsci, 1971: 350)
should be read. In the next section, we shall analyse more in detail the type of pedagogical
rapport that Gramsci envisioned. However, we already found a sample of this approach in the
PCI, whose politics was guided by both the attempt to make sense of the society in which it
intervened through an analytical approach with the creation of specific working groups, the
dialogue with renown intellectuals and an incredibly ample editorial production, and the
alphabetisation of vast segments of the population. Yet, its grasp of economic matters was far
from being at the height that the situation required. Oppositely, the Citizens' Revolution
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abdicated the latter role and its level analysis was, despite some noteworthy efforts of some
intellectuals that were included in the government or maintained a close relationship with it,
not only insufficient, but also hampered by the role of the leader, whose inimical attitude
towards discussion did not create the most favourable environment.
Let us now proceed to define the contours of the notion of hegemony. A further level that
needs to be investigated is that of the subject. What do the subject and the related processes
of subjectivation tell us about the hegemonic reach of a particular discourse? To begin from
an author internal to the Essex school, we find an interesting proposition in a recent
intervention by Yannis Stavrakakis, although the point is only scantly developed. The
argument is that while long-term hegemonic identifications start by deploying
representational-symbolic complexes cum libidinal investments capable of mobilising
jouissance, it is only to the extent that they precipitate into habitus that they manage to
ensure their durability (Stavrakakis, 2014: 122-125). Here Stavrakakis summons, if only in
passing, the studies of Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias on the matter. The invocation seems
warranted and insightful. For Bourdieu, habitus is defined in terms of 'systems of durable,
transposable dispositions', that structure practices and representations in a regulated way
without this being perceived as dictated by explicit rules or by the conscious intervention of a
single external agent that pursues determined aims (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). Elias is equally blunt
in recognising the primary status of personality structures in the sustenance of a particular
order. According to the German sociologist, sociogenesis and psychogenesis need to be
studied in conjunction, as the long-term transformations of society always entail the
alteration of human behaviour and the control of human affects (Elias, 1978: xiii, vx, 221). In
particular, where a monopoly of force is established and an area is pacified, a number of
pressures that tend to model individual's behaviour kicks in, such that a type of self-control
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becomes so ingrained to the extent of becoming a super-ego capable of automatically
supervising the subject's drives (Elias, 1982: 235-236, 241). It is worth emphasising here that
the focus of Elias' two-volume enterprise is limited to the process of civilisation in the post-
medieval period and how this was in turn subservient to the sustenance of absolutist forms of
rule (Elias, 1982: 4). This probably explains why Elias concentrates exclusively on the
inculcation of restraining forms of control - with special attention dedicated to the
instauration of good manners as well as feelings of shame and embarrassment - and does not
seem to envisage the possibility of modelling the very desiring structure of the subject.
Despite this deficit, the avenue opened by concentrating on the repercussions on the
structuring of the subject seems promising.
Once again, turning to Gramsci provides a number of valuable keys in order to come up with a
redefinition of hegemony that suits the overall orientation of Laclau's theoretical edifice.
Making an improper borrowing from Gramsci, it is possible to tell apart two levels, which in
turn indicate the pervasiveness of a particular discourse. In his excerpts on Americanism and
Fordism Gramsci speaks of a 'hegemony' that 'is born in the factory and requires for its
exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries',
identified in 'high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political
propaganda' (Gramsci, 1971: 285). In other words, a politics of concrete seduction, conducted
by way of concessions that tackle or even avoid the arousal of potential grievances, and a
modest work of cultural mediation, which defends and pushes for particular societal
arrangements. It is hard not to see an analogy with the Ecuadorian case here. Gramsci refers
to the peculiar ways in which capitalism's sway had taken hold in the United States up to the
1929 implementation of the New Deal. In particular, Gramsci is concerned with how the life
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and the conduct of the new type of worker had been rationalised in the advanced capitalist
regime developed in the US. Accordingly, rationalisation:
is still at the stage of psycho-physical adaptation to the new industrial structure, aimed for through high
wages. Up to the present (until the 1929 crash) there has not been, except perhaps sporadically, any
flowering of the "superstructure". In other words, the fundamental question of hegemony has not yet
been posed (Gramsci, 1971: 286).
Contrary to Europe where the complexity of past histories made for the accumulation of
passive sedimentations, 'America does not have "great historical and cultural traditions"'
(Gramsci, 1971: 285). The take that Gramsci adopts towards Americanism is ambivalent: on
one side, he recognises that these differences with the Old Continent permitted a 'superior
living standard enjoyed by the popular classes compared with Europe' and the consolidation
of a 'sound basis' for industry and commerce (Gramsci, 1971: 285); on the other, he
recognises that the lack of 'literary forms' and of an 'epic' went hand in hand with repressive
methods (Gramsci, 1971: 285; Gramsci, 1985: 113). Of further significance in this sense is the
fact that:
Gramsci concludes that the American system cannot carry out [the creation of a new type of worker] in
a definitive manner […] because the necessary discipline for this complete interiorisation of the
characteristics of the new type […] can only derive from a power that is perceived by the worker as its
own, that is it has to configure itself as self-discipline (Filippini, 2015: 152).
In other words, Gramsci sees Americanism as inherently politically underdeveloped, while it
emerges implicitly that an authentic and interiorised self-discipline can only emerge in a new
order, with reference to the Soviet model being built in those years (Filippini, 2015: 152-153,
167).
What can be rescued among these theses from the point of view of the aims pursued here?
Clearly, there are strong and unmistakable traces of a certain mechanicism that cannot be
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embraced. Talk of structure/superstructure and the ‘suturing’ allusion to the exclusive
possibility for socialism of creating a superior psycho-physical nexus that delivers a new
discipline that is perceived as genuine freedom by the workers is far-removed from the post-
structuralist tenets that characterise Laclau's work and which are upheld here. However, we
have a clear distinction between discourses that manage only partially to grip the subject and
revolutionise her habits, and discourses that are instead capable of performing a much more
all-encompassing reform. While in Gramsci this distinction has something to do with the
inherent contents of the discourses at stake, it still gives us a clue as to the differing degrees
to which subjects' conduct can be modelled. Accordingly, the first level has to do with an
explicit form of consensus, which takes the form of a more or less conscious acceptance of the
ways in which a certain society is organised. Here, only a fairly superficial cultural work is
conducted along with the adoption of repressive measures. The 'conformism' - a term that
Gramsci employs in relation to the inculcation of a certain type of sociality by the means of
Law and public opinion (Gramsci, 1971: 195-196; Gramsci, 1975: 773) - that is here achieved,
is only very partial.
Oppositely - and this is the second level - a full hegemony entails 'the socio-political capacities
of a leading class to construct a system of legitimation in which individuals' acts are framed
within pre-ordered schemes of action that political power leaves available' (Filippini, 2015:
91). As a result, the terrain of hegemony does not merely involve the consensus of the
subjects sic et simpliciter, but a transmission of cultural values, which is seen by Gramsci as
the key component of power systems (Canfora, 1990; Filippini, 2015: 91). Other Gramscian
categories are also of help in order to further comprehend the reach of hegemony. In
particular, the notion of common-man:
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presupposes the attainment of a "cultural-social" unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills,
with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common
conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways)
or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it
becomes passion) (Gramsci, 1971: 349).
According to Gramsci, the construction of a common-man is a long-term process, one which
involves a number of 'molecular' changes, that is processes of transformation that shape the
outlook of personality and make for the construction of collective will and consensus, as well
as the production of subjectivities (Forenza, 2009: 551). The second level thus indicates the
sedimentation of certain social logics, by which the subject has largely - even though always
contradictorily - internalised the rationality of the dominant ideology. The distinction is well
captured by Anne Marie Smith when she claims that '[u]nlike Bourdieu's "habitus", subject
positions [by which she means the ensemble of beliefs to make sense of one's own structural
position] may or may not be durable; their relative fixity depends upon the contingencies of
political struggles' (Smith, 1998: 58, 63). For Gramsci, the transition from non-durability to
durability occurs when the:
Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him
passive; and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political
form and a source of new initiatives (Gramsci, 1971: 367).
The reason for distinguishing the two levels is thus not simply analytical, as in practice they
may not coincide. In the case of the PCI, the politics inaugurated by Togliatti - a tradition that
was gradually watered down over time as we have seen - reveals a preoccupation for the
ethical and cultural questions and the cultivation of a set of human relations and habits that
were antithetical to the social formation it was fighting against. The reason for attributing a
counter-hegemonic character to the PCI lies in the fact that the notion encompasses both 'the
political strategy of conservation as well as the disaggregation and destruction of organic
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systems' (Filippini, 2015: 91). While populism has been credited with the capacity to shatter a
number of political sedimentations, the complex ‘organicity’ of a system, that is its deep social
ramifications, its cultural underpinnings, its disciplining aspects, may well remained
untouched by a populist intervention. Only a strategy that takes up the task of going beyond
the cursory domain of propaganda can be deemed to be acting in hegemonic terms. As put by
Gramsci: 'not the passive and indirect consensus, but the active and direct one is a matter of
life' (Gramsci, 1975: 1771).
As we have seen in the Ecuadorian case instead, a blend of democratic socialism and other
ideologies gained particular salience over the course of almost 10 years. Many social justice
battles acquired strong visibility and, by incarnating themselves in the figure of Correa, they
took over the public agenda and were translated, although not without some dilution, into
public policy. A more or less conscious acceptance of the Citizen's Revolution tenets among
the bulk of the population took place, as well testified by the electoral predominance of
Correa and his movement. Such a sway was not necessarily the fruit of a battle of ideas per se,
as it is to be recognised that people were not always necessarily enticed by the literal
contents expressed by the Citizens' Revolution, but it was especially the capacity to elicit
people's passions and cast a coherent horizon in a moment of crisis that played a decisive
role; to put it in Laclau's terms, to project an order when one was manifestly starting to lack.
However, the grip of such an ideological complex proved to be ephemeral. At the very
bottom, the subject maintained fidelity to the coordinates that predated the advent of the
Citizens' Revolution. The core of the personality that sustained the social model that Correa
took issues with was thus unchallenged. Consciousnesses are always contradictory as they
harbour different modes of thinking, acting and feeling. It can be stated that in this period this
contradiction was heightened more than ever, with the subject developing ever more
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ambivalent modes of existence. In a sense, forms of critical insight were certainly fostered
during this period. Nevertheless, these did not ‘trickle down’ so as to change the most basic
‘automatic’ reflexes of the subject.
French philosophers Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have come up with a similar intuition in
their seminal work on neoliberalism. It is worth quoting this passage at some length as it
neatly reveals the congruence of the analysis:
we might be tempted to expect a change of policies in the wake of a change of government to create
the conditions for constructing a different subject. This would be to ignore the fact that the
reorientation effected by neo-liberalism, although voluntaristic, was in no way a creation ex nihilo. It
was based on the whole dynamic of the global economy, aligned with the new norm of competition,
such that subjects were internally 'bent' to this norm through multiple techniques of power. Moreover,
it is to forget that one does not escape a rationality or an apparatus through a mere change of policy,
any more than one invents a different way of governing human beings by changing governments
(Dardot and Laval, 2013: 316-317).
Their history of neoliberalism builds upon Foucault's insightful remarks on the matter and
more in general on his governmentality approach, through which he explored the nexus
existing between particular conceptions of human nature, subjectivities and political
ideologies (Sum, 2015: 36). After all, Foucault also had a bearing - although always mediated
by a robust critique - in the philosophical pantheon of Laclau's early days, only to be later
repudiated (Laclau, 2000b: 285). In a recent collection of essays, Gramsci and Foucault are put
in relation with each other by overcoming the traditional reciprocal mistrust between Marxist
and post-structuralist perspectives (Kreps, 2015). What is it that Gramsci and Foucault share
and which concerns us here? It is the fact that 'both stress the capillary and contingent nature
of power' (Sum, 2015: 41), that they are 'both concerned with describing the exercise of
power in ways other than through the use of force or violence' (Schulzke, 2015: 63), or put
otherwise, that they both contend that 'power is concentrated in diverse institutional centers
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and deployed in complex and productive relations throughout the social according to multiple
and hybrid logics' (Smith, 1998: 165).
The Foucauldian stance permits us to grasp better the existence of the two levels and the
Ecuadorian paradox. The outright discrediting of a particular ideology does not necessarily
lead to its repudiation in terms of social relations. As put by Wendy Brown, another scholar
working within this tradition: 'neoliberalism can become dominant as governmentality
without being dominant as ideology' (Brown, 2005: 49). Neoliberalism's resilience has then to
be located in a territory whereby it has lost its capacity to be explicitly attractive, but it has
achieved the status of a rationality 'profoundly inscribed in government practices, institutional
policies and managerial styles' as well in a subjectivity that spurs individuals to constantly
compete between themselves (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 14). As a result, it becomes legitimate
to speak of the creation of an 'entrepreneurial subject' that creates new types of psychic
functioning (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 256).
Finally, an important feature characterising the notion of hegemony proposed here needs to
be spelt out more clearly. It is important to make sure that no misunderstanding arises with
respect to the normative and ethical character of hegemony. The position adopted here is
that hegemony in itself, as in the case of populism, cannot be associated with a particular
normative or ethical position. In other words, there can be normatively different types of
hegemony, and hegemony is not to be located as a specifically modern concept. This
clarification is needed because, as we shall see below, there are attempts to bend the notion
of hegemony to normative purposes. This seems to be part of a latest trend in Laclauian
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thinking by which certain categories are being normatively appropriated.56 Let us make a
short detour to see this more closely.
In a passage of their book in which they discuss the techniques proper of the 'personal
enterprise' that are assimilated by the subject, Dardot and Laval also invoke Lacan by claiming
that:
following one's desire and obeying the Other who speaks softly within the self are one and the same
thing. In this sense, modern management is a ‘Lacanian’ government: the desire of the subject is the
desire of the Other. It is up to the new power to make itself the Other of the subject (Dardot and Laval,
2013: 260).
Prima facie, the statement seems accurate: the process by which neoliberal governmentality
works is that of sneaking into the subject without even being noticed, and making it seem as if
the subject perceived it as a source of personal freedom. A closer look, however, reveals the
inconsistency of the Lacanian reference: one is always spoken for, always subjectivised
through the available symbolic networks. It is not neoliberalism that ignites this dynamic, even
though it is fair to argue that new subtle techniques of motivation, incentivisation, stimulation
and social fear (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 260-261) have enhanced its pervasiveness and made
it more sophisticated. Rather, the argument becomes more cogent when the authors refer to
the process of de-symbolisation, with reference to the ‘capitalist discourse’ as formulated by
Lacan. The nutshell of the argument is that neoliberal capitalism has made for a volatility of
identification, providing continuously new posts, functions and skills related to the world of
the market and the enterprise in which the subject can identify and that do away with other
symbolic forms (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 293-294). As they put elsewhere in the book, the
56In this sense, it is possible to note the temptation of Stavrakakis to negate the qualification ‘populist’ with
regard to contemporary right-wing political forces that operate a dichotomic division of society while
articulating sectors that have been left behind by globalisation processes. A purely normative line of
reasoning is employed in order to come up with this conclusion, thus ‘disobeying’ the Laclauian maxim of
treating populism as a purely thin political logic (Stavrakakis, 2014b: 514).
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‘modern’ western subject oscillated between three broad symbolic registers: Christian society,
the nation-state and the monetary-productive realm. While this range may be broadened, it is
possible to concur that liberal democracies 'within certain limits, enabled and respected a
mixed functioning of the subject, in the sense that they guaranteed both the separation and
the articulation of the different spheres of existence' (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 256). The
withering away of democracy consists precisely in the colonisation of the symbolic at the
hands of capitalism, through a discourse that rejects its own contingency and eliminates
plurality within the symbolic domain. As they unmistakably put: neoliberalism, 'by erasing the
separation between private and public sphere, erodes the foundations of liberal democracy
itself' (Dardot and Laval, 2016: 303).
The discussion on de-symbolisation is picked up by a theorist that has shown a particular
proximity to Laclau's thinking over the last few years, his co-national Jorge Alemán. In the light
of the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of neoliberalism, Alemán concludes that there are:
two aspects of the symbolic that, though they may appear mixed in our phenomenological reality, obey
radically diverse and distinct logics. The first symbolic dependence is ineradicable and constitutive of the
subject. The second, insofar as it is a socio-historical construction, is susceptible to differing periodic
transformations (Alemán, 2016: 14).
Accordingly, the latter has an influence on the bodies and captures the subjects through a sort
of symbolic dependency (Alemán, 2016: 14). The upshot of this line of reasoning is reached a
few pages later: neoliberal capitalism is not hegemonic, as by attempting to conquer the
whole symbolic space it admits no heterogeneity. On the contrary, hegemony is unstable and
requires a failed type of representation, while capitalism is a domination - a power - that
never undergoes crisis, it is an unlimited, circular movement that presents itself as invisible
(Alemán, 2016: 19, 27, 48-49, 54, 56). However, this is in contrast with Alemán's repeated
assertion that 'there is no perfect crime' (Alemán, 2016: 15-71 passim), meaning that any
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complete suture is impossible, as well with Laclau's assertion by which 'social relations [...] are
always power relations' as 'taking a decision can only mean repressing possible alternatives
that are not carried out' (NR: 30-31). After all, Alemán blatantly contradicts himself also when
he says that 'universality is impossible if, in turn, it does not go through the hegemonic
process' (Alemán, 2016: 61).
What is, then, the purpose of postulating that neoliberalism works through an aspect of the
symbolic that is all-encompassing, circular and makes it invulnerable to crisis, while finally
subscribing to a thesis that foregrounds contingency? It seems that Alemán treats hegemony
as an imperfect synonym of democracy, and particularly as a left-wing interpretation of the
latter, especially when he attributes to the right a profound hatred for hegemonic politics
(Alemán, 2016: 19). In other words, for Alemán hegemony is more of an ontic/normative
concept rather than an ontological one. While it is certainly possible to agree with him that
neoliberalism has totalising ambitions, it seems far-fetched to say that it is the first historical
formation that 'attempts to touch the ontological nucleus, that truly aims at the very
production of subjectivity' (Alemán, 2016: 64). Rather, its capacity to deactivate differences is
part and parcel of the differential logic that sediments social relations and sanctions, this time
in a particularly accentuated way, a certain hegemony. Not surprisingly, in one of the final
essays that compose his book, the disagreement between him and Laclau explicitly comes to
the fore. According to the latter, Alemán says, neoliberal capitalism is a form of hegemony so
sedimented so as to be perceived as natural, an assertion with which it would be difficult to
disagree from the perspective adopted here and which corresponds with the quotation from
the Preface of HSS provided above. He further claims that Lacan's capitalist discourse is thus
incompatible with the hegemonic logic, as the former presupposes homogeneity and rejects
impossibility, while the latter functions by way of a constant articulatory renegotiation
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(Alemán, 2016: 176-177). However, it seems to me that this dualism is profoundly
unsatisfactory as it does not permit to understand the gradation through which certain
articulations gain more strength and display more resilience over time. In this dispute, Laclau
certainly defends a persuasive notion of hegemony!
Unmediated leaderism and the question of the empty signifier
So much for the question regarding the relationship between populism and hegemony and
the definition of hegemony. In order to transition to the theme of left-wing populism, I shall
advance a few remarks on how Laclau puts forward populism as a strategic tool for the Left. In
his trialogue with Žižek and Butler Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, Laclau recognises the
impossibility of value-neutral descriptions, an acknowledgement which leads him to openly
speak of descriptive-normative complexes (Laclau, 2000b: 294). If we take this seriously,
populism should then be treated as a descriptive-normative complex. As hinted in the second
chapter already, populism is indeed both a way to analyse very distinct political phenomena
and the form suggested for the Left: a form that without being normative in itself is not
exempt of substantive normative repercussions, precisely because it has a prescriptive
character. It is the character of this normative prescription that should be qualified with more
care.
As reminded above, Laclau has postulated that the empty signifier - the singularity - keeping
together the popular camp is often to be identified with the name of the leader. Even more
tellingly, he has concretely and strenuously defended the personalisation of the different
populist experiments of the Latin American pink-tide (Laclau, 2005c; Laclau, 2006: 119; Laclau
in Arellano, 2012). The argument that the identification in a leader can ease the getting-
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together of heterogeneous demands and signifiers is certainly plausible, and one can
recognise its productive effects. However, even when progressively oriented, the desirability
of the prolongation of the leader's prominence is open to question. In fact,
the leader may be cast as an empty signifier, but s/he is also a person, so any talk about "the symbolic
unification of the group around an individuality" must also address the potential underside of the
argument. [...] This prevents him from engaging with those who maintain that following a leader morphs
all too easily into a cult of personality, that is, who see in the populist mode of unification unedifying
traits such as the infallibility of the leader, her being beyond good and evil, the role the leader as
indisputable broker among factions, the perception of challenges to the leader as treason, the
suppression of dissent in the name of the unity of the "people", and so on. This undermines the
presumed populist empowerment of the underdogs or produces a travesty of empowerment by
subjecting the "people" to the dictates of a leader (Arditi, 2010: 490-91).
In this way, the prominence of the leader impedes the processing of decisions within the
popular camp: the leader is already conceived as the embodiment of the popular will and the
need for deliberation and debate is suppressed. Again, a return to Gramsci may be of help in
order to strike a position that does not eliminate the figure of the leader, his vital role in the
unhinging of inertias, but weakens the rather uncritical position of Laclau. To be sure, in an
early passage of the Notebooks, while recognising that charismatic direction entails great
political dynamism, Gramsci relegates the question of charisma to the 'primitive stage of mass
parties' where doctrines are cashed out in vague and incoherent terms, which requires the
intervention of an infallible 'Pope' for interpretation and adaptation (Gramsci, 1992: 320-321).
This take cannot be quite embraced, because it is informed by a sort of stagist conception of
history that has little to do with the philosophical presuppositions endorsed here. Yet Gramsci
is certainly right in the same passage in pointing out that 'the longevity of charismatic parties
is often dependent upon the longevity of their energy and enthusiasm, which sometimes
provide a very fragile foundation' (Gramsci, 1992: 321). Importantly, once the leader
disappears, what happens? Here, the insistence of Laclau on the leader is not simply naive
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insofar as it fails to consider the possibility of the disappearance of the leader - be it physical
or political, e.g. when a leader is swamped by scandals of any sort - but also impedes the
passage to the centrality of genuine political contents, preventing the building of a truly
alternative common sense and thereby becoming particularly problematic from the point of
view of strategy.
In later passage on the role of leaders, Gramsci is more illuminating. Here, he firstly
distinguishes the small ambition of certain leaders, characterised by opportunism and rush,
from the great ambition, where the elevation of the single goes hand in hand with the
elevation of a whole social stratum. He considers the great ambition as healthy, necessary and
not morally reprehensible (Gramsci, 1975: 771). Similarly, he then proceeds to discriminate
the bad from the good demagogic leader: while the former makes use of the masses only
instrumentally, creates a desert around himself by crushing all potential competitors and
enters into a direct, unmediated relationship with the masses by way of plebiscites, great
oratory skills and phantasmagoric expedients, the latter tends to create an intermediate layer
between himself and the masses, encourages others to take up his role, elevates the level of
the masses and thinks in terms of continuity of the project he leads (Gramsci, 1975: 772). As
this is not a strict dualism, but rather two ideal poles, it may be argued that, in the light of the
analysis, the leadership of Correa tended towards the former pole, while that of Togliatti
towards the latter. The further consolidation of the PCI as a party following Togliatti's death
confirms the impression of a political practice whose lynchpin did not lie in a person, but
rather in a set of ideals, with the leader constituting a further value added that did not
prevent the emergence of a vast and differentiated apparatus in society. Oppositely, it can be
argued that an unmediated relationship between leader and led hampers the strategy of the
war of position. The excessive centrality of the leader and the tendency to exclude
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intermediate bodies obliterates anything that falls outsides this relationship, thereby making
it difficult to diversify the political work in a variety of sites, and spatially deconstruct the
prevalent common sense in order to construct a new one. Once again, we find quite a neat
example in the Citizen's Revolution, whose main political work remained confined to the
electoral sphere and failed to create a new wide classe dirigeante that operated in the
country.
Coming back to Laclau, his notion of leadership is paralleled by a specific place for the populist
followers. If the primacy of the leader becomes all that matters, what is the point of struggle?
Beyond the emphasis placed on elections and referenda, populism has often been
accompanied by political inaction (Westlind, 1996: 104). Correa's left populism has notably
rested on an overall political passivity of the population. The only modality was the activation
of die-hard supporters in order to display strength in the face of challenges mounted by other
political forces. The positive dynamic between the autonomy of the movements - the
horizontal moment of civil society - and the assault on the state - the vertical moment which
Laclau calls hegemony - (Laclau, 2014: 9) was quickly lost and replaced by the sheer verticality
of the state. This is also why, after a few years, there was little ‘social material’ for this leftist
populism to work upon or to ‘hegemonise’. Even a left-wing oriented type of populism thus
runs the risk of reducing politics to winning elections and keeping power, rather than
empowering the people and creating new sites for the deepening of democracy and bridging
the gap between representatives and represented. This in turn reinforces the impression
expressed above regarding the single-minded focus on political society. Progressive decrees
and laws may well still be promulgated, but people have almost no say on such matters other
than ratifying their allegiance to the leader. In this sense, what seems to be missing is a
healthy space for self-critique. In referring to Gramsci's conception of the party, Schulzke
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reminds that 'it would have to give greater attention to its internal dynamics and ensure that
they can permit conflict and competition [...] According to Gramsci's model, this task of self-
critique is probably a function that would be best performed by intellectuals' (Schulzke, 2015:
70). This was well enacted by the PCI, where the intellectuals played a major role, even
though we have seen how Togliatti often attempted to censor those expressions that did not
suit his line. However, it would be erroneous to infer from this that the internal debate was
severely curtailed, because in actual fact different positions found expression and Togliatti
was at times also outvoted. In this sense, Gramsci suggests a reshaping of the typical
relationship between leaders and led, such that automatic obedience of the led cannot be
taken for granted, thereby extirpating what he terms 'Cadornism'57, that is 'the conviction that
a thing will be done because the leader considers it just and reasonable that it should be
done' (Gramsci, 1971: 145). More generally, Gramsci, while not doing entirely away with the
leaders/led distinction, challenges many of the assumptions of the elitist school of Mosca,
Pareto and Michels (see Filippini, 2015: 194-213), and sees the necessity of 'working to
produce élites of intellectuals of a new type which arise directly out of the masses, but remain
in contact with them to become, as it were, the whalebone in the corset' (Gramsci, 1971:
340).
A solution here may be hidden behind the ambiguous status attributed to the role of the
empty signifier. When it is represented by the leader, alive and kicking, the very structuring of
the popular camp coincides with the emergence of the leader; differently, if the empty
signifier is a prominent demand, or symbol or cause in society that acquires a mythical and
salvific value, this does not necessarily belong to a determined political subject, because
57From the Italian General and Marshal, Luigi Cadorna (1850-1928), Chief of Staff of the Italian Army during
the first part of WWI.
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various projects are in competition to perform the filling function (Laclau, 1994: 176; also in E:
44). To further highlight this difference, suffice it to recall that Laclau argues that sometimes
the 'victory' of a signifier that becomes the rallying point of a heterogeneous body of demands
ends up being a dangerous victory for its beneficiary and promoter (Laclau, 1994: 177; also in
E: 44).
It follows that leaders and demands/symbols do not occupy the same status, especially
because - as we have seen in the case of the Citizens' Revolution - if it is the leader to occupy
that nodal position, she/he can determine in an arbitrary way what enters and what does not
in the equivalential chain and, while in principle a leader may have to renounce some of
her/his personal objectives, speaking of a dangerous victory or of a break of the links with the
leader seems improper. By the same token, a leader is often the incarnation of a political
project, while demands are claims arising from society.
Nevertheless, as the analysis of the Ecuadorian case has shown, the building of the
equivalential chain may rest on the presence of more than a single privileged signifier. The
importance of one signifier does not exclude that of others, as more than one singularity can
play an articulating function. To put it differently, a strong leader does not prevent a specific
battle or symbol from emptying itself of its own specific contents and refer to a set of
different demands. Equally, this does not imply that more demands or symbols can occupy
that centrality in the articulatory process. As also put by Howarth: '[t]here seems to be no
reason why one demand should play this role - why not an amalgam or articulation of
different demands?' (Howarth, 2008: 185). This is particularly important, because a left
populism that goes beyond the exclusive centrality of the leader and puts certain concrete
struggles at the forefront of its discourse - linked to a particular world-view and imbued with
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however revisable a normative ethos - is much better equipped not only to avoid arbitrary
decisions, and make the practice remain faithful both to the radical democratic and agonistic
precepts, but is also in a better position to install a new hegemony and transform the social
formation a whole. While many factors concur to the possibility of changing the latter in a
radical fashion - the international dimension, for instance, has been overlooked in this work
but is admittedly a key variable - the love for the leader may prove to be ephemeral and make
it more difficult to adopt those behaviours, the needed civilisation as Gramsci put it, that are
consonant with an emancipatory project. The mere libidinal bond with a person provides too
frail a basis of adherence to the practice for it to have an all-encompassing function. The role
of the leader is thus not denied, but embraced, in the name of the acknowledgment that
inertias can be best unblocked by a figure that can easily become the personification of a
number of heterogeneous societal grievances. This implies an initial search for emptiness that
needs to then be transcended and filled with a new set of social relations, which are in turn
introduced throughout society at large over a reasonable period of time by way of a war of
position that increasingly conquers new spaces in society. In this sense, the leader needs to
make room for this process to occur: the protraction of her/his prominence will risk making
the focus on political society primary with respect to an equally needed level of work in civil
society.
For an agonistic, radical-democratic and ethical left-wing populism
Is it then just a question of a disproportionate insistence on the figure of the leader? The
matter seems to go beyond that. In fact, some elements inherent to the populist model
suggested by Laclau collide with the very intuitions of Laclau and Mouffe's project of radical
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and plural democracy. Is a populist politics construed around the hegemonic model suggested
by Laclau utterly incompatible with the respect for difference and the autonomy of
movements as some suggest? (Khan, 2008; Wenman, 2003) That would be a far-fetched
conclusion. From the start, the normative proposal of radical democracy has been a synonym
of articulation of the different existing struggles. In particular, Laclau and Mouffe stress that
since no privileged point of rupture exists and thus no exclusive subject can be devised, the
imperative is to expand the equivalences, that is bringing into a unified political space a
number of antagonisms, where socialism would be only one of the components (HSS: 152,
178). This roughly amounts to the definition of populism, advocated from an emancipatory
perspective. The further twist is that '[t]he task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce
liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a
radical and plural democracy' (HSS: 176). Mouffe examines this aspect more in depth in her
writings. She conceptualises liberal-democracy as the contingent articulation between the
liberal tradition of the rule of law, human rights and individual liberty on one side, and the
democratic traditions constituted by equality and popular sovereignty on the other (Mouffe,
2000: 2-3). Far from being a linear and smooth process, and despite a mutual contamination
between the two traditions, she views that:
The dominant tendency today consists in envisaging democracy in such a way that it is almost
exclusively identified with the Rechtsstaat and the defence of human rights, leaving aside the element
of popular sovereignty […] creat[ing] a ‘democratic deficit’ (Mouffe, 2000: 4-5).
Under these circumstances, Mouffe advocates a rebalancing of the weight of the two
traditions, whereby the deepening of the democratic control and its extension to more and
more areas of the social should go pari passu with the defence of pluralism. While critical of
economic liberalism, Mouffe is indeed particularly blunt in asserting that '[i]t is only by virtue
of its articulation with political liberalism that the logic of popular sovereignty can avoid
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descending into tyranny' (Mouffe, 1993: 105). In parallel, Mouffe complements her normative
project by incorporating some key suggestions of civic republicanism, such as the
enhancement of political participation and civic virtues (Mouffe, 1993: 19-20).
Is populism in it and for itself inimical of political liberalism, political participation and civic
virtues? That would amount to the adoption of the view held by Bartolini and Urbinati
exposed as in the literature review, by which populism is an intrinsically negative
phenomenon, and negate not only that it can have positive manifestations, but also the more
fundamental intuition that it is a logic that permeates politics through and through. It would
also be inattentive towards the contingent articulations that populism can establish with
other traditions, such as the liberal-republican tradition and that of grassroots movements,
which qualify the relationship between populism and liberal-democracy on a case by case
basis (Panizza, 2008: 92). As we have seen in the chapter on the Ecuadorian Citizens'
Revolution, a left-wing populist project does not always necessarily entertain a relationship
with such traditions, or they may be lost on the way. If populism leans towards a
communitarian conception of the good, often enshrined in the leader, there is no plurality of
struggles to articulate, or alternatively such a plurality becomes frozen and fails to maintain its
dynamic character.58 A left-wing populist experiment is not automatically attentive towards
the differential specificity of each demand and should incorporate a special observance for
the dimension of autonomy if it does not want to recede into a closed notion of the common
good informed by moral rather than political values. This is even truer in contemporary
societies where the rapid proliferation of radically new political spaces makes it difficult to
freeze the notion of the common good in a unitary conception that fails to consider the
58Laclau and Mouffe put this bluntly: '[a] radical and non-plural democracy would be one which constituted
one single space of equality on the basis of the unlimited operation of the logic of equivalence, and did not
recognize the irreducible moment of the plurality of spaces' (HSS: 184).
247
multiplicity and the dynamic evolution of communities and relations that subjects are
enmeshed in (Mouffe, 1993: 20). As a consequence, the will to construe collective identities
nowadays must be informed by a plastic adherence to the ever-changing political sites and, as
shown by the Ecuadorian case, failure to do so runs the risk of generating a deep discomfort
and ultimately the undoing of any equivalential enchainment. As suggested by Howarth: 'the
autonomy and difference of each component should be respected and valued in the
construction and operation of any political coalition' and this becomes possible only to the
extent that 'such an ethos […] inform[s] the democratic subjects who conduct radical
democratic politics, permeating the way they hold their beliefs and demands, as well as the
different ways they interact with each other in different public spaces' (Howarth, 2008: 187).
Which ethos?
Drawing from the Nietzschean tradition, William Connolly develops an ethics concerned with
the question of an ethos that cultivates 'relational dispositions of people', an ethics that 'does
not depend upon the demand to lock all reverence for life into some universal theistic faith,
rational consensus, secular contract, transcendental argument, or interior attunement to a
deep identity' (Connolly, 1995: 27). Specifically, Connolly is in favour of a fluid approach that
shuns the risk of an identitarian or apodictic fossilisation of politics. In this sense, the thought
of Connolly is chiefly aimed at spurring openness to the constant revision and transformation
of identifications (Finlayson, 2010: 11). This is crystallised in his 'politics of becoming', 'a
paradoxical politics by which new cultural identities are formed out of old energies, injuries,
and differences' (Connolly, 1999: 136), whereby a form of critical responsiveness is taken
onboard, which entails 'careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies
struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition,
justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy' (Connolly, 2005: 126).
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But are the approaches of Mouffe and Connolly entirely compatible though? According to
Howarth, whether the two are variants of the same position remains an open question
(Howarth, 2008: 174); on her part, Mouffe is receptive but more dubious:
An 'ethical' perspective is - potentially at least - more conducive to apprehending the limits of reason
and to conceptualizing the plurality of values, and I certainly feel closer to the different approaches that
speak in terms of 'ethics' instead of 'morality'. The problem with them, however, is that, while being
generally more receptive to the role of rhetorics and persuasion and the importance of 'differences',
they either avoid or do not emphasize enough the need to put some limits to pluralism, and they do not
acknowledge the hegemonic nature of every possible consensus and the ineradicable violence that this
implies (Mouffe, 2000: 134).59
In fact, it is to be admitted that the insights of Connolly furnish a precious antidote against the
always pervading threats of self-absorption and self-enclosure of a political practice, but his
thought is principally aimed at a micro-politics of self-modification (Dean, 2006: 44-45). Even
though, as reminded by Howarth (2008: 184), Connolly does engage with questions such as
the state and the suitable type of political organisation in order to forge representational
assemblages (Connolly, 1995: xxi), the overall thrust of his intervention seems to be more
concerned with a personal dimension that fails to engage systematically with the pragmatic
aspects of politics. The solution here seems to lie in the mediation between the respect for
diversity and the attentiveness towards the fluidity and plurality of demands on one side, and
a more realist approach that deals with the complexities of day-to-day political activity on the
other. As for the former task, Connolly remains an indispensable ally.
59This is mostly evident in some passages in which Connolly treats hegemony as a byword for the attempt to
stifle difference and impose a relationship of domination (Connolly, 2002: ix, 9, 10, 34, 40). Yet, there is the
acknowledgement of the possibility of a democratic type of hegemony, whose terms closely resemble the
position endorsed here, i.e. the securing of an ample and diffuse consensus coupled with a the
abandonment of any suturing temptation: '[w]hat I will call a relation of democratic hegemony obtains
when the perspective of an identifiable constellation attains predominance in several areas of public
debate, resisting factions remain effective in publicly articulating the terms of their opposition and
compelling compromises on some of these fronts, and the news media, judiciary, and electoral system
function to keep the terms of contestation among coalitions reasonably open and to protect elemental
rights to life, a significant degree of personal self-governance, freedom of expression, and full citizenship in
a representative government' (Connolly, 2002: 212-213).
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However, it is not just a matter of paying heed to the originality that may emanate from the
demands and avoid suffocating them through an excessive verticalism. Possibly, one of the
greatest traps that a left-wing populism should be careful not to fall into is that of neglecting
contingency altogether. The case of the Citizen's Revolution suggests that what could be
termed a ‘besieged fortress syndrome’ could take place. In other words, in a context
characterised by the promulgation of policies that hit particularly strong interests and the
ensuing attacks from the affected, the friend-enemy logic can take over any other
consideration. In this regard, even the very agonistic model proposed by Mouffe is thrown
into doubt. Let us recall what the difference with radical democracy is. While radical
democracy is a political project among many, a peculiar and radical interpretation of the
liberal-democratic tradition, the agonistic model provides for a fair confrontation between
competing political interpretations and projects (Mouffe in Dreyer Hansen and Sonnichsen,
2014: 266). While the two are not unrelated, it is possible to claim that the latter is specifically
predicated on the acknowledgement of the negativity of the social, that is the ineradicable
characteristic of human societies of being permeated by antagonisms. With Carl Schmitt,
Mouffe indeed maintains that relations among human beings are always permeated by a
hostility that cannot be eliminated (Mouffe, 1993: 2; Mouffe, 2005: 14). However, differently
from Schmitt, for Mouffe such antagonisms ought to be mediated in such a way so as to avoid
seeing one's adversary as an enemy to be destroyed:
The aim of democratic politics thus is to construct a ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as
an enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary’, that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but whose
right to defend those ideas we do not put into question (Mouffe, 2000: 101-102).
What needs to be considered more carefully is that the exacerbation of the friend-enemy
logic inherent to a practice that foregrounds an us/them distinction risks turning populism
into a naturalising and essentialist politics that makes its contingency invisible by trying to
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suture the social. This resurfacing temptation puts the agonistic model under threat, precisely
because it may diminish the tolerance towards opponents and disagreement more generally,
suggesting ways to manage dissent that collocate themselves outside the democratic
perimeter. In the Ecuadorian case we have seen that the lure that such a perspective exercises
on power holders with radical ideas is always around the corner, even when liberal-
democratic institutions are not questioned per se. This does not amount to implying that
politics should be rather viewed as the sphere in which rational beings coldly bargain their
interests. Expressing one's own political passion with the aim of constructing collective
identities is to be encouraged as 'to conceive democratic politics exclusively in terms of a
struggle of a multiplicity of interest groups or of minorities for the assertion of their rights, is
to remain blind to the relations of power' (Mouffe, 2005: 20). Yet, while conflict cannot be
overcome, hostility needs to be domesticated and antagonism defused by abiding to
democratic rules and procedures that make for a common symbolic space in which conflict
can be maintained within a democratic track that respects plurality (Mouffe, 2000: 101;
Mouffe, 2005: 20). It is important to stress here the need for such an approach to be not only
bargained with opponents, but most especially to be assimilated by those who conduct a
leftist populist politics.
More generally, we can say with Panizza that populism may well expose liberalism's blindspot,
but its relationship with democracy can be problematic, especially when a political discourse
'claims to speak for the people as its unmediated representative [...] Taken to the extreme
populism descends into totalitarianism' (Panizza, 2005: 29). Of course, this does not mean
that populism tends necessarily towards totalitarianism. It just means that when advocating
for a left-wing populism, we should not lose sight of the risks it harbours. Let us deepen the
line of reasoning concerning the type of suitable democratic approach by taking a step back.
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Laclau maintains that 'from the fact that there is the impossibility of ultimate closure and
presence, it does not follow that there is an ethical imperative to ‘cultivate’ that openness or
even less to be necessarily committed to a democratic society' (Laclau, 1995: 93; also in E: 77).
This peremptory distancing from the ethical-as-democratic is revealing of a deeper trend, as
Laclau seems to have dedicated more attention to the theoretical rigour of his post-
foundational argument rather than to provide the antibodies against the always latent
temptation of closure. However, it is worth emphasising that deconstruction, a tradition that
to a large extent has shaped Laclau's theorising, 'brings more to political analysis than just a
foregrounding of contingency' (Norval, 2004: 140). By emphasising hesitation, undecidability
calls for an ethics of responsibility. According to Derrida, the subject of the decision must be
guided by 'infinite analysis', by knowledge, by information, as:
political, ethical and juridical responsibility requires a task of infinite close reading. I believe this to be
the condition of political responsibility: politicians should read. Now, to read does not mean to spend
nights in the library; to read events, to analyze situations, to criticize the media […] that’s close reading
(Derrida, 1999: 67).
The experience of the undecidable, which consists of taking a decision and assuming
responsibility for it, constitutes a tragic situation, a terrible experience. While no strict
normative conclusion follows, this kind of experience still cannot leave the subject unmarked.
As Norval argues:
the consequences of undecidability are far-reaching and go all the way down: it affects the manner in
which one conceives of the decision as well as of subjectivity. The effect is one that contours the subject
and his/her engagement in a democratic direction. That is, it does not determine that all subjects aware
of their own contingency and relationality would act in democratic fashion. Derrida, however, has never
claimed anything of this sort. Nothing follows of necessity and by determination from the field of
undecidability. However, it would be equally misjudged to assume that since nothing follows by
necessity, the experience of undecidability has no consequences. Undecidability and its related
philosophemes establish what I would argue are the minimum conditions for the thought of democracy:
in principle openness to an other and a demanding conception of responsibility, conceived in terms of
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taking responsibility and of responding to, or being accountable to, an other or others (Norval, 2004:
152).
According to Critchley, Laclau runs the risk of incurring banality when he argues that the
ethical is something constitutive of all societies (Critchley, 2004: 121). While such a view
seems a bit ungenerous, I support that the ethical is part and parcel of democratic societies
alone. According to Critchley then, 'Laclau's theory of hegemony [and of populism I suggest]
requires an ethical dimension of infinite responsibility to the other if it is not going to risk
collapsing into the arbitrariness of a thoroughgoing decisionism' (Critchley, 2004: 116). Let me
put this clearly: while the ethical-as-‘society is impossible’ merely conveys that dislocation
always brings about the crumbling of any identification in the name of the impossibility of an
ultimate fixation of meaning, the ethical-as-democratic produces significant political
repercussions, as it implies a particular attentiveness to the ways in which a political practice
may undermine the ethical commitment to plurality, to openness, to responsibility and in the
last instance, to put it in the language of Claude Lefort, to the emptiness at the place of
power. Mark Devenney explains well the type of ethics that is involved here, as it:
functions rather differently than for traditional ethics. For it does not predetermine ethical decisions in
advance. It entails serious accounting for every decision, as particular decisions are not prescribed. [...]
Nonetheless, while no decision or action is predetermined by this stance, certain ethical decisions are
excluded if contingency is deemed necessary [...] Indeed, there is no ethics as such, only an orientation
towards the ethical which entails treating contingency seriously, and refusing an absolutism of either
the subject or object (Devenney, 2004: 134).
It is not by chance then that both Norval and Howarth speak of the necessity of a democratic
hegemony and a democratic populism, respectively, thus emphasising the distance between
hegemony and populism tout court (Norval, 2004: 151; Howarth, 2008: 186). Under the logic
that I propose, any normative position must foreground the ethical. This:
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means that our normative stances are always relative to the ultimate contingency of social relations and
practices. [...] the norms and ideals that we project […] are intrinsically contingent, contestable and
revisable. Contingency necessarily penetrates the realm of the normative, which in turn indicates the
need to develop a suitable ethos (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 198).
Is such an ethos part and parcel of left-wing populism? The arbitrariness of thoroughgoing
decisionism that has been one of the hallmarks of the Latin American populist projects,
including that of the Citizens' Revolution, and with which Laclau did not seem to quarrel,
suggests that this may not be so. Equally, the texts of Laclau on populism are tellingly devoid
of such considerations.60 Populism by itself does not provide any guarantee that the Other will
be treated as an adversary and not as an enemy.
This is no doubt a slippery terrain. For some, 'the condition of being active politically is
precisely to be unilateral: the structure of the political act as such is 'essentialist' (Žižek in
Dews and Osborne, 1991: 27). Of course, it would be a caricature to impute to Laclau a
position like this. Indeed, Laclau fully incorporates in the notion of radical democracy the
Lacanian ethics of the real, 'cast in Laclauian terms as a kind of 'respect for the gap', where
gap aims at the constitutive split of the signifier' (Glynos, 1996: 6). Such a recognition entails
that while a libidinal force is indispensable when generating a sustainable identification, the
latter should not necessarily disregard the fundamental lack underlying any symbolic
representation - the Lacanian 'lack in the symbolic Other'. As put by Stavrakakis:
the type of investment has still to be decided. Emptiness and lack can indeed acquire a
positive/institutional expression and can be enjoyed. Instead of functioning as a support for fantasy […]
the partial drive can become the leading force towards a reorientation of enjoyment faithful to the
60It is to be noted that Laclau is not entirely unaware of the problem, but the treatment he gives to it is
notably scant and mostly related to the question of the respect for the autonomy of the demands. 'What is,
however, true, is that between the political centrality of the leader - and of the bureaucratic power that
surrounds him - on one side, and, on the other, the autonomy of the grassroots movements, the danger of
a tension that can only be resolved through incessant political negotiation will always exist' (Laclau, 2006:
119-120).
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positive/negative dialectics. Only thus shall we be able to really enjoy our partial enjoyment, without
subordinating it to the cataclysmic desire of fantasy (Stavrakakis, 2007: 282).
An unmediated fantasy can in fact be problematic for both radical democracy and the
agonistic model. The mode of investment to be promoted should be non-ideological, whereby
the ideological 'consist[s] of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity,
of the impossibility of any ultimate suture' (Laclau, 1983: 24). Rather, the mode of investment
should be associated with an alternative approach that comprehends and takes into due
account the contingency of social relations, maintaining an openness towards new,
unexplored possibilities. It is my contention that such an attitude, which by necessity implies
an ironic thrust that thickens one's normative commitment with an ethical approach, is
particularly difficult to achieve in the light of the prominence of the leader. While charisma
may be a necessary ingredient of the affective dimension of any project that seeks to dislodge
previous political identifications and pull together diverse demands, the perpetuation creates
a dependence that blinds followers and fosters an aggressive mode of militancy. Not only, it
also fails to construe a genuine and durable hegemony. To sum up, it is paramount to think in
terms of a democratic populism that construes equivalencies between subjectivities without
ceding to the leadership cult, respecting the autonomy of each component involved in the
construction of an emancipatory political coalition and accepting the common rules of the
game, that is accepting defeat and contestation (Howarth, 2008: 186-187). This in turn is the
only available route towards a different and democratic type of hegemony.
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Conclusion
This work started by interrogating the validity of the notions of populism and hegemony in the
corpus of Ernesto Laclau. The two concepts possibly constitute the most visible categories
through which he has made himself known. My own personal political and intellectual
experience familiarised me with the two notions in separate and very distinct environments
and to wonder whether both contained fundamental insights for the analysis of political
phenomena as well as for the exploration of new avenues for emancipatory action. As stated
in the introduction, Laclau provides a fascinating and theoretically potent synthesis between
the two, which incorporates both the Italian insights of Gramsci and the PCI, and the Latin
American ‘innate’ inclination for populism where his political upbringing took place, while
fusing them in a post-structuralist architecture that foregrounds the importance of
contingency. The latter carries enormous weight insofar as the status of his theorising is
concerned. Crucially, it is not only the militant origin of Laclau's preoccupations that make his
thought eminently strategic. Much of the strategic thrust resides indeed in the very political
ontology that Laclau postulates, by which the hiatus between the ontological and the ontic
remains fundamentally unbridgeable. This provides for a flexible and dynamic approach that
shuns any pretension to fix a universal or a ground once and for all, thus recognising the
importance of continuous articulations between heterogeneous elements.
Yet, despite devising new analytical and strategic roads, the framework of Laclau needs to be
considered itself as contingent and open to constant modifications, and this has been
precisely the idea behind the work hitherto conducted. Faithful to the retroductive approach
adopted by the Essex school of discourse analysis, such a revision has taken a triple route. To
begin with, it has focused on a theoretical exploration aimed at individuating the precise
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development of the two notions in Laclau. By adopting a mixed methodological apparatus
informed by the Foucauldian genealogical approach and the Skinnerian history of political
thought, I have tried to reconstruct the birth, evolution and variations of populism and
hegemony in his corpus, while trying to locate theoretical and real-world influences, pinpoint
flaws, trace intellectual connections and situate populism and hegemony within the broader
context of political theory/science. Despite recognising the great potential enshrined in the
conceptualisations of Laclau, the first theoretical round raises a number of questions. Some of
these issues are worth reiterating. Firstly, populism and hegemony maintain a conceptual
proximity, to the extent that they may be said to be partly overlapping in Laclau. This
jeopardises the theoretical cogency of the two categories and negatively hampers their
strategic usefulness. Secondly, Laclau lays excessive emphasis on the question of antagonism
and does not provide an adequate conceptualisation of this crucial notion. This complicates
the possibility of a fruitful understanding of the differential character of any substantial
hegemonic relationship and confines the pertinence of hegemony to modern times, thus
failing to provide a genuine a-temporal political ontology. Thirdly, Laclau seems to leave
behind some of the promising insights of Gramsci that were once fully active in his thought.
Specifically, by excessively focussing on the signifier to the detriment of the signified, Laclau's
hegemony seems to merely indicate the instability of any system and to lose sight of the
contents that actually become hegemonic. Finally, the status of the empty signifier is
uncertain and lends itself to misunderstandings, with the question of the leader emerging as
particularly problematic.
Concurrently, this work has taken the empirical question seriously through the analysis of two
emblematic cases: the Italian Communist Party's trajectory and the Ecuadorian Citizens'
Revolution. While the former has been historically associated with the notion of hegemony,
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the latter has sparked much talk of populism. The aim of this empirical section has been to
deploy the theoretical apparatus of Laclau in order to analyse both its merits and limitations
from an analytical and strategic point of view. In particular, the case studies are deemed as
essential in the elaboration of a sound ontology in a to-and-fro movement between the
empirical and the theoretical. What are the lessons that these two cases teach us? The PCI
speaks of a practice that managed to articulate a number of different demands and symbols
that did not naturally tend to converge. In a sense, it created a broad popular pole, irreducible
to its former identity as the mere representative of the working class. Yet, its particular empty
signifier, communism, despite being emptied of much of its original contents, was still too full
to become a singularity capable of becoming the rallying point of a plurality of sectors, as
Laclau himself admits (OPR: 185). In other words, it was not a societal horizon that could be
emptied at will, but rather the nodal point of a distinct discourse that, in the historical
conditions of the Cold War, had a hard time converting itself into a surface of inscription for
the majority of grievances existing in the Italian society. Nevertheless, the PCI rooted itself in
the country, by establishing deep and capillary ramifications in both political and civil society
and by cultivating a truly alternative political alphabet. This strongly impacted the ideology
and habits of millions of men and women as well as the way in which they experienced social
relations and, although indirectly, the content and shape of public policies. Over time, such an
alterity with the rest of the system faded. At its basic core there was a paradoxical situation:
despite its counter-hegemonic attitude, the party constantly searched for compromise with
other political forces. Even though up to a point the constitution of a ‘people’ took place
against the background of a political frontier that was not always so marked, the privileging of
the work of alliances in the political rather than in the civil society meant the gradual
introjection of the motives of their adversaries and the difficulty of maintaining a fundamental
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diversity with rest of the system. This was only the prelude for the incorporation of the
communists into the camp that they had historically opposed.
The Ecuadorian Citizen's Revolution displayed different attributes. Although, in the terms of
Laclau, an equivalential chain between a variety of demands and symbols was also created,
this political practice was fundamentally dissimilar. Differently from the PCI, it swiftly
conquered political power understood as electoral share and, despite this, a stark frontier
with the rest of the political system was maintained throughout the whole period. While this
made for a strong articulatory potential at the beginning, things changed after a few years as
such a division started to become a source of a societal discomfort. Even more importantly,
the Ecuadorian Citizen's Revolution failed to go beyond electoral victory, thus demonstrating
its incapacity to conduct a wide and differentiated struggle in civil society and to give birth to
a more sustainable hegemony. Among other things, this was also made difficult by the
excessive centrality of the leader. Moreover, although Rafael Correa can legitimately be
considered the real cement that spurred the articulation of diverse demands and provided the
spark that removed the initial inertias running against political change, the prolongation and
intensification of his role gave rise to a cult of the personality and, in turn, to a suppression of
deliberation within the popular camp and an approach that put pluralism at risk.
How do we make sense of these cases from a theoretical viewpoint? This is the point at which,
in a third and final move, the empirical and the initial theoretical discussion merge into a full-
blown proposal that reformulates some of the coordinates of Laclau's theoretical edifice while
maintaining intact its overall thrust. Faithful to the problematisation approach by which
unexplored or forgotten possibilities are mobilised again, this exercise has been conducted by
way of a re-Gramscianisation of Laclau, both by recuperating insights of Gramsci that once
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played a major role in Laclau and by taking into account others that were entirely overlooked.
The first notable intervention concerns the distance between populism and hegemony. While
the former designates a construction of political meaning that can prove ephemeral and is
mostly concerned with the outright contestation of a political regime, the latter entails an
always contingent but nevertheless much more subtle and pervasive influence of a particular
normativity. Such normative contents are not granitic as they always intertwine with
ideological elements of different provenience; yet, it is necessary to carefully maintain the
focus on the signified rather than on the signifier and understand which particular worldview
takes hold in a social formation. The road to separate out populism and hegemony in Laclau is
that of providing plural conceptions of space and time, as opposed to the singular conception
that he upholds. Here, the attention is directed at the existence of a myriad of sites of the
social through which a particular hegemony is sanctioned. In other words, it does not suffice
to conquer political power: the success of a political project that wishes to challenge the
status quo and steer a social formation towards a meaningful emancipatory process is
determined by its capacity to spread across the various fortresses of civil society. In order to
talk about hegemony then, a practice needs to conduct its struggle not only in the political
realm stricto sensu, which is to be associated with populism, but in much more enlarged
terms. As for the question of time, each present is pierced by a singular time that sets the
contours of the political game and determines the asymmetric plane in which day-to-day
political disputes are conducted. The latter corresponds to a plural temporality, whereby
different projects are in (unequal) competition with each other. Populism clearly pertains to
the latter register, while hegemony to the former: it is only when populism manages to make
its influence felt across society as a whole that space and time come to coincide and a project
evolves from the plural to the singular temporality.
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Some further details that specify the scope of the reformulated notion of hegemony are
provided. Contrary to populism which entails a certain ambiguity, a certain emptiness, as it is
predicated on the uneasy clustering of dispersed elements, hegemony is instead concerned
with fulness, that is with a pedagogical and adaptive side that needs in turn to be informed by
sound analysis and normative contents. Further to this, hegemony also defines the capacity to
go beyond the cursory domain of infatuation with a political project and become instilled in
concrete habits, such that a molecular change that transforms subjectivities and spurs a far-
reaching moral and ideological reform takes place. Finally, hegemony is not a normative
project and cannot be reduced to a particular project and, by the same token, it cannot be
treated as a synonym of democracy. The political game as such is hegemonic and no
articulatory predominance takes place outside its canons.
Possibly, thinking strategically from an emancipatory perspective means thinking both
populistically and hegemonically, where by populism and hegemony, however, we refer to
two different things. Populism à-la Laclau remains an effective weapon for contesting an
existing political regime and create new majorities, drawing on elements of common sense
and creating equivalences out of the rejection against a common opponent. Hegemony,
however, is to be understood as building a consensus around a new culture and civilisation,
which envisages a war of position with a ‘geography’ and a timing very different from those of
populism, which is typically bent towards a change in political society rather than civil society
and has imminence as its privileged temporal horizon. A sound emancipatory strategy should
therefore be able to reach a mediation between the ‘emptiness’ of populism and the ‘fullness’
of hegemony: a strategy, in other words, able to deal with ambiguity without being
overwhelmed by it.
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Moreover, I advocate that both populism and hegemony need to be democratically inflected
in a left-wing, emancipatory project. This is particularly true for populism, whose
implementation has been marked by some worrying tendencies insofar as its democratic
credentials are concerned, as the Ecuadorian case shows. In particular, the desirability of
prolonging the centrality of the leader is questioned. In the long run, the excessive weight of
the leader threatens to suppress deliberation in the popular camp, and to make the role of
the led passive and impede the undertaking of a war of position in society that modifies
common sense. Even more importantly, left populism needs to be reconciled with the project
of radical democracy and the agonistic model proposed by Mouffe. As for the former, this
means that populism should not withdraw into a closed version of the common good but
needs to maintain itself open to the ever-changing plurality of demands and components
aspiring to transform society. Insofar as the latter is concerned, populism has to respect
disagreement, and heed pluralism, thus avoiding the temptation to curtail opponents' rights.
By taking onboard the ethical insights of Derrida, Connolly and Lacan, it is here proposed that
those who conduct a left-wing populist practice need to incorporate an ethos that fully
acknowledges the contingency of social relations and the impossibility of fixing a meaning
once and for all.
Finally, this work has attempted to be faithful to the idea of connecting emancipatory theory
with emancipatory practice. The former often insulates itself in its concepts and convoluted
jargon, and ends up providing little help to the elaboration of novel, original and effective
political practices. The hiatus between two is thus seldom bridged. Even though this work is
no exception in the use of a specialised language, it has put special attention on rendering its
findings relevant and concrete to praxis. Whether or not it has at least partly lived up to this
aim is up to the reader, and particularly to the practioners of political theory and politics
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proper, to decide. Yet this piece of work should not be seen as a conclusive contribution, but
as a first approximation to a number of issues that my exposure to both political conundrums
and theoretical elaborations has given way to. Not only answers have been provided, as
between the lines new questions have emerged. I will mention only a few. From the point of
view of the empirical research, the degenerative arch of the PCI seems to have a bearing on
the current sorry state of the left in Italy. What are the political and cultural drawbacks that
saw their genesis during the PCI experience and that still impact upon its leftist heirs in Italy
today? Similarly, the decline of the Ecuadorian populist experience could be analysed within
the broader regional context of the ‘pink tide’. The similar fate of the Venezuelan, Argentinian
and Brazilian left experiments begs a comparative study. The need for a potent, honest and
self-reflexive account of the recent errors and flaws of the left in the Latin American continent
is urgent. What about theory? The oeuvre of Ernesto Laclau is an open mine which provides a
variety of stimuli. The exploration and mediation of his influences is a fruitful field of inquiry.
Further work in the study and in the renegotiation of Laclau's political and theoretical
connections with the aim of refining his theoretical edifice as well as revitalising the
emancipatory potential of the latter is paramount. In this sense, the reincorporation of
Gramsci conducted so far is only a first step towards more a more far-reaching restructuration
of the encounter between Laclau and the Italian thinker.
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Appendix A
Interviews
Luciana Castellina (Interview 1)
Date of the interview: 9/1/2016
Place: Rome
Consent for quotation: given
Language of the interview: Italian
Short biography: Born in 1929. Leading member of the PCI from 1947 to 1970 and from 1984 to 1991.
In the 1960s she was a close collaborator of Pietro Ingrao. In 1970 she was expelled from the PCI for
factionalism after the publishing of the dissenting magazine il manifesto.
Maria Lisa Cinciari Rodano (Interview 2)
Date of the interview: 11/1/2016
Place: Rome
Consent for quotation: given
Language of the interview: Italian
Short biography: Born in 1921. Leading member of the PCI from 1944 to 1991. She was the first
woman to become Vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies in Italian history (1963-1968). Her
husband, Franco Rodano, was a very close advisor to both Palmiro Togliatti and Enrico Berlinguer.
Alfredo Reichlin (Interview 3)
Date of the interview: 12/1/2016
Place: Rome
Consent for quotation: given
Language of the interview: Italian
Short biography: Born in 1925. Leading member of the PCI from 1946 to 1991. He was a PCI's MP from
1968 until its dissolution. He was a member of the National Executive Office of the PCI in the 1970s
and a close collaborator of Enrico Berlinguer. He died in 2017.
Aldo Tortorella (Interview 4)
Date of the interview: 12/1/2016
Place: Rome
Consent for quotation: given
Language of the interview: Italian
Short biography: Born in 1926. Leading member of the PCI from 1946 to 1991. From 1970 to 1975 he
was the director the PCI's daily newspaper L’Unità. He was a PCI's MP from 1972 until its dissolution.
Initially a follower of Enrico Berlinguer, he then opposed the choice of the historic compromise.
